SEPTEMBER 1967

Commentary

Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited

A SYMPOSIUM:

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THE NEW AUSTRIA & THE OLD NAZIS
Paul Lendvai

MOVING THE MIKVEH
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
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Commentary

SEPTEMBER 1967
NUMBER 3
VOLUME 44

A Symposium

Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited **31**

The Old Austria & The New Nazis **81** PAUL LENDVAI

Observations

Moving the Mikveh **89** SANFORD J. UNGAR

Letters from Readers **6**

Books in Review

Washington, D.C., by Gore Vidal **93** WILFRID SHEED

The Reconstruction of the Nation, by Rembert W. Patrick **94** DAVID DONALD

Eustace Chisholm and the Works, by James Purdy **98** WARREN COFFEY

The Supreme Court Review, 1966, edited by Philip B. Kurland **103** ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN

The Chosen, by Chaim Potok; The 28th Day of Elul, by Richard M. Elman; Thou Worm Jacob, by Mark Mirsky **107** BARUCH HOCHMAN

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

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About a mile outside the Korean village of Ku Am there are a few dozen young, still-tender mulberry trees growing on a small hill. Someday these trees and their succulent leaves will be the heart of a new village industry—a silk raising farm. That day is still many months off, but it doesn't stop the village men from making daily inspection treks up the steep hill, just in case. Just in case something miraculous has happened since yesterday. After all, it wouldn't be the first miracle to happen in Ku Am. Everyone in the village knows the story of Chang Sook, the daughter of the widow.

Ten years ago Chang Sook's chances of survival were as slim as she was. Her father had disappeared during the family's flight from North Korea. Her mother, a seamstress, worked a backbreaking day and most of the evening to earn $10 a month. Barely enough to keep them from starving.

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

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LETTERS FROM READERS

The Review Board

To the Editor of Commentary:

I have little quarrel with Milton Himmelfarb's contention ["Are Jews Still Liberals?" April] that the vote against the civilian review board in New York City's 1966 referendum was a vote against New Left demonstrations at Berkeley and Cambridge, occasionally excessive and unwarranted cries of police brutality at racial demonstrations in New York City and Philadelphia, and a variety of other symptoms of civic disorder. However, I am not sure that Mr. Himmelfarb's analysis supports his conclusion, which seems to be that Jews are no less liberal than they used to be.

At stake in the review board referendum was basically a very simple proposition: are persons with no organizational connection to either of the two parties to a dispute better judges of the dispute than persons who have an organizational connection to one of the parties? That such a simple question could entirely disappear from view and that the referendum campaign could become entirely an outlet for pent-up resentments against Negroes and Puerto Ricans and New Left activists seems to be a very significant measure of illiberalism. That Jews were less subject to this growing illiberalism than other groups of whites in New York City is true and is demonstrated by the figures cited by Mr. Himmelfarb. Nevertheless, a Jewish backlash vote was more clearly in evidence in the review board vote than ever before.

My personal experiences during the referendum campaign lead me to believe that the breakdown of the Jewish vote was a little more complex than Mr. Himmelfarb indicates. With the possible exception of Norman Frank, chief spokesman for the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (with whom I frequently debated), I suspect that I did more public speaking on the review board issue than anyone else. Many of the audiences before which I spoke were predominantly Jewish. As might have been expected, the intellectually oriented Jews in their 20's to 40's who comprised much of my audience in, say, the ten or eleven reform democratic clubs before which I spoke were heavily pro-review board. Also, as might have been expected, the Jews in their 30's to 50's, many of them owners or partners in small businesses, who comprised much of my audience in the many synagogues, Jewish centers, and YMHA's before which I spoke in Brooklyn and Queens, were much less sympathetic to the review board. But, most interestingly to me, a third variety of predominantly Jewish audience (before which I didn't get to speak as often as I would have liked) turned out to be strongly for the review board.

This third variety consisted of Jews with a working-class background mostly in their 50's to 70's, who comprised the audience at the Workmen's Circle groups before which I spoke, and at the Educational Alliance on East Broadway. These audiences seemed to have an ability to identify with the victims of injustice that simply did not exist among either the young intellectual pro-review board groups I had spoken to or the middle aged, middle-class, not-so-pro-review board groups.

Mr. Himmelfarb castigates the leaders of the fight for the review board for fighting the wrong fight. "Naturally," he says "the leaders blame everyone else."

I suppose I am about to prove his point by blaming if not someone else, then *something* else. That *something* is the feature of New York law that made the review board issue referendable. Clearly, if there were a method of putting the state's laws on job discrimination or housing discrimination on the ballot, those would be the wrong fights. If the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision could have been put on the ballot, that would have been the wrong fight. In fact, in California, it was possible to put the state's law against discrimination in housing on the ballot and it lost by an even heavier vote than the review board in New York City—and two years earlier, when the "backlash" wasn't as great. A civilian review board is just as right as school desegregation, and anti-discrimination legislation in employment and housing. But none of those issues could possibly win at the polls.

Mr. Himmelfarb ends by suggesting that "if liberals had proposed measures to protect citizens

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

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

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against bureaucrats, everyone would have cheered. Instead, they singled out the police; and the white voter mutinied." In 1965, I was one of those who helped secure the introduction of, and tried to generate support for, bills in the New York City Council and the New York State Legislature to create, respectively, city and state ombudsmen. In 1966 and again in 1967, similar measures have been introduced. If Mr. Himmelfarb will tell us how to generate a little more cheering, perhaps we will get someplace.

ARYEH NEIER
Executive Director
New York Civil Liberties Union
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Last November two out of every three New York voters opposed the civilian review board, while Californians gave Ronald Reagan a one-million-vote majority. At face value these are significant, frightening political developments. But Milton Himmelfarb (in an analysis based substantially on a recent American Jewish Committee report on the 1966 elections) has apparently decided that nothing out of the ordinary happened. If racist and right-wing voting is called ordinary, it will lose its power to shock us; and we will accept behavior beyond what we can now only imagine. But Himmelfarb knows that something is wrong, so scapegoats must be found, and whatever is out of the ordinary is projected from the mainstream onto precisely those who call attention to the outrages committed by the society. Somehow Reagan and the review board get blamed on the New Left.

In New York, we are told, the average citizen was not a racist; but the campaign forced a choice between violence and crime on the one hand, and the police on the other. But who defined the campaign that way? Not the pro-board forces surely; only a few intemperate slogans about "police states" were scrawled on walls. Why did Himmelfarb's New Yorkers believe the slogans? Voters who see civilian control of police as leading to lawlessness have a frightening, racist mentality. The fact that Himmelfarb's nice Italians and nice old Jewish couples, saw things that way only suggests what the Negro—and the rest of us—face now in America. Himmelfarb would rather not face this; instead he blames Berkeley New Leftists, the Philadelphia

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

















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




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



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

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NAACP, and Harvard students who protested McNamara's visit. Against a university which brings police on campus, or a government which murders civilians in Asia, emotion is apparently impermissible. But we can be so understanding about emotional antipathy to demonstrations and "crime," or emotional support for the police.

On California, Himmelfarb devotes most of his space to New Left opposition to Brown, although the movement hardly had the votes to make a dent in Reagan's plurality. (To assert, as Himmelfarb does, that some leftists *supported* Reagan, is slanderous. Perhaps a handful of such people could be found, though I never before heard of any; certainly they were without political significance.) Shocked at New Left "pre-Hitler Communist" tactics ("more common on the Left than just before Hitler came to power"), Himmelfarb finds that Reagan conducted a moderate campaign—though how anyone who watched the hysterical intensity of his television spot announcements, or listened to his attacks on the university, on "welfare," on fair-housing, and on crime, can still say that, is beyond me.

If this country becomes as repressive at home as it is abroad, the New Left and the militant civil-rights groups will be the first to suffer. How convenient if we can believe they brought it on themselves. One need not then explore the sources of extremism that reach from the nice Southern rancher in the White House and his nice New Deal shadow to the nice suburbanites in California and the nice Italians in New York. Do Jews still need to be reminded of what nice, ordinary people, with whose problems we can all sympathize, are capable?

MICHAEL ROGIN
Department of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . The statement that more than 50 per cent of the Jews voted for the civilian review board is at once the cornerstone and the weakest point of the Himmelfarb argument. Given the accuracy of that statistic, why does the remaining 45 per cent of voting Jews, which traditionally votes Democratic, and so overwhelmingly voted against Goldwater, now align itself with the forces of conservatism? The rather simple answer is that the Jews

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

voted in favor of more protection in the streets (though whether we're getting it is debatable, in the light of daily newspaper reports of crimes of violence).

In the areas of economics and foreign policy, Jews will still vote for the liberal approach, but when the issues become personal . . . such as forced busing of schoolchildren and protection from physical violence, we will eschew the casuistry, and vote our own self-interest.

WALTER MEYER
Brooklyn, New York

MR. HIMMELFARB writes:

Mr. Neier's simple proposition is that the civilians on the New York civilian review board were impartial, having no organizational connection with anyone. Among other things, simple is ingenuous; but the proposition is disingenuous.

Let's look at the board through the eyes of the people, policemen and voters alike, it was his job to win over. The chairman was an NAACP vice-president; and what's more, an Ethical Culture "leader," *vulgariter* clergyman (which is to say, a Jew who wasn't even a Jew) —the very type of the reflex liberal. The other members were a Negro professor of education, a salaried official of the Puerto Rican community, and a lawyer active in the Catholic Interracial Council. If these are unconnected, what would it take for Mr. Neier to call them connected? Would a policeman expect fairness from them? Would a voter expect them to give due weight to his anxieties about violence and disorder? They weren't just civilians, they were civilians of a special kind. That it was precisely they who were named to the board only confirmed the suspicions of the police and the friends of the police. After all, the mayor could have appointed, say, a Negro former policeman and a Puerto Rican former assistant district attorney. Justice must not only be done, it must manifestly be seen to be done. That legal maxim is good for public relations, too.

In those same days Mr. Neier was prominent in the news for something else, besides—and it wasn't for advocating an ombudsman. Mr. Neier was busy denouncing federally-aided remedial and enrichment services for parochial-school students, and he was further endearing himself to Catholic voters by calling the parochial school a refuge for racists. Did he expect that to enhance the political value of

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

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his testimonials for the review board?

Watching the Civil Liberties Union assures me, in a way I don't think it intends, that civil liberties must be in superb health. When I first became aware of the Civil Liberties Union, it was protecting Norman Thomas's right to speak in Jersey City against Mayor Hague and his "I am the law." Now, apparently, the big thing left for it to worry about is that some wicked people think the Constitution's separation of church and state is separationist enough for New York State.

Do me a favor, Mr. Neier. If someone tries to censor me, fight for me in court; but if I want to do something political—for instance, putting across a civilian review board—don't tell anybody you're on my side. With you for a friend, I wouldn't need enemies. Most voters aren't like you and me, enlightened and far-seeing. For them the Civil Liberties Union is the organization that defends flag desecrators and prevents kindergarten children from pronouncing, over their milk and cookies, "God is great, God is good,/And we thank Him for our food." That can win approval only among an elite who understand the doctrine of action as symbolic speech, which must therefore be allowed; and who also understand that children uttering that unutterable word are guilty of a deed which must be forbidden.

Mr. Neier likes government by the judiciary, but this time it was the referendum crowd that went to court, and got the decision it wanted.

I wish I could agree about the immigrant, working-class Jews. Many of them read the *Forward*. By now the joke is no longer new that the *Forward* used to have one man taking care of all letters to the editor, but has had to add a specialist for letters complaining about what happens to people in nice neighborhoods when those newcomers move in. Still, the Jews, including working-class Jews, remain more liberal than others.

As to Mr. Rogin: Those Harvard students didn't just protest against McNamara, they tried to manhandle him. Emotion? It was violence—and by the privileged, as far removed as can be from all that might excuse the violence of the poor, humiliated, and excluded, in Watts or Hough or Roxbury.

Mr. Rogin evidently fears and despises the people in this country.

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Really, they're no worse than others, and better than most. They aren't Nazi storm troopers; and they're less scary than the Red Guards who would compel them to be virtuous. It has been remarked that out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made. These awful people are normal, crooked humanity. Why should a political scientist have to be reminded of such an elementary thing?

I wrote: "The experts kept saying that whether the review board won or lost, actual police brutality would hardly be affected one way or the other. . . ." I notice Mr. Rogin doesn't dispute that.

A warm heart, by all means—and a cool head. "Himmelfarb finds that Reagan conducted a moderate campaign—though how anyone . . . can still say that is beyond me." When cardiac heat becomes cephalic a man can forget how to read: what I wrote was that "Reagan was careful not to sound like an extremist." How could I say that? By relying on such arcane documents as *Newsweek* (October 31, 1966): "From the beginning [Reagan] never looked like an extremist; now with his old right-wing views muted, he doesn't even sound like one. . . . So far, Reagan has avoided direct exploitation of the backlash issue. . . . There is no hysterical adulation among his followers—the new, middle-roading Reagan wouldn't want it. . . ." This isn't from a pro-Reagan journal; and the report is contemporaneous with the campaign, not a retrospective explanation of Reagan's victory.

Why had Mr. Rogin never before heard of any leftists who supported Reagan? Were my esoteric sources unavailable to him?—some colleagues of his in his own part of the country, and the obscure Herbert Gold in the obscure New York *Times* Magazine (December 11, 1966): "The *Ramparts* and New Left intellectuals, many of them, were hoping for a Reagan victory for a complex of reasons, including a desire to embarrass the President, resentment of Brown's temporizing and muddling, a doctrinaire conviction that things have to get very bad before they can improve, a greedy desire for the bright target of Reagan and perhaps, for some, a naive anarchism." And Gold is well-disposed to the New Left. When it is the follies of the Right that he is mocking, his language is lively. With the Left, his language can become wooden.

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

The "piece work" poet

"Oh, here in the shop the machines roar on madly
I often forget I'm alive, or have been
I sink and am lost in the awful tumult;
And void is my soul; I become a machine."

Morris Rosenfeld was his name. His lot was the sewing machine, steam iron and intolerable conditions of New York's 19th century garment industry. And his destiny, ultimately, was an invitation to read his poetry – in simple, unadorned Yiddish–before the scholars of Harvard, Wellesley and Radcliffe.

Born in Poland in 1862, Morris, at 24, was withering on a diet of persecution and poverty, and escaped with his family to America. Like most Jewish immigrants, he found underpaid work in the garment trades; and soon began to describe, in verse, the numbing, dulling, grinding, despairing plight of the needle worker.

At first, his writings were published only in the lesser Yiddish papers. But they were sung and resung in the shops and in the workers' meetings. And they were memorized and chanted by the lowly in their tenements. Thus it was until 1897, when a Harvard professor, Leo Wiener, translated some of Rosenfeld's work into English and published it as "Songs of the Ghetto".

Rosenfeld quickly gained international renown. He was translated into French, German, Polish. Into Roumanian and Russian – even Japanese. He toured Europe and was acclaimed in England, Austria and Galicia. The songs – and praises – of the Yiddish poet were sung world-wide!

In the movement to outlaw the sweatshop, Morris Rosenfeld was a cultural force. For, while those about him sewed and suffered in silence, the immigrant poet raised a small, yet eloquent voice. A significant voice. And it was heard.

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Mr. Rogin is a university teacher of political science and a political activist, yet he says that as late as April 1967 he had never heard of something that any political scientist should have heard of and that an activist had a special interest in hearing of. Look at the position that puts him in. Either he really had heard of it, and was fudging in his letter; or he was telling the truth, and was more ignorant than anyone like him has a right to be. If ignorant, he must have wanted to be.

But that sort of thing almost begins to resemble what we mean by the *trahison des clercs*, doesn't it?

California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Possibly the most interesting note in James Q. Wilson's "A Guide to Reagan Country" [May] is the one on which he concludes. If our democratic system is likely to be torn apart in the effort to take up moral issues, is it not likely to fall apart if it does not?

In any case, Mr. Wilson mistakenly finds solace in the position of the Catholic Church. Only an ostrich would conclude in the era of Vatican II that the Church "draws the religious and moral interests of its followers inward"! For better or worse, morally-loaded questions are now going on the public agenda; for better or worse, the Catholic Church is in the vanguard of this movement—as to some degree are most of the churches.

JAMES M. ROHERTY
Department of Government
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

... Mr. Wilson is absolutely correct when he states that to a Southern Californian (and many in the North as well) a candidate's position on private property is more important than his views on Vietnam or civil rights or crime in the streets.... Southern Californians were utterly dismayed at the Watts riots because that part of Los Angeles is so much different from the riot areas of Cleveland or Chicago or New York. Watts is a community of single dwellings, devoid of teeming tenements, etc. Its streets are clean, neat, and shaded.... There is more Negro family life in Watts than in any other Negro community. In short, it seemed that the Negro of Watts shared with his white neighbor a few miles away

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

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. . . an apparent desire for private property, an attempt at family stability, and a comparatively conservative mood. Not unlike many people in the South, Southern Californians blamed much of the trouble in Watts on "outside forces" who misunderstood the dynamics of Los Angeles life and persisted in a diabolical attempt to equate life in California with that in New York.

Although on the surface all this seems patently opposed to reality, it is closer to the truth than many care to admit. There is in Watts, and elsewhere in the Negro and Mexican communities, a strong tendency on the part of the Negroes to join the white citizen in his desire for property, order, support of local police, and less interference by federal agencies. Easterners may well be amazed at the degree of conservatism prevalent among many Negroes. Ronald Reagan, the arch-conservative, did quite well in Negro precincts and actually carried many a Mexican-American ward. . . . Interestingly enough, California Jews too are probably more conservative than Jews in other parts of the country, Mississippi and Alabama excluded. Although the more vociferous among Jews tend to follow the liberal (and Democratic) line, there is a great body of Los Angeles Jews who are neither liberal, nor Democrats. . . . .

Quite contrary to popular Eastern notions, the repeal of all fair housing measures is not supported only by racial bigots. Many a decent Californian believes that the disposition of private property is a sacred act into which the government may not inject itself save for tax purposes. The potential for discrimination is a small price to pay for the right to select the person to whom property is offered for sale or rent. . . .

. . . Easterners have great difficulty understanding California politics, partly because they fail, or refuse to understand, the criteria upon which it is based. . . .

[Rabbi] ISRAEL B. KOLLER
Santa Barbara, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Mr. Wilson's conclusion that the recent California open-housing referenda are manifestations of support for property rights is based on some facts, but on a larger degree of wishful thinking. He obviously did not go door-to-door on this issue and encounter the good ladies of Southern California. . . ; nor did he

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

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examine the Los Angeles police department bulletin boards for their ladies'-auxiliary-type call to arms in 1964. But he might have been expected to take into consideration the August 1964 Opinion Research of California Survey which indicated that one-third of the Los Angelinos asked concluded that Negroes and Mexican Americans should not have the right to "buy a private home that someone will sell to them." (One of four in the entire state similarly separated from the property-righters on this issue.)

Once the voter could clothe his prejudice in sacred property rights, an election could be won in 1964. Several political analysts have suggested that a close examination of the public opinion polls indicates that the entire 1966 election battle in California was waged on the basis of a code language in which the Negro was equated with immorality, violence, and lack of respect for property rights. Thus a voter could express opposition to Negro rights and still maintain race was not an issue. Needless to say, this was a selective morality since the same voters were not concerned with failure to obey California laws on housing code violations in slum areas, or failure to obtain fair employment practices legislation (or even with the assessor scandals that hurt everyone)....

E. LESTER LEVINE
Washington, D.C.

MR. WILSON writes:

I think Mr. Roherty misunderstands my point. Of course the Catholic Church is deeply involved in current issues. But my argument as to its introspective and apolitical tendencies refers to the effect of its religious and communal life on its parishioners, not to the institutional and public positions it takes. I think the observation is supported by the distinctive and conservative role played by most Catholic politicians, civic leaders, and trade union officials in contrast to the equally distinctive and more radical role played by Jews occupying equivalent positions. Mr. Roherty and I might agree that the potential tension between the psychological product of the Church and the positions now being taken by its liberal spokesmen may have important consequences for American politics.

Mr. Levine, on the other hand, does not even try to understand my point. I am perfectly aware that there are bigots in Southern California and that many of them were brought out of the woodwork by the fair-housing referendum. I would hope he might forbear from so vigorously restating the obvious and consider that, on the basis of the poll he quotes, it is quite possible that if every voter opposed in principle to equal rights for minorities had been disfranchised, the fair-housing bill might still have been repealed. His general point—that "the entire 1966 election" was in California waged on the basis of a "code" in which the Negro was equated with immorality, violence, etc.—is even more pernicious. Again, that there are many voters who interpret a concern for crime as code language for being anti-Negro can be easily conceded, but I am not aware of any evidence that the millions who voted for Reagan were all equally gifted cryptographers, or felt that crime was only an evil if Negroes committed it. Worse than being wrong, however, his point is strategically ill-advised. I would like to see the

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

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

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Democratic party win again in California; I do not believe it can if it acts as if it must stigmatize as "anti-Negro" any popular concern for crime, violence, immorality, or the like. Conceding to the Republicans a concern for those issues may be tantamount to conceding the election.

Vietnam

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Oscar Gass's defense of American intervention in Vietnam demonstrates the messianic beliefs and moral insensitivity of those "pragmatists" who find their little scale-model, games-theory concepts adequate to cope with the issues raised by the war ["China, Russia & the U.S. II," April]. The abstract jargon Mr. Gass employs reveals how far removed from the reality of the war our armchair Clausewitzes are.

Grateful for Moscow's moderation, we "reciprocated by pledging a war of limited objectives." As if, even metaphorically, it makes any sense to suggest that we escalated the war only after Johnson and Brezhnev drew up a set of rules. More significantly, our goals in Vietnam are not in any meaningful sense "limited." Johnson seeks a total military victory and the formation of an anti-Communist government in South Vietnam. No military power takes greater risks than it has to. We have not yet invaded North Vietnam because of the fear of war with Communist China. As Johnson's almost daily escalation makes clear, he is perfectly willing to go to war with China if he cannot install Marshall Ky (or some other puppet) in South Vietnam at a lesser cost.

Mr. Gass's treatment of the bombing is particularly enlightening. Bombing the North is the "permitted substitute" for outright invasion; designed to inhibit supplies, it is clearly of "military weight." The administration's original defense of the bombing is conveniently ignored. It has failed to prevent infiltration, and has not forced North Vietnam to the conference table (indeed, it is now the chief obstacle to negotiations). Presumably, then, the bombing is of "military weight" because we have mercifully refrained (so far) from blasting the country back to the Stone Age. Since World War II proved that everything can be a military target, . . . Mr. Gass should have no trouble explaining (or ignoring) the administration's

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

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recent decision to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi. The utility of his analysis is obvious. Rather than explain why the administration first says bombing Haiphong will not seriously curtail North Vietnam's war effort but only kill civilians, and then contradicts itself by saying the bombing of this port is essential, the entire problem can be avoided. Since the United States could be using atom bombs, our use of lesser weapons proves our moderation and decency.

In one glib sentence, Mr. Gass dismisses any concern with the nature of the society we are protecting: "Of injustice we have always plenty, in Vietnam or elsewhere." Not a word about the corruption of the ruling classes, the need for land reform, the obvious unwillingness of the South Vietnamese army to fight for their own country. No mention of our defoliation projects, napalm bombing, and herding of Vietcong sympathizers into concentration camps. Such mundane concerns have no part in Mr. Gass's global chess game.

Examples of his Orwellian language are endless: the "war prize" is the South (what is second prize?); "political strategy" forbids us from invading North Vietnam; the Vietcong would misuse the "political liberties of a democratic state" (whatever these are in a dictatorship where it is a crime publicly to advocate neutralism); the war is a "test case" (as if Communist peasants in Bolivia will determine their actions on the basis of how many Vietnamese we exterminate). Mr. Gass's arguments, and similar absurdities like our "basic SEATO commitment," have failed to convince the American public of the wisdom of our war policies. LBJ knows this. . . .

America became involved in the Vietnam war out of stupidity and pride, not reasoned calculation. LBJ is now attempting to bomb North Vietnam into submission to save his own political neck. . . . I am sick of the rhetoric of middle-aged men who serenely send off thousands of Americans to die for reactionary rulers as part of a holy war against Communism. Johnson has turned America into an immoral, imperialist power. Those who defend his policy by ignoring both what he has done, and why he said he did it, are as dishonest as he is.

DENIS CLIFFORD

New York City



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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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16. Prayer for wine from a manuscript ritual for circumcision. Afghanistan, 17th century. 25¢

17. Prayer for travel written by Simon ben David Ulmo (Ullman). Palatinate, ca. 1780. 25¢

18. Book of Esther inscribed as a technopagion in the form of a bear. Russia, ca. 1870. 25¢

19. Illumination of evening prayer which begins observance of Rosh Hashanah. From an Italian Mahzor, 15th century. 25¢

21. "Shoshan"—the lily symbolizing Israel. Illumination of the initial word of a poem for the Day of Atonement. Rhine Valley, ca. 1380. 25¢

22. Ketubah (marriage contract). Lisbon, 1830. 35¢

23. Jacob before Pharaoh. Woodcut from Koberger Bible. Nuremberg, 1483.

24. Illustration from the book of Ardeshir and Ezra, two parts of a poetical paraphrase of the Pentateuch. Persia, 17th century. 35¢

26. "Praise be the Lord." Illumination from a Haggadah completed in Italy, 1484, by the scribe Joel ben Simon of Cologne. 35¢

27. Left: Adam and Eve. Right: Noah releases the dove. From a miniature book of daily prayers for the Omer or Sephirah period between Passover and Shavuot. Central Europe, 1803. 35¢


24

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Mark Drugs, Southfield
Spitzer's Book & Gift Shop, Oak Park
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LIBERAL ANTI-COMMUNISM REVISITED

A Symposium

Introduction: Although some of the participants in this symposium would disagree, at least as to the consistency of their own political views over the past two decades, Richard H. Rovere is, in my opinion, very close to the truth when he says "that the war in Vietnam has brought about, or perhaps merely revealed, great changes in attitudes and opinions in the liberal and intellectual communities." In order to explore the range and depth and significance of those changes, the editors of COMMENTARY invited about 40 prominent intellectuals of liberal or democratic-socialist persuasion—people whose names, moreover, were associated at some point in the past with an opposition to Stalinism and/or Communism in general—to discuss certain charges of inconsistency and even of venality which have been brought against the broad political position they held in the 1940's and 50's. The 21 responses we received appear below in alphabetical order.

Many differences of opinion, both on large questions and on points of concrete detail, emerge from those responses. Nevertheless several rough generalizations are possible. Most of the contributors, though by no means an overwhelming majority, repudiate the idea that liberal or left-wing anti-Communism is responsible in any significant measure for present American policies in Vietnam—and with very few exceptions, they are all vehemently opposed to those policies. Most would still call themselves anti-Communist in one sense or another, but virtually all seem to agree that the American effort to contain Communism by military means cannot be justified either politically or morally in the double context of a polycentric Communist world and an unstable underdeveloped world seething with nationalist aspirations. As to CIA backing of cultural projects, the consensus appears to be that it was on the whole a disaster, but that the intellectuals who received such subsidies were subject to no actual coercion and were in any case, for better or worse, doing and saying what they would have done and said anyway.

It is not, however, these positions in themselves which reveal the great changes to which Mr. Rovere refers. The major change, I think, lies in the extent to which the liberal and intellectual communities have lost the faith they momentarily had at the height of the cold war in the possibility that the United States, the main bulwark against Stalinism, could act as a relative force for the good in international affairs. Not everyone in this symposium entertained that faith in the 1950's, but most to some degree did, and not many do any longer. This loss of faith in America may be added to the growing list of casualties for which the war in Vietnam has been responsible, and it may in the end turn out to be not the least consequential.—N.P.

THE QUESTIONS

1. It has recently been charged that the anti-Communism of the Left was in some measure responsible for, or helped to create a climate of opinion favorable to, the war in Vietnam. What justification, if any, do you find in that charge? As someone whose name has been associated with the anti-Communist Left, do you feel in any way responsible for American policies in Vietnam?

2. Would you call yourself an anti-Communist today? If so, are you still willing to support a policy of containing the spread of Communism? If not, why have you changed? Assuming that you once supported containment because you were opposed on moral *rather than narrowly political grounds to the spread of a totalitarian system, why do you think it wrong to apply the same principle to Vietnam?*

3. Do the recent revelations concerning covert CIA backing of projects, some of which you probably sympathized with, or may perhaps have been involved in yourself, prove that liberal anti-Communism has been a dupe of, or a slave to, the darker impulses of American foreign policy?

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Lionel Abel: Let me first answer your questions:

1. I do not believe that the anti-Communist Left is, to use your language, "responsible for," or that it "helped to create," a climate of opinion favorable to the war in Vietnam. The war imposed itself; it was not required by any body of opinion either on the Left or on the Right. And I was among those who opposed this war from the start.

2. Nor would I today call myself an anti-Communist, one good reason being that I do not know whom to call Communists. The Russians? The Chinese? The former seem to be closer to the Communist goal, the latter more interested in reaching it. Thus, I could hardly support a policy of containing the spread of Communism, since I do not know what the words "Communism" and "spread" in this usage signify. And since I have never supported containment—I suppose you mean containment of Communism—on "moral rather than narrowly political grounds," I do not now have to make an exception of Vietnam: I do not know what is being contained there by American arms.

3. So far as I am aware, I have not been involved in any project covertly backed by the CIA—though some of the publications to which I contributed may have helped themselves to CIA funds. You ask, has liberal anti-Communism "been a dupe of, or a slave to, the darker impulses of American foreign policy"? No doubt it has, but I think too that American foreign policy has often been a dupe of, if not a slave to, the darker impulses of illiberal theorizing; and we have to admit that among the theorizers there have been not a few ex-Trotskyites. Which brings me to a question you did not ask, but which I want to answer: What happened to Trotskyism?

The Trotskyism of the late 30's was a radical ideology whose adherents expected to take over leadership of the Communist movement once Stalin had been exposed—that is, once his crimes and mistakes had been made clear. Stalin was so exposed; this did not at all lead to the results Trotsky had anticipated.

In fact, the exposure of Stalin led to a liberalization of Russian society; and also introduced a trend toward bourgeoisification, bourgeois moral standards, capitalist methods and motivations. Who today opposes such trends? The Chinese, first of all, with their demand for authentic internationalism and revolutionary intransigence. Are the Chinese, then, the heirs of Trotsky, as Isaac Deutscher thought in 1959 when he first wrote of the "great leap forward"? Or are they the heirs of Stalin, as he now thinks, predicting that China will suffer even more from Mao's "cultural revolution" than Russia did from Stalin's purges? It is the Chinese defenders of Stalin's reputation who today are interested in international revolt. It is the Russians, interested in postponing revolution, who today are critical of Stalin's terror. So neither the Russians nor the Chinese can be said to continue Trotskyist thinking. Was Trotsky wrong then? Were his followers deluded? Was he himself deluded? Was Stalin right, after all—is this thinkable?

I suggest that Trotsky was indeed wrong, on one fundamental matter; and that his error on this matter has created a peculiar misunderstanding of events among his former supporters.

About what was Trotsky wrong? He was wrong in thinking, or leading others to believe—many believed him on this point—that drastic social change could be achieved, and speedily, without tyranny. Notice that I am using the old classical term "tyranny" and not the modern term "dictatorship." I submit that drastic social change cannot be speedily achieved without some kind of tyranny, and that the illusions Trotsky created about this among his followers are today still being furthered. For instance, by some of my old friends on *Dissent* who often give the impression of thinking that merely to reject the methods of tyranny is actually to bring about drastic change.

Trotsky, it will be remembered, did insist on rapid change: in Russia this meant industrialization. But he was not ready to acknowledge the full brutality which the rapid industrialization of Russia entailed. So when we ask today, what happened to Trotskyism?—this answer has to be given: it simply disappeared. Why? It was never a real alternative to Stalinism. Was there any such real alternative? Yes: the position of Bukharin, now adopted by the Soviet Union for other countries—that is to say, the achievement of socialism at a snail's pace.

I AM NOT going to argue that Stalin was right about any political matter; I am not going to argue that his opinion on any political question is to be defended against those who opposed him. If Stalin was right, it was only in one sense: Russia, for rapid and drastic change, required a tyrant, and that instrument Stalin was, most eminently.

The liberals of the 30's, believing in drastic change but not seeing that tyranny was needed to effect it, supported the Soviet Union but denied that Stalin was a tyrant. Now the Trotskyites saw that Stalin was a tyrant, but thought his tyranny an obstacle to drastic change. On the second point they were entirely wrong. We now ask: was the development of the Soviet Union possible without Stalin's kind of terror? Did Trotsky's attack on Stalin assert Stalin was wrong because he was a tyrant? Did it not rather assert that Stalin was the *wrong* tyrant? But is not "wrong tyrant" an impossible term? The right tyrant is simply the one who holds power, and is able to hold it against all comers. Certainly any issue of a "right tyrant" against a "wrong tyrant" must be confusing. The serious antithesis for society is between rapid and drastic change but by means of

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tyranny—as against the limiting of change to those slow processes consistent with the methods of liberalism.

It seems to me that this question touches on the problems now being faced by the movement for civil rights. To some Negroes, Stokely Carmichael for instance, drastic social change is called for. But if drastic social change means tyranny, what kind of tyranny does Stokely Carmichael have in mind? There cannot be a Negro tyrant over those Negroes who have segregated themselves in the manner of the Muslims. But in any case, what has to be seen clearly is that any drastic and rapid change—the Negroes are insisting on rapidity—in the relations of whites and Negroes cannot be achieved under the standard of liberalism.

What I am arguing for here is clarity, that is to say, a will to clarity. Let us admit once and for all what it means to claim that drastic—and rapid—change is needed.

China is certainly committed under Mao to radical change; and that I take to be the reason why the Chinese, though international in their outlook in a way the Russians are not, refuse to reject Stalin, and even defend his purges. What the Chinese are defending is, very simply, tyranny. If we do not want to go along with them on this, then we have to ask: do we want them to continue the changes they initiated in Asia, or not? An answer to this question requires answering the very questions I brought up: what, fundamentally, is the instrument of social change? And what happened to Trotskyism?

And answering these questions is not irrelevant to the discussion of those projects which, as you put it, had "covert backing" from the CIA. Was not the *raison d'être* of the CIA the mounting of drastic actions with a view to *preventing* drastic change? Now drastic actions to prevent drastic change could not but involve operations incompatible with liberalism. The whole enterprise had to end up in a kind of Bolshevik bounderism, this time in the service of the bourgeoisie.

What about the so-called "psychological radicals" who, defining their situation drastically, put their faith in resolute inner action against society? To the degree that such people—mainly students—require changes that are both drastic and rapid, they will tend—they themselves have provided the evidence—to place themselves under an inner, a psychological tyranny: that of drugs. I think that the principal interest of drugs nowadays lies in their power to tyrannize. That is why, as I see it, the argument for legalizing a particular drug, marijuana, on the ground that it is less tyrannical than others, seems somewhat specious. If society is really as nauseating as the proponents of legalized marijuana regularly assert, then isn't something stronger than marijuana needed?

Finally, I should like to point out to all who insist that our situation is a drastic one, calling the U.S. an awful place in the hands of awful people, that this, their violent rhetoric, commits them to exactly nothing. If, for instance, the position of the Negroes is as bad as Stokely Carmichael says, then it could only be changed by a massive violence for which the Negroes just do not have sufficient numbers. I would suggest to our would-be radicals that they try to practice a certain verbal austerity and deny themselves the use of Manichaean phrases calling for actions which they cannot take.

LIONEL ABEL, *playwright and critic, teaches English at the State University of New York at Buffalo.*

David T. Bazelon: To answer the questions: Yes, I feel responsible for American policies in Vietnam: I am an American, which for me is not a mere fate, but a point of view. I have intellectually allowed for and, if it means anything, have supported the postwar policy of military containment. One Vietnam or another—the containing power being sucked into excessive support of a nonexistent government—seems nearly inevitable in restropspect: a time-bomb flaw in American policy from the beginning.

I most certainly remain an anti-Communist today; although both Communism and I have changed. For one thing, I would never favor the use of nuclear weapons in pursuit of anti-Communist policy, or any other. Most sane men would rather be red, or even red-white-and-blue, than dead-in-a-devastated-world. However, once thus-colored—or living in any spiritually devastated world—I would treasure the option to choose a rich occasion of my own death. But this heroism, suicidal or otherwise, is a personal choice, not a social policy.

I am a slave to almost all American policy—foreign or not, dark or otherwise—as are we all. As for being a dupe, quite the contrary: if anybody in 1947 had told me we would all be alive in 1967, and with a chance for our kids to survive us, I would have sneered at length and in detail.

Communism—any system—is livable, I suppose: half of Europe even survived the plague. And I can think of a dozen or more social arrangements right here in the United States that I cannot imagine surviving, and that would at the same time constitute rapid social advance for millions of my fellow citizens. The confusion of personal and social policy considerations is now, among us, at an exquisite height: I know women who cannot be diverted from imagining themselves as mothers of napalmed babies long enough to give substantial attention to their own affluent children: *we lust after primitive conditions of life.* It was that romantic idiot, Gauguin, who afforded our current half-civilized masses the key to historical experience, he, and more recently Missis-

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sippi (somewhat more available by Greyhound, but now forgotten).

It is this elevation of primitivism to the status of the sole revelatory truth that provides the core of the New Style in American public expression, including politics. To measure the depth of our fall to primitivism, compare this new kind to the romantic naturalism of D. H. Lawrence—the last of the great romantics, now almost forty years dead. Lawrence *imagined* a new animal man, he did not merely imitate existing primitives (and certainly not men whose primitivism derived mostly from their unnatural deprivations); and he rejected modern industrialism in its fact and its essence. Our current romantics accept all the benefits—including the personal chemical distortions—of the technological order; they owe their stylish existence and most of their ideas to the representational media of the technological society; and their Noble Savages are the enraged victims of ghetto hysteria, and the stunted peasants of the Black Belt.

Liberal anti-Communism, growing out of the history of the socialist movement and more particularly out of the utter rejection of Stalinism by elements of that tradition—as well as the coerced political propriety of the McCarthy period—is not so much attacked as it is summarily dismissed by the politicos of the New Style: dismissed for no better reason than that it is inconveniently inhibiting. (They are capable of thinking about it.) This new generation of New-Class middlebrows—only gently sprinkled with the paprika of old fellow-traveling maturity and wisdom—believes that Communism is a bogey invented by McCarthy in order to disrupt the Left; and they are not about to be taken in by any such obvious maneuver. In any event, it is not an issue important enough to think about—it will mellow, it has mellowed; what do you mean by Communism; what about lynching in the South; Stalin is dead; Yankee go home; America never does anything right; Ho Chi Minh is an intelligent, well-educated, peasant leader.

Primitive identifications are strangely like projective images, as in the scapegoat theory of anti-Semitism, only benign. They have the desperate object of avoiding the entanglements, or awareness of the entanglements, of one's emotional life (or what is left of it) in the immediate actualities of a rationalistically organized social order, and the accompanying consumerism. It is all a middlebrow rewrite of selected moods of popular culture—as if some images on television had jumped out of the tube and begun picketing and demonstrating in the living room. The civil-rights revolution occurred mostly in the media: the demonstrators were unpaid actors for the networks.

In the context of this absurdly derived and puerile emotionality, it now becomes necessary to rediscuss a complicated historical phenomenon like Communism, as some decades ago it was necessary to delineate the tragic fate of the October Revolution to a movie audience that had just moments before seized upon a Russian Dream as its American one dissolved in the sick ozone of the Depression. Vietnam is our nightmare, just as Soviet power, years ago, was our dream. So be it—even though now the group concerned, centered in the growth industry of education, is many times over more numerous and assertive and powerful than was the earlier generation. This time they are so strong they don't even need Stalin.

COMMUNISM IS NOT a matter of indifference, no matter how much it has or will become mellowed. Moreover, its mellowing, such as it is, is the result at least *also* of checked Soviet expansion, and the fact that Stalinism did not find an heir in Europe. Leaving other things aside for the moment, it seems ordinary to me that the necessity of the last battle, Vietnam, should be more deeply questioned than that of earlier ones—like the Berlin airlift or the Italian election of the late 40's. But in the absence of American counter-pressure, even Stalin might very well have succeeded in building a more durable totalitarian empire.

While Communism cannot be opposed effectively without American power, the purpose of the opposition cannot be to secure the planetary dominion of the patterns of the American order. These are not viable, worldwide, since the two main strands of Americanism—our capacity for technological application, and our freedom to indulge minority cultural and political expression—are both derived from our exceptional wealth, which in turn has a unique basis in our continental history. The planetary issue should not be conceived as either/or—since mellowing Communism is not a matter of indifference, and non-military Americanism is not yet exportable. The issue before the planet is not to copy an inimitable America, but to suffer the technological transformation with less rather than more damage to the humanity that may survive it. And that is, for me, the vital point about Communism, in *any* of its polycentric forms: it concentrates all power in a purportedly supra-historical agency devoted to technological transformation without any conception at all of the accompanying human damage, and of course without allowing for any expression of any such conception by others. Moreover, in its monolithic concentration of power in the party and over the state, it is politically musclebound (overadministered) *even* in its introduction of the technology, apart from the character of the accompanying social order. This is not acceptable, to humans, except for pure survival.

What is a better way than the Communist way?

Any nationalist way, since that preserves an indigenous sense of the human in the inevitable engagement with technology; the way of any internationalist agency, including that of national

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corporations of advanced countries, where more technological sophistication than world-view is being exported (e.g., Krupp factory-building or Japanese trade); and perhaps, one future day from somewhere, the way of a truly humane social democracy (which technological wealth may soon make feasible). But the issue is technology: 1) to keep it from destroying us; 2) to make it available to the poor who insist on having it; 3) to preserve options of the survival of indigenous humane society in the wake of the devastation that inevitably accompanies the introduction of effective production; and 4) most especially not to accept the simple recapitulation of the past experiences of *any* advanced nation, concerning the primitive accumulation of capital, upon the helpless, greedy, unknowing body of the pre-technological peoples of the planet.

Conceived in this manner, the struggle is clearly with ourselves as well as with Communism. Just as clearly, it is not merely with ourselves, but also with a Communist pattern that is often woodenly stupid, and not even—for all that—as useful to the Third World as idiot American efficiency that cannot as yet distinguish between steel and Coca Cola.

I AM AFRAID that we are fighting a war in Vietnam for no better reason than that it is what we do best—and somebody has to do something. Both notions are tragically true. There is good reason not to lose the war in Vietnam; there is also good reason not to bother winning it. This war, which now involves Vietnam itself only as victim, should not be won or lost but transcended. The Pentagon desires to prove that guerrilla subversion, or Wars of National Liberation, can be defeated by the determined application of American power: I believe that some can and some can't, and that if we won this one this year the proof of victory would be deeply deceptive. Very crudely, it has already cost too much to be a pattern of anything but defeat. To date, we have proven that we are bigger than France, which everyone knew anyway; and that American power, when acting alone, must be selectively applied—and this was a very poor selection from the point of view even of the Pentagon. We have said that we are prepared to fight for ten or twenty years: what would possibly remain, of Vietnam or of our purpose, after ten or twenty years? Better to destroy North Vietnam next year, or sit in Saigon and wait, than to persist in any such wilful absurdity. The best way to win in Vietnam is to finance Ho Chi Minh thirty years ago.

But the Vietnam experience, however concluded, is a beginning as well as an end. It is an end only of the simple minded postwar policy of containment monstrously misapplied. But a beginning of *active military world government.*

Notice how much seems to have been forgotten in the recent concentration on the Vietnam over-involvement—by the liberal intellectual community as well as by the Pentagon. There is an ever-present issue of the survival of the planet which we must strain to recall. It is perhaps still vaguely reasonable to argue about winning a war in Vietnam, or not losing one again; it is simply insane to discuss the winning of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Not to fight that war means to make a deal with that enemy. This deal must be, in the first instance, military; it had better be, secondarily, something more. But note that the realistic range of possibility here is from immediate utter destruction, all the way to a horrifying planetary condominium by the two most detested powers in the world (which comprise not much more than one-sixth of the population), the central drama of which will consist of waverings between obnoxious piety and sickening insecurity. The politics of the future necessarily occurs under this black umbrella.

The issue is the survival of the planet, and the pattern of control over its development if it does survive. That is an ultimate and an immediate—therefore an apocalyptic—issue: indeed, somebody ought to make a morning prayer out of it, so that we might properly greet the fresh apocalypse of Everyday. *And this issue is to be met by firm mental opposition to war? And fervent demonstrations in favor of love and de-escalation in Vietnam? And hating American power so much that we drift into a benign view of Communist power?*

So I am an anti-Communist who believes that our most urgent business is to make a deal with the Communists. This may strike some unilinear logicians as contradictory—as what, in the real world, would not? Further to pursue this contradiction, as to a non-nuclear matter, I imagine that if I were a Frenchman in politics I would affirm and elaborate my anti-Communism *in order to* participate effectively in the construction of the new Popular Front now challenging, and soon to inherit, the Gaullist state. Thus, and not otherwise, the ugly dialogue of the 30's continues.

Russia and the United States are being driven together by the greatest force in organized (rather than organic) human society—the need of equal powers to cooperate in order to avoid the irony of neutralization. And the need to recognize the iron law that governs all anti-suicide arrangements, namely, that if we do not kill each other, then we damn well must live together, God help us. And if we spend all of our time and energy threatening each other with revocation of the arrangement, others with less power will prevail in our absence.

TO CONCLUDE: I said the war in Vietnam should be not won or lost, but transcended. That is, indeed, the effort of the liberal intellectual community in the United States—to transcend the war with primitive emotional assertion as to this, that, and the other. I propose, instead, an alternative *policy* that can be lobbied and campaigned for

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right here at home, and that will thereby raise rather than reduce the activists thereof. It should be endorsed by Congress before being acted upon. It is as follows:

1) The President of the United States shall appear before the General Assembly of the United Nations and apologize to the world for our excessively military emphasis in opposing the evil of Communist subversion;

2) A radical change of policy shall be announced, consisting of a secondary military posture in all instances, and a primary effort to afford technology and capital assistance to all who desire it and who observe the planetary peace;

3) A continuing Coexistence Commission under the auspices of the United Nations with a free agenda for the discussion on intercontinental television of all aspects of Soviet-American problems, differences, similarities, prospects, attitudes toward this-and-that area of the world, etc., by both private and governmental persons;

4) A congressionally authorized commitment by the United States government, presented to the United Nations, specifying (on conditions to be negotiated) the devotion of a sum equal to five per cent of American GNP, or 50 per cent of the last annual increase in American GNP, whichever shall be greater, to a new international development authority controlled according to the extent of contribution of whomsoever thereto, plus whatever sums shall be made available by negotiated reduction of armament; and

5) A one-organization plan for the planet reported upon and/or revised annually as necessary, and in any event not less than every five years.

You want peace? This is the way to fight for it.

You want to fight Communism? This is the way to hit them where it counts.

You want a real fight, or just occasions for primitive hate?

You want to persuade the United States to act its age? Try this way for size.

Or shall we persist—decade after decade—in expecting that the Soviet Union, once we play dead, will accomplish all of this without our assistance?

Is it really up to them alone to save the world?

DAVID T. BAZELON *is the author of* The Paper Economy *and* Power in America.

Daniel Bell: The order of your questions should be changed, since the response to the second controls the others. I shall begin, therefore, with the second.

2. I would still call myself an anti-Communist today in the sense that I describe below. But your formulation of the question confuses a distinction crucial to such an attitude and, indeed, to all relations between morality and politics.

I oppose Communism on moral grounds. It is a social philosophy which, in the name of rationality and humanism, imposes a repressive regime on people, on the principle that only a vanguard or a conscious elite knows the "truth" or what is best for everyone. This becomes the justification for suppressing dissent, for censorship in literature and the arts, for *partiinost* (i.e., guided thought), and the like. Such a regime, whatever its claims, leads to a denial of those liberties and protections without which free inquiry cannot function. A magazine like COMMENTARY could not exist in such a society; that, in itself, is a simple test of freedom.

But it is a mistake to confuse moral with political grounds as the basis for governmental policy; and equally to confuse individual and governmental actions. In a pluralistic society (with diverse creeds), the essence of a civil politics—and of traditional liberal philosophy—is to separate moral from political considerations in the behavior of groups. The separation of Church and State, for example, is founded on the liberal belief—formed in opposition to older Catholic dogma—that no creed, whatever its claims to truth, should be able to impose its moral views on others through the political mechanisms of the society. The essence of ideology (as a kind of secular religion) is that it fuses moral with political considerations, and leads to either/or confrontations between antagonists.

Within a civil society, politics is based on the principle of toleration and on compromise among diverse views. Primarily, one seeks agreement among all parties on the "rules of the game"; any group which accepts these rules is entitled to be heard. Among nations, politics is based, necessarily, on the play of national interests (whose legitimacy is often difficult to define, but they are rooted in history and the will to survive) and on the effort to create some rule of law in the international sphere. This is the moral context for politics.

IN OTHER words, one's reasons for opposing Communism politically may be quite different from one's reasons for opposing it morally. It is also necessary to distinguish between what one might say when talking as an individual and what one might say when looking at a problem from the point of view of the government.

I supported containment, as a policy of the American government, in the late 1940's and the 1950's, not for "moral" reasons, but because the Soviet Union was aggressively expansionist. I oppose today, on moral grounds, many of the repressive features of the Tito regime (though I also recognize many changes), but I would not favor taking political measures against Yugoslavia, for it keeps the peace with its neighbors. I opposed the "liberation" policy of the Eisenhower administration, because it rested on a confusion of moral

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and political categories and resulted accordingly in a confused notion of the national interest.

Thus, your question about the "spread" of Communism is based on a false premise. The problem is not the spread of Communism, but the *way* it spreads. Where nations seek aggressively to change boundaries, or to cause other regimes to fall illegally, one opposes such actions in the name of international peace. Where left-wing guerrillas, as in Venezuela, seek to overthrow a democratic and legally constituted government by force, one opposes such actions. If Italy tomorrow were freely to vote a Communist regime into power, and if that regime were to maintain constitutional liberties, I would oppose any effort to overthrow it. But I would support the right of a citizen of Greece, where the army has just overthrown a constitutional regime and suspended many liberties, to resort to arms to restore those liberties.

While one cannot anticipate all political situations, the grounds of policy are, it seems to me, fairly clear: what is possible for individuals may not always be possible for governments; individuals are motivated primarily by moral considerations, but a polity, composed of diverse individuals and groups, cannot impose the singular moral conception of any one party on the society as a whole. Within a civil society, individuals are bound by the rules of the game and can take up arms or resort to coercive action only when there is a denial of the liberty to act. In the international sphere, the internal character of one regime cannot be the basis of another government's decision to go to war or use coercive measures—such a decision has to be guided by the willingness of the other regime to keep the peace and to foster its views, or its social system, by peaceful means.

The Vietnamese situation is an unhappy compound of civil war and international confrontation. Whatever its internal origin, the Vietnamese conflict does involve China and the United States as great powers, and a victory for the Vietcong would be a powerful stimulus to the Maoist theory of violent social change, a type of politics which, in a nuclear age, risks the holocaust.

The "solution" in Vietnam (if any is possible) is to reduce great-power involvement and to let the political character of South Vietnam be determined by the free competition of political forces. Such a solution may require an American presence in South Vietnam, but for the end described, rather than to maintain a specific regime.

I oppose the present American policy in Vietnam, particularly the bombing of the North, because I think that the means employed are wholly disproportionate to the ends. Contrary to what Theodore Draper has written in these pages* (although I agree with his conclusions), I do not believe that we have relied on military action to compensate for political failure. I think that we are guided by bad political considerations (which, however, still keep our military actions in check). Thus, the bombing of North Vietnam, it now seems clear, was not undertaken primarily to interdict North Vietnamese troop movements (bombing is a highly ineffective way of doing this) but for political reasons: both to pressure Hanoi, and to bolster the morale of the Ky regime. A cruel price is being paid for bad political reasoning.

I do think there are valid political (i.e., national interest) reasons for our presence in Vietnam, but I do not approve of the administration's present policies, which have moved beyond the original intention of a limited war. Such extensions, however, were not dictated by "ideology"; the escalation was the product, I fear, of a wrong judgment about how to be "tough-minded" in politics.

1. THE CHARGE THAT "the anti-Communism of the Left . . . helped to create a climate of opinion favorable to the war in Vietnam" makes no sense to me either as history or as sociology. It assumes a single-minded American public opinion. It presumes the effectiveness of a complicated set of attitudes held by a small and diverse intellectual milieu—a presumption of influence which is contradicted by what we know about the formation of policy. Worst of all, it makes erroneous judgments about the development of American policy in Vietnam.

Various opinion polls (see the analysis by S. M. Lipset in a recent issue of *Trans-action*) indicate the volatile and even contradictory nature of American opinion. A majority favors negotiations because these might lead to peace. A majority approves of bombing because it seems to promise a cheap victory. A majority wants to see the war continued if a settlement would mean the "loss" of South Vietnam. A majority would accept a settlement allowing the National Liberation Front to participate in South Vietnamese elections, if this would stop the war. What it all adds up to is that, within large limits, a determined and forthright President is capable of molding a majority out of a wide range of contradictory attitudes, and that "public opinion" gives him considerable latitude to do any number of difficult things.

If the question assumes that the sophisticated attitudes of the anti-Communist Left came into play, not in mass, but in "elite" opinion, or that sections of the administration shared such attitudes, this still, I think, misreads the way American policy in Vietnam has developed. It is striking that at the time when the country was most ideologically anti-Communist (i.e., during the Eisenhower years), the Republican administration resisted the efforts of leaders of the military (notably Admiral Radford) to commit American troops to Vietnam after the downfall of

* "The American Crisis," January 1967.

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the French fort at Dienbienphu. The decision to commit American troops (and to engage in counter-insurgency maneuvers, including abortive efforts to infiltrate the North) came in the "cool" Kennedy era. These decisions, as both Goodwin and Schlesinger have testified, were not made with any forethought of long-range consequences. They were dictated by immediate military considerations—the floundering of the South Vietnamese troops when the Giap strategy moved the Vietcong from its phase of guerrilla warfare into more conventional military operations—and they dug the pit in which we find ourselves today.

I do not think that the American presence in Vietnam can be traced to an anti-Communist passion or to an anti-Communist ideology which forces us into a holy war, whatever the simplistic right-wing view may be. I think we owe America's presence in Vietnam to a power vacuum in Southeast Asia after World War II. One forgets that America—the paramount world power at the time—became engaged in Asia because of a Japanese "co-prosperity scheme" which would have given Japan the political hegemony in Southeast Asia which the Chinese Communists seek today. For political reasons, we assented to the return of France (under de Gaulle) to Indochina; for political reasons, we opposed the return of the Dutch to Indonesia. While some of our actions are colored by the ideological fact that China is a Communist country, the basic framework of politics in Southeast Asia, as in the Middle East, remains that of great-power confrontations.

3. Your third question is lurid and melodramatic. If you had specified what you mean by the "darker impulses of American foreign policy," then I might have been able to judge whether anyone has been a "dupe or a slave" to them. Failing that, I can only reflect on my own activities for fifteen years in the Congress for Cultural Freedom—an organization which, it is revealed, received money from the CIA—and assess your question in that light.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom grew out of an international meeting in Berlin in 1950, organized by the city's socialist mayor, Ernst Reuter. This was the period during which Berlin was ringed by Russian forces and had been saved only by the American airlift. A year earlier, Czechoslovakia had lost its independence in the Communist takeover, and its foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, was murdered. In this period, purge trials of Communist leaders took place in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and dozens of these men, including Petkov, Rajk, Clementis, and Slansky, were hanged. In the Slansky trial, leading British Labourites were accused of being "Zionist agents" in league with imperialists and Titoists in an anti-Soviet conspiracy. In the Soviet Union, Zhdanov opened his attack on such literary figures as Akhmatova, while many Jewish writers—Bergelson, Feffer, and dozens of others—disappeared into concentration camps (which were filled with tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers like Alexander Solzhenitsyn), camps which the Russians maintained even after the public revelation of the Nazi camps. By 1953, Stalin had announced a "Doctors' Plot," and it was clear that a new, wholesale purge was brewing in the Soviet Union; this time, since most of the accused doctors were Jews, the Jewish population would be the main target. In western Europe, particularly in France and Italy, anti-Communist and non-Communist writers found it difficult to be heard, or were ostracized. In Paris, when Albert Camus suggested that concentration camps existed in the Soviet Union, he was denounced by Jean-Paul Sartre for slandering the Soviet Union!

IN THIS SETTING, the Congress for Cultural Freedom was formed by hundreds of intellectuals—including Ignazio Silone, Arthur Koestler, Manes Sperber, Sidney Hook, and Elliot Cohen (the founding editor of COMMENTARY)—to rally their fellows against totalitarianism and to stand as a symbol of free inquiry and common discourse for intellectuals in all countries. It is simpleminded, in fact, to think of the Congress as "anti-Communist," for when the "Communist" writers of the Petofi circle, the group that started the train of events culminating in the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, came out of Hungary, they turned to the Congress for Cultural Freedom for support, and the magazine of the Petofi circle, *Udrolami Uzhlag*, was supported by the Congress, in exile, after 1956.

But whatever the reasons for its founding at the height of the cold war, the Congress for Cultural Freedom sought to be, especially after 1956, an open community of intellectuals, independent of government and free of ideological flags within the context of its opposition to totalitarianism. It sought to pose the serious and complex intellectual issues of the day, to debate them freely, and to foster open dialogues among intellectuals of all persuasions—including efforts, in early 1956, to open discussions with editors of Soviet magazines.

This effort to create an open community was the intention of the international conferences and seminars in which I participated and, in several instances, organized. In Milan in 1955, the central theme was Freedom and Planning, and the confrontation was between those like R. H. S. Crossman, C. A. R. Crosland, and Roy Jenkins of the British Labour party, who felt that the two were compatible, and those like Frederick Hayek, who held that they were not. It was out of these discussions that the theme of the "end of ideology" arose—the feeling that the old intellectual debates had become exhausted. At Rhodes, in 1956, the conference was devoted to Public Liberty and the New States. In Vienna, in 1958, the theme was Workers' Participation and Self Management in Industry, with discussions among American trade

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unionists, British Labourites, Histadrut leaders, and Yugoslav workers' council leaders. In Berlin, in 1960, one of the major themes was Mass Society and Mass Culture.

This diversity of interest was also present in three international seminars I had a hand in organizing. In April 1957, in Tokyo, a seminar directed by W. Arthur Lewis, including among its participants the socialist Ashoka Mehta and the conservative Colin Clark, discussed alternative roads to economic development. In June 1957, a seminar held in cooperation with St. Antony's College, Oxford, was devoted to the question of liberalization tendencies in the Soviet Union. In June 1965, a seminar at Rutgers University, sponsored by *Partisan Review*, explored the role of the intellectual in a technical society; the spectrum of opinions included those of Herbert Marcuse, George Lichtheim, Irving Howe, Leslie Fiedler, Norman Podhoretz, Edward Shils, and Sidney Hook. A dozen other seminars—on the role of tradition, on religion, on city planning, on Soviet historiography—were held in different parts of the world. These were never propaganda jamborees, but discussions enlisting some of the best minds of our time in an effort to clarify the intellectual issues of the day.

During this period, some (but not all) of the funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was underwritten by the CIA. It is also evident that early in the 1950's the CIA, as a matter of government policy, decided to support and sustain a host of liberal and socialist international organizations, at a time when such organizations could not find the means to be self-sustaining, in order to strengthen opposition to Communist domination of various milieus. Given the context of the times, I understand the political reasons for such a decision. As to the moral rights and wrongs, there is no easy answer. From the viewpoint of the organizations, there was, and is, a simple test: whether independence of those organizations, and of the individuals within them, was compromised. I cannot apply the test to other groups which were financed by the CIA—for I have not been privy to their experience. So far as the Congress for Cultural Freedom is concerned, and so far as my own experience shows, liberal anti-Communism was not "a dupe of, or a slave to, the darker impulses of American foreign policy."

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Lewis A. Coser: Anti-Communism is so protean a term that no intelligent discussion can proceed before its various meanings are defined with some precision. Definitions, here as elsewhere, far from being neutral, are pregnant with consequences. At least four different meanings of the term may be distinguished:

1) Anti-Communism may refer to opposition to a political philosophy and a program for action developed by Lenin and his disciples. Being committed to a democratic and libertarian socialist position, I have opposed Leninism and Stalinism ever since the 30's and consider them mischievous political doctrines that have caused untold harm not only to the politics but to the very idea of socialism in the world. By having fostered in the minds of many the idea that socialism involves a centralized, dictatorial imposition of the will of an elitist few on the powerless many, it bears primary responsibility for the current debilitation and loss of appeal of the socialist vision.

2) Anti-Communism may refer to opposition to the spread of Stalinism and its heirs, as institutionalized in the Soviet Union, to other areas of the world. In this respect I am, again, as anti-Communist now as I have been ever since the 30's. Every victory of Communist trends in the labor movement, and among intellectuals and other men of good will, signifies a defeat for libertarian ideas, be it in the West or in the East. It is important, however, to recognize that the missionary zeal of Soviet Communism has vastly declined in the last decade or so and that the various Communist parties of the world are presently on the defensive. The ground for messianic and chiliastic visions or for reliance on a Third Rome no longer exists in the West. I think it most likely that the Western Communist parties will in the long run abandon Bolshevik politics and organizational structures, further emancipate themselves from Moscow direction, and re-enter the political dialogue within their respective nation-states. When this happens the European socialist Left will be relieved of the Communist incubus. It may then have a second chance. I shall reserve comment on the non-Western world for a later part of this essay.

3) Anti-Communism may refer to the goals and ideology of American foreign policy ever since the late 40's. This policy was initially designed to stop further penetration of Russian power into Western Europe, although there were men with powerful voices in the seat of government who indulged in the fantasy of a "roll-back" of Communist power in the satellites. It was an eminently successful policy; there were no further advances of Russian power in Western Europe after the Czechoslovak coup.

During the first phases of the cold war the two super-powers confronted each other in what was for all intents and purposes a bipolar world; we now witness the disintegration of these two blocs, neither of which can any longer control its previous client states. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the United States have become aware of their common interests in avoiding military confrontations and have moved to a state of antagonistic cooperation.

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The official anti-Communist ideology, which was initially designed to provide justifications for the drive to stop Communist power in Europe, later acquired a momentum of its own, and we witnessed the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal value.

Hoisted by its own ideological petard, American foreign policy is now committed to a global anti-Communist stance. A doctrine which at the onset had fairly specific and limited fields of application has now become obsessive and is being used on a world scale. It has led to the alignment of America on the side of some of the most reactionary and illiberal regimes. Anti-Communism has become the last refuge of all the scoundrels of the world in their effort to get backing from America.

The present orientation of American foreign policy, insofar as it is committed to global anti-Communist policing of the world, is profoundly reactionary and needs to be opposed by all liberal and radical intellectuals. It not only subverts, I believe, liberal and libertarian ideas and ideals, but it is contrary to America's national interest.

4) Anti-Communism may also refer to a flourishing racket. Ever since the beginning of the cold war, a fair number of American intellectuals, from whatever motives, have become professional anti-Communists. Among them ex-Communists frequently have been the most vociferous. Such men have taken advantage of official ideological commitments and have exploited them to the hilt for their own purposes. Ample financing was readily available, whether from the CIA or through other channels. We thus were treated to the unedifying spectacle of American intellectuals waxing indignant about the kept intellectuals of the Soviet Union while being subsidized by secret or not so secret American government funds. These men helped to poison the intellectual atmosphere of the late 40's and 50's. They have subverted the intellectual vocation by abandoning a critical stance toward their own society in the name of anti-Communism.

Many other intellectuals were for a time inclined to suppress their misgiving about this or that aspect of American domestic affairs in order to close ranks against what they considered the dangers of Communism. Certain of them, it should not be forgotten, were even moved to mute their criticism of McCarthy from some such motives. American "establishment" intellectuals, in their enthusiasm for a newly discovered *union sacrée,* contributed to the unhealthy and conformist atmosphere of the 50's, and left America woefully unprepared to face the new challenges of the 60's both domestically and internationally. I consider this kind of anti-Communism a disaster. I have had no part of it and have fought it steadily in the pages of *Dissent* and elsewhere.

LET ME NOW comment on your questions: Yes, the anti-Communism of the Left—variants 3 and 4, that is—to the extent that it bolstered official ideology, and in its own right as well, must bear a measure of responsibility for the war in Vietnam. It would seem inconceivable that the American population would have been willing to accept the sacrifices entailed by this war had it not been for the ideological *bourrage de cranes* that preceded it for over a decade. Those American intellectuals who now oppose this war and yet had some part in the official anti-Communism of the 50's need to engage in a good deal of soul-searching in this respect. But that is *their* problem. So far as I am concerned, I feel no reason to be ashamed of past positions. I opposed the American Celebration of the 50's; let those who indulged in it come forward and admit that the chickens have come home to roost in Vietnam and elsewhere.

American anti-Communist foreign policy, as presently conducted, is not likely to contain the spread of Communism as a system of ideas but is more likely to lead to its continued vitality in the underdeveloped nations of the world. Our alignment with the haves of the world drives many of the have-nots into the arms of one or another version of totalitarianism.

I devoutly hope that other areas of the world will be spared the ordeal of a Communist takeover, but I am not prepared to call for crusades anywhere in the Third World in order to stop native Communist regimes from taking over. Our present foreign policy in effect prefers the absence of development to the chance of a Communist takeover. I opt for development even at the risk that certain of the have-not nations might fall for one form or another of what are from my point of view, distasteful regimes. I am for developmental aid both for intrinsic human and humane reasons and because I would hope that sufficient aid might prevent takeover by totalitarian regimes in many non-Western countries, but I oppose aid that is tied to ideological guarantees of certified anti-Communism.

Yes, American anti-Communism of the third and fourth variety has been a dupe or a slave to some of the "darker" aspects of American foreign policy. It has helped to cloak the moves of American power on the world scene in a mantle of self-righteousness and has allowed statesmen to engage in the most devious power games with a good conscience. By dividing the world into those areas committed to the powers of light and those governed by the powers of darkness, it has made it difficult for us to realize that most of the world is neither dark nor light but rather gray. It has thus prepared for crusades rather than for compromises, for final confrontations rather than for pragmatic adjustments.

To sum up: Although I am as opposed to the principles of Communism and to its political practice as I have been in the past, I feel that the political map of the world has basically changed

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since the mid-50's. World Communism no longer exists as a unified political force or ideological vision. Western Europe is no longer menaced by either Soviet expansion or internal Communist takeover. Hence the *raison d'être* for official anti-Communism as formulated in the 40's has largely disappeared.

Official anti-Communism is now in the main an ideological justification for an American global involvement on the side of those who try to hold back the tide of fundamental change in the underdeveloped areas of the world. It has led to our sinister and suicidal involvement in Vietnam and it is likely to lead to similar involvements in other parts of the world. Those committed to a liberal or radical vision will have to hold fast to a principled rejection of Communist ideology and practice, while at the same time being opposed to the reactionary ventures of American foreign policy which are but too often justified by official anti-Communist ideology. If men of good will in the Third World come to realize that American intellectuals, or at least significant portions of them, are as firmly opposed to the imperialist ventures of their government as they are to Communist imperialism, there will exist some incentive for them to engage in an autonomous course. Only the emergence of such autonomous action in the Third World might halt the spread of totalitarian systems. The official anti-Communism of our governmental and military establishment, insofar as it prevents such autonomous action, is a profoundly regressive ideology which American intellectuals need to oppose in a principled and decided manner if they wish to play a political role on the American scene. As to the professional cold-warriors, it is indeed high time that they were put out to pasture.

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Paul Goodman: I doubt that I belong in this symposium. I have always—since about age 19 (1927)—been "anti-Communist," if Communism means a strongly statist regime repressive of liberties. But I have never been "liberal," if liberalism means social engineering, a fetishism of parliaments without leavening by populism and civil disobedience, and/or a heavy reliance on the profit motive. I am metaphysically democratic and would not oppose an authentic General Will (though I would go into exile if it were too disgusting); but in fact in the so-called democracies, there is little real democracy because of baronial corporations, semi-monopolized mass media, and entrenched bureaucracies. And both actual liberalism and actual Communism tend to be militaristic and imperialist: in this crucial respect there is little to choose between them, except that the liberal states have usually been richer and therefore more inclined to use overt or covert violence to maintain the status quo rather than change it.

Neither am I "of the Left," if this means preferring socialism as an economy. For certain underdeveloped regions and for certain aspects of very advanced technologies, social control seems to be most efficient; and pure socialism across the board has moral virtues. But a free market and individual enterprise, if they can be maintained, also have moral advantages and have certainly proved themselves economically. But whatever the economy, to me the important tests are whether there is the possibility of countervailing political power and whether people have real options as to their style of life. (For a high technology, the Scandinavian mixed system best passes these tests.) The present American system is so base and ugly that I think I would prefer "socialism," but it would have to be loose indeed to allow as much individual safety and freedom of enterprise as I consider indispensable for human growth.

What, then, to say about "liberal anti-Communism," the subject of this symposium?

By and large, in my opinion, the anti-Communism of the Left did not help to create the present climate of American opinion. Where the Left has failed is in not providing a critique and a program of resistance and direct action to cope with the tyranny of the corporate, bureaucratic, and military establishment that has grown apace in this country and now prevails. Is it a surprise that democracy is not working in imperialist affairs? Has it been working for seventy years? During this century the Americans have been only too open to conceptions like anti-Communism. Smug, lusting for private goods, plunged into One World with narrow ideas; with capital and labor tied to a swollen subsidized war economy; with technology and management expanding overseas; and withal, most individuals being powerless and anxious, and prone to irrational identifications and projections—it was not hard for such a people to be sold both the American Century and the Communist Menace by Hearst, Luce, Spellman, Chambers of Commerce, the lobbyists of the Armed Forces committees, J. Edgar Hoover, etc., etc. This process did not need radicals and professors. The chief effect of the more rational anti-Communism of intellectuals has been to confuse themselves and *to make it impossible for them to take a revolutionary stand against the home threat to American democracy, and to conspire with their fellows internationally to fight for peace.*

Consider a few examples. Magazines like *Dissent* have given most of their space to the defects of American society which are our first order of business. But unfortunately, embarrassed by their own socialist nostalgia and needing to show themselves resolute against totalitarian socialism, they have been feeble in their critique in such whop-

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ping topics as the industrial-military, the genesis of the cold war, the popular revolutions in underprivileged nations. If *Dissent* had been more forthright on these matters, it must certainly have called for populist resistance, illegal if necessary. Its Left-coalition party politics has been ludicrously inadequate to the danger. It has always been unable to distinguish between the open illegality of populism—e.g., black power, the student movement, the peace movement—and its memories of elitist Stalinism. Thus it has betrayed the bright American spirit of anarchic freedom. And *this failure has added to the drift of students and Negroes to Trotskyism and Maoism,* precisely what *Dissent* disapproves of.

IN THIS COUNTRY, at least, people like the Congress for Cultural Freedom have been more contemptible than maleficent. When one found, for example, that they were eager to lead the attack on Russia's censorship of *Dr. Zhivago* but were uninterested in our own cases or cases neutral in the cold war, it was hard to take them seriously as other than paid agents. My guess is that persons for whom Sidney Hook has provided ammunition were not honest citizens to begin with, though naturally this kind of yakety-yak has often made dialogue impossible—and that was no doubt the CIA purpose, sabotage. Abroad, of course, the effect has been more deadly, to create universal distrust of and disgust with the Americans, so that no international movement is possible.

The earnest voice of Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr in the *New Leader* has been different. Niebuhr's tough "realism" probably did have the effect of making some sensitive souls so alive to the Communist evil that they could not conceive that our own establishment could become equally diabolic. Indeed, this has been one of the chief bad effects of anti-Communism on the climate of opinion: not that it painted the reds black, but that it lulled the American self-delusion of righteousness or merely venial sin. Given our position as a rich exploiter of a starving world—not to speak of our unspeakable past with the Indians and Negroes—we simply could not afford the luxury of Dr. Niebuhr's "Immoral Society." At this degree, one must *first* repent and try to undo; and the Vietnam war has brought Reinhold Niebuhr to understand this.

But none of the foregoing amounted to much. Far more malign has been the kibitzing by liberals like the *New Republic,* COMMENTARY, James Reston of the *Times.* These have been detached—which is a plausible, though not essential, position for critical intellectuals; they have published keen and often devastating analyses of both sides of the Iron Curtain; but they have so managed that nothing has added up to a new position which would logically have to follow. Editors proceed as if they had no memory of what they printed in the last issue. In the case of an individual journalist like Reston the effect is grotesque; it should be impossible for a man to have written some of his reports and then come back the next day as if the American regime were still credible and worthy of comment in its own terms rather than seeking a revolutionary alternative. Thus, the status quo, including the cold war, has been allowed to preserve a shabby legitimacy; and intellect is reduced to impotent kibitzing. Within the United States, the CIA could not ask for more—and I assume that among the intellectuals I am now discussing it has gotten it for nothing. It is out of the question that intellectual people could approve and support the government's policy, but it is sufficient if their voices are dissipated in random outcries, turned into a babble, and no action follows. Meantime, the monstrous premises that are empowered persist, wreak their will, escalate. Who needs moral authority?

It is uncanny to me that intellectuals (of all countries) have allowed themselves to use the We-They terminology of power politics. At least as far back as the First World War it must have been sufficiently clear that the worthwhile conflict in the world was not between We and They power blocs, but between the people of the world and the power structures of the world embracing both (or sometimes three) sides. Since the atom bombs, everybody *knows* this. Indeed, chiefs of the great states have *said* it, although they themselves are the menace of universal destruction that they mention. The Disarmament Conference has now had a hundred thousand sessions, the stockpiling of bombs continues, we are starting on the anti-missile missiles, and despite the treaty there will be armed platforms in space—if there is time. Nevertheless, we have the astounding situation that in two generations radical intellectuals have produced no program of theory and action that mankind can rally to. Instead, they have solemnly agreed to discuss garbage like "containment" and "deterrence" and "have they changed their spots?" (Only radical youth, in many countries, know the score in their bones and refuse to play the game; but their theorizing—though not their actions—is expectedly jejune.) Thus, the most disastrous effect that "anti-Communism" and "Communism" have had is that we are on the brink of doom without even a party or movement or strategy and tactics to put up a fight for life.

IF THE QUESTION is asked specifically, what is the moral and politic thing to do about Vietnam?—an idle question, since our regime is not moral or politic—the answer is easy: 1) bring to America a few thousand adherents of Ky whom we have used and made doubly detestable, and settle them handsomely in Texas across from LBJ's ranch; 2) get out ourselves; 3) offer to pay as an indemnity about two years' cost of the war—40 billions!—for reconstruction and any *broad-based* schemes of economic development; and 4) urge

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the Vietnamese quickly to get themselves a government to accept the money.

I do not think that the Vietnamese adventure has ever serously been about "Communism"; it is, rather, an incident of American expansion that happens to have gotten out of hand. There are far worse governments than Ho Chi Minh's, which cause us no qualms; and there are few governments as bad as those we have supported in the South. There has been no morality whatever in destroying Vietnam as part of our policy with regard to China—but as of today (May 21, 1967) it seems likely that we will have succeeded in working the thing up to the point of getting embroiled directly with China, with the applause of a majority of the American public.

PAUL GOODMAN's *books include* Growing Up Absurd, The Empire City, The Community of Scholars, *and most recently,* Like a Conquered Province.

Michael Harrington: I am for democracy and socialism for all people. I oppose America's tragic intervention in Vietnam and favor ending the cold war even though I regard bureaucratic collectivism, which is how I define Communism, as a plausible but terrible future for the world. I am also an anti-Communist and an anti-anti-Communist.

In recent years, a new generation of radical youth has been profoundly shocked by the horrors of a war directed by a populistic President. Some of them have reacted by adopting a theory of the international anti-Communist conspiracy. Like all conspiracy theses, this one blurs differences and shuns distinctions. Worst of all, it leads to an agnosticism about the historic options for good and evil now confronting mankind.

There are, of course, reactionary versions of anti-Communism which struggle against the totalitarianism of the pseudo-Left for the sake of the totalitarianism or authoritarianism of the Right. Hitler and McCarthy are obvious examples. There is a conservative anti-Communism which fears any social change and masks its defense of Western injustice by hypocritical, if usually accurate, denunciations of Communist injustice. Winston Churchill and John Foster Dulles come to mind. All liberals and radicals should be anti-anti-Communist where these, or similar, anti-Communisms are at issue. There is also an anti-Communism based on a single-standard advocacy of freedom and justice everywhere in the world. It proposes, among other things, one-man one-vote in Saigon and Hanoi, Mississippi and Madrid, and even in Peking and Moscow. I subscribe to it.

Now it is, of course, true that sophisticated manipulators in the American government have used this anti-Communism of the Left for their own anti-Left purposes. The most outrageous case in point is the CIA infiltration of democratic organizations. This was a shrewd and despicable policy and those who wittingly cooperated in it were worse than dupes (hopefully, however, they will not be treated in that style perfected by the House UnAmerican Activities Committee for the degradation of fellow travelers and former Communists). But then does the whole sordid episode prove that any anti-Communism, no matter how subtle, gives aid and comfort to the official, napalm-wielding variety?

According to McCarthyite logic, the answer is yes. The witch-hunters held that anyone whose position coincided with that of the Communist party on a given issue—say civil rights or HUAC—was therefore a Communist collaborator. The democratic Left fought vigorously against this doctrine of guilt by association. But now the international anti-Communist conspiracy theory gives an ultra-Left twist to the old red-baiting syllogism: hawks are anti-Communist; liberals are anti-Communist; therefore the liberals are unwitting hawks and must take responsibility for the death of children in Vietnam. For my part, Mr. Kosygin cannot keep me from denouncing American poverty, racism, and imperialism just because he superficially seems to agree with me (*The Other America* got a predictably good review in *Pravda*). And Mr. Johnson cannot silence me with regard to Russian, or Chinese, exploitation, class privilege, and imperialism just because he too thinks they are bad things.

But what of the more ingenious versions of the theory of the international anti-Communist conspiracy? Left anti-Communism, it is said, helps create an atmosphere in which all is permitted against the demoniacal enemy. Such a charge of generating the wrong *Zeitgeist* is difficult to deal with because it is as vague and yet as sticky as cotton candy. However, a brief excursion into current history should make the issues more substantial.

THE PROXIMATE cause of the American involvement in Vietnam was the invasion of South Korea in 1950. Up until that time the cold war had been largely confined to Europe and the opinion polls showed a majority in favor of admitting Communist China to the UN. With the Korean war, however, all that changed. The nation moved to the Right, McCarthyism thrived, and the French were able to enlist Washington in their colonialist crusade in Indochina. In the 50's, John Foster Dulles went far beyond the relative pragmatism of the original containment doctrine and developed an anti-Communist theology which required global intervention and scotch-taped alliances like SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. John F. Kennedy inherited the American presence in Vietnam from Eisenhower and Dulles. In the greatest single error of his administration, he escalated the conflict there—yet it was also Kennedy who, in June of

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1963, challenged the ideology of the whole cold war.

Liberals made their share of errors during those years (and those of us on the radical wing of the democratic Left criticized many of them at the time). They did not understand the profoundly conservative, though reversible, tendencies of a rich America in a revolutionary world. They therefore underestimated the forces which worked to militarize Point Four and all the other bright hopes and to recruit practically every rightist dictator on the planet into the "Free" world. And some had illusions about the early Diem—but then so did Ho Chi Minh. Yet, and this is the crucial point, the distinctive characteristic of liberalism in this period was precisely its concern for economic and social alternatives to Communism rather than for bloody crusades.

In all of this, liberals—and the democratic Left generally—did indeed try to persuade America that it had an obligation to offer the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America a more humane way of overcoming backwardness than totalitarianism. The fact that this internationalism can be tragically misapplied, as Mr. Johnson is doing now, does not contradict its basic validity. Indeed, it is my personal impression that the bulk of those protesting against the war in Vietnam today do so precisely out of liberal, internationalist motives. Only a small minority in the peace movement agrees with the McCarthyite notion that one must be in favor of, or indifferent to, Communism in order to oppose the war.

Finally, let me touch upon the most recent critique of Left anti-Communism. The crackup of the Communist monolith, it is argued, demonstrates that there is no such thing as Communism but rather a variety of antagonistic Communisms. Therefore anti-Communism has become a meaningless obsession left over from the days of Joseph Stalin.

In part, this view expresses an epochal truth which often eludes the State Department. The new ruling classes in Communist nations can be as narrow and self-interested as the old ruling classes of the West. More important, the changes in Russia and Eastern Europe are often a response to pressures from below and a proof that even totalitarianism cannot permanently still the democratic aspirations of the people. But to then conclude that polycentrism demonstrates that there is no such thing as Communism is a sloppy and anti-radical way of thinking.

Under all varieties of Communism, the state owns the means of production and the bureaucracy owns the state through a monopoly of political power. Thus, Communism can be described as bureaucratic collectivism. In this context, Russia and China represent different historic examples of the same social system. And Communism is understood, not as the spawn of the devil or the product of Dean Rusk's imagination, but as a workable, reactionary way of responding to very real problems.

In the less developed countries, bureaucratic collectivism is a way of sweating capital out of workers and peasants while limiting their consumption. If the gap between the rich and poor nations continues to grow and there seems to be no other way to modernize except by brute force, this approach will appeal to elites in the Third World independently of any machinations by Moscow or Peking. In a mature bureaucratic collectivist society like Russia the system presides over an advanced technology, but the ruling class does not hand power over to the people. Indeed, in the United States itself, the alliance of governmental and corporate bureaucracies could lead to an utterly managed, manipulated society with a democratic facade.

Communism is, then, a plausible but totalitarian version of the future. I believe that it is at least possible that free men can rule themselves and that we need, not simply reforms, but a new democratic civilization. I am therefore anti-capitalist and, in the specifically socialist sense of the term, anti-Communist.

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Sidney Hook: The notion that anti-Communist liberalism has had a profound influence on the conduct of American foreign policy—more particularly that it is responsible for the American presence and subsequent strategies in Vietnam—is a myth. It is a myth circulated by ritualistic liberals whose anti-anti-Communism has periodically been proved bankrupt by the persistence of Communists in acting like Communists. The leading anti-Communist liberal during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations was John Dewey. His warning that Stalin would resume his cold-war offensive unless peace was secured when the Kremlin had need of the West, went unheeded by Republicans and Democrats alike.

John Dewey had no successors. The small group whom he influenced exercised no more appreciable influence on the administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy than he did on the administrations of the 40's. They did not disapprove of everything that was done by the State Department, but in the main they were critical of its failures of omission and commission, of a policy which merely reacted to Communist initiatives instead of developing positive programs to strengthen the free world.

Let us begin by introducing some semantic order into the use of our terms. By a "liberal" I mean a person committed to the use of intelli-

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gence in behalf of the values of freedom—not Freedom in the large but those specific freedoms that enhance the significance and dignity of individual lives in a community of self-governing persons. A liberal therefore must be an anti-Communist just as he must be an anti-Fascist and an anti-totalitarian of any stripe. But an anti-Communist is not necessarily a liberal, for he may be a Fascist, and an anti-Fascist is not necessarily a liberal, for he may be a Communist. A liberal who is not an anti-Communist or an anti-Fascist is "a phoney." In the 30's I coined the expression "totalitarian liberal" to designate those professed liberals who entered into united fronts with totalitarians and willingly let themselves be exploited for Communist causes. They endorsed the Moscow Trials and in general served as apologists for the Soviet Union.

It is clear from this that a genuine liberal is not necessarily opposed to the *economy* of Communism, but that he is necessarily opposed to the political despotism of Communism. He is prepared to recognize and approve the fact that there is a far greater degree of socialization, albeit hidden, in some of the Western democracies, including the U.S., than many apologists for free enterprise and/or a Communist economy are aware of. In other words, the liberal puts democracy or freedom first and supports or opposes those social and economic changes that extend or restrict the ethos of democratic life. His basic allegiance is not to free enterprise but to freedom of choice—the freedom to live under any economic system, to believe or disbelieve in any religion, to accept or reject any style or form of the spirit expressed in art, literature, science, or philosophy. In short, the basic issue, according to the liberal philosophy, between the Western and Communist worlds, is *not* "capitalism or socialism" but the right to self-determination—national, political, economic, cultural—versus the forcible imposition of minority party rule.

The anti-Communist liberal recognizes that among the causes of Communist influence in a society is the failure of that society to give every group a vested interest in its preservation, and some sense of meaningful participation in determining the basic decisions by which it is affected. He therefore seeks to strengthen the plural democratic forms that make social progress possible, and in principle is opposed to the efforts of Communist regimes, whether in the Kremlin or Peking, to overthrow them by armed intervention or by subversion organized from without. He believes it is wrong to try to impose political freedom by force of arms on a nation which does not want it or has lost it. But he supports resistance to armed Communist aggression against the independence or freedom of non-Communist nations, by the use of sufficient force to make the Communists abandon their military adventure. This does not mean that the response to Communist military aggression anywhere in the world—whether Tibet or West Berlin—is automatic, or that we must always be prepared to risk more than what is threatened. General principles by *themselves* are no guides to action in specific cases because the principles may conflict and circumstances may be inauspicious; but without adherence to some principles, there can be no coherent and intelligent policy. Refinements aside, the anti-Communist liberal is committed to a double strategy—a program of social change or reform under the protective umbrella of a military defense that guarantees the freedom to initiate progressive measures.

THE RITUALISTIC liberal is one who believes that since Communism (like Fascism) arises out of social conditions of poverty and injustice, the best defense against it is fundamental social reform; nothing, he thinks, could be worse than military resistance to Communism because such resistance might lead either to a nuclear holocaust and the end of civilization, or to the triumph of totalitarianism in the democratic countries embarked on military defense rather than social reform. This was, as those old enough to remember will recall, essentially the point of view of the ritualistic liberals of the pre-Hitler period. In effect they argued that the best defense against Fascism was the elimination of the slums and poverty of Western Europe, England, and the United States.

The simple fact is that if we had followed the foreign policy advocated by the ritualistic liberals at the time of Hitler most of us would be dead by now. Yet a good many of the ritualistic liberals who have survived only by virtue of our disregard of their hysterical admonitions are still shamelessly repeating the same arguments, with some differences that reflect a younger vintage of political foolishness.

The new school of ritualistic liberalism does not share one of the fundamental positions of the old, according to which liberalism had no enemies on the Left. (It used to be believed in these circles that "Communists" were really liberals, or "agrarian reformers," in a hurry.) It is now admitted that Communists were and are enemies of democracy, but not to the same degree as Fascists (after all, Communists call their societies "democratic"). But the excesses of Communist tyranny at home and the posture of Communist aggression abroad are now explained as mainly due to the baleful influence of Stalin and Stalinism. With the end of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and the rise of polycentrism, we must recognize the great changes that have taken place in Communist domestic and foreign policy. Mao's Stalinist China may have to be feared in the future, but not now. Further, even the evils of Stalinism must be seen in perspective as part of the price paid for Russian (and Chinese) modernization—costs comparable to those paid by the West for its industrial revolution. Finally, although it was alarmist to say that in 1940 all of civilization was in danger of destruc-

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tion, today it is simple common sense. Did not that great scientist, C. P. Snow, proclaim in 1959 that it was an absolute "certainty" that the world would blow up in a decade unless universal nuclear disarmament were to prevail? This gives us at most a respite of two years! A detente with the Communist countries is therefore not merely diplomatically desirable, but a necessity of sheer physical survival.

There is considerable truth in this complex of beliefs. A profound change *has* taken place in the domestic life of the Soviet Union. This change is symptomized by the survival of Stalin's accomplices in crime. And even more important is the fact that the fissure in monolithic Communism produced by Tito while Stalin was still alive has now widened into a probably irreparable breach between Peking and Moscow and loosened the chains that bound the satellite nations to the wheel of their policy.

The basic error of those who see this and nothing more is the assumption that therefore the foreign policy of the Soviet Union will necessarily change—indeed, that it has already changed and that it will seek to establish a genuine form of peaceful coexistence. This is one of the root illusions of the ritualistic liberals who have become anti-anti-Communists. The truth, however, is that the foreign policy of the Kremlin since Stalin died has been less cautious and more aggressive than that of Stalin who originally broke with Tito, the most intransigent Communist of the postwar period, because he feared Tito would plunge the Soviet Union into war over Trieste, and who backed down in Iran, in Greece, and in Germany when the air-lift broke the blockade of West Berlin. Stalin never issued bloodcurdling threats of the kind made by Khrushchev. He would probably have avoided the risks Khrushchev took in Hungary and Cuba. Nor are Khrushchev's successors much different from him. It is clear that they were—and still are at this writing—prepared to underwrite, encourage, and defend the genocidal war of their Arab allies against Israel. If anything, history shows that domestic difficulties within the Soviet Union have had a sobering influence on its foreign policy. It has been more aggressive when it has been more "united."

This does not mean that the Kremlin or Peking wants war with the West. Neither country will ever go to war (if not attacked) unless it is confident of victory and survival. But both believe they can ultimately win by expanding their influence, and weakening the only power they really fear, the United States, by unremitting encouragement of wars for "colonial liberation" in countries that are not colonies, by subversion, and by neutralizing large sections of the population outside of the United States, and important sectors of public opinion within it. One of the great dangers of all pacifist, neo-isolationist, appeasement, or unilateral-disarmament policies, and their anti-anti-Communist propaganda, is that they may mislead the Communist powers. Communist intelligence seems much better informed as a rule than Western intelligence. But it has blundered badly in the past and can do so again. In the expectation that the United States will remain supine before Communist aggression, Moscow or Peking may take that one step too many or too far which will trigger world war.

IN PASSING it should be pointed out that the degree of de-Stalinization in domestic Soviet life, particularly in the strategically important cultural sector, has been exaggerated. The entire history of Soviet cultural life since the October Revolution has been one of thaws and freezes. The chief difference between Stalin's regime and the present is that dissidents are being censored, where they are not being jailed, instead of being shot. We should be grateful for this, but we should also recognize that the cultural climate is still not one that permits the necessary criticism of the helmsmen of Soviet policy. The failure of a single Soviet voice to protest the persecution of Pasternak, or the imprisonment of Brodsky, Daniel, and Sinyavsky, tells the story. As Svetlana Alliluyeva has pointed out—and who should know better?—not even under Tsarism when "gendarmes and policemen were the first critics of a writer's work" was the situation as bad as it is today. "Neither Gogol nor Schedrin was ever brought to trial for the sharpness of his satirical fantasies, and they were not punished for laughing at the absurdities of Russian life. But now you can be tried for a metaphor, sent to camp for a figure of speech."

The glorification of Stalin by Mao has led the Kremlin to halt the processes of de-Stalinization. A partial rehabilitation has set in since the XX and XXII Party Congress. Visitors to the Soviet Union who speak to professors and scientists come away with misleading notions of official policy. It is the leaders of the party bureaucracy who determine the policy and no one else. And they are still Communists. Last May in a remarkably frank discussion I held with one of the editors of *Pravda*, Vitali Gorionov, I was told that Stalin, despite "some excesses against Soviet legality" in the last years of his life, was a truly great man, that the Moscow Trials had not been frame-ups, and that Beria had misled Stalin about the loyalty of Yezhov and Yagoda! Stalin was no longer the scapegoat for the millions of imprisoned and slaughtered innocents, but rather Beria. Trotsky was still "an enemy of the people," not even a socialist but a plain counterrevolutionist! Gorionov was on an "unofficial" cultural visit to the United States, but his views were as unofficial as those of *Pravda* whose political line, he coolly insisted, was not controlled by the Politbureau even though admittedly it never disagreed with anything that appeared in *Pravda*.

I mention the domestic situation in the Soviet

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Union because a cheerful view of the agony of the Soviet people seems ingrained in the attitude of many anti-anti-Communists. One distinguished but rather fitful representative of this view sent me a message on the eve of a prolonged visit to the Soviet Union not to worry about the danger of his becoming a Communist. My reply was that such a worry had never entered my mind. My real worry was that he would return convinced that the members of the Politbureau were no longer Communists! And no sooner did he return than he predicted that it was "inevitable" that the economy and culture of the U.S. and the USSR would converge in a few years. Despite this evidence of "vulgar Marxism," he was no more a conscious Marxist than was Henry Wallace who spoke in almost identical terms in the early 40's. Democracy and Communism were both mythologies. Technology had replaced ideology as the decisive causal factor in shaping the political future. As if modern technology and industry could not support value systems as diverse as those of Hitler's Germany and Great Britain. Modern technology and industry may exclude certain value systems, but they are compatible with both free and totalitarian cultures. To derive a value system from a technological industrial structure is comparable to deriving a marriage system from the sexual structure of man. It is a gross confusion between necessary and sufficient conditions.

WHATEVER THE factors have been which have influenced American foreign policy toward Communist nations since World War II, it is fantasy to see liberal anti-Communism as one of them. The truth seems to me to be that there has been no consistent American policy. It has alternated between unintelligent yielding to Soviet pressure and unintelligent inflexibility. It is a history largely of missed opportunities. But there have been lucid intervals of intelligent response. It took considerable time for the United States to realize what the Soviet Union had in store for Poland, Czechoslavakia, Germany, and Western Europe. The history of the cold war is being rewritten by some ritualistic liberals to prove that the United States initiated it out of obsessive fear of Communism against a war-torn and justifiably vengeful Russia. The postwar mistakes of the United States have been many, but in fairness one must list actions which—even if they do not all reveal great statemanship—explode the fiction that the United States has blindly opposed Communism any time anywhere and independently of whether Communists have moved aggressively against the West.

The first such action was the withdrawal of the bulk of American troops from Europe while the Red Army still bestrode the continent, executing a horrible vengeance wherever it could against liberals and democratic socialists who refused to become pawns of the satellite Communist regimes established by the force of Russian arms. The second such action was the Marshall Plan offered to all European countries, including Communist ones, to help rebuild their economies. The third was the offer by the United States to surrender its monopoly of atomic bombs to an international authority at a time when Bertrand Russell was urging that the bomb be dropped on the Soviet Union if she refused to enter into an international accord with strict controls.* The fourth was the generous help given Tito, who had the lives of a score of American airmen on his conscience, after he broke with Stalin, proclaiming himself a better Stalinist than Stalin.

A liberal anti-Communist policy would have gone along with some of these moves but modified them to some extent. It would have pressed for a degree of liberalization in the domestic life of Yugoslavia as a condition of our aid to Tito. But we asked nothing of Tito except that he take our aid, just as earlier we had asked nothing of Stalin except a few gestures when we helped him to survive Hitler's onslaught. Had American policy been influenced by liberal anti-Communism we would have exerted the same pressure on France as we did on the Netherlands to liberate its Asian colonies. It was de Gaulle who was responsible for the failure to give legitimate expression to the demands of Vietnam nationalism. It was a mistake for the State Department to veto General Clay's plan for breaking the Soviet blockade of West Berlin which might have led to Soviet withdrawal from Germany. (The cautious Stalin would never have fought the United States while it had a monopoly of the atomic bomb.) It was a mistake to announce that South Korea was outside the sphere of vital American interests because this invited the Communists to invade. It was a mistake to accommodate the British Tory regime which hoped to bring Nasser to heel by *our* threat of withdrawing aid for the Aswan Dam. American encouragement of the Bay of Pigs fiasco was a colossal blunder, not retrieved by the fact that Kennedy broke off the air support. (It was also irresponsible of him to have called for an invasion of Cuba in his campaign speeches.) But can anyone doubt that the U.S. had the power to destroy Castro if it had wished, on grounds better than those Castro offers for launching guerrilla wars against Venezuela and other countries, especially if it had been inspired by an *anti-communisme enragé*? It was a mistake to send marines into the Dominican Republic. But the reason they were sent was the erroneous belief that Bosch's return was being engineered by Castroites, that it was an attempt by a foreign Communist govern-

* "Even at such a price [the destruction of Western Europe], I think war would be worthwhile. Communism must be wiped out, and world government must be established." This means that Russell was prepared to sacrifice half a billion people to ensure the supremacy of a free society!

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ment to subvert a non-Communist government by force. The subsequent election established even to Bosch's satisfaction that unfortunately he did not command the support of the majority of the population.

Why anyone should hold anti-Communist liberals responsible for the American presence in Vietnam is obscure to me. We should have taken the same position with respect to France and Vietnam as we did with respect to Algeria. Things were too far gone under French rule to save the situation. But whatever the mistakes of the past, they cannot now be undone. Anti-Communist liberals are divided today on the policy to be followed in Vietnam. If few are hawks, still fewer are in favor of immediate withdrawal and the surrender to torture, imprisonment, and death of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese who resisted Communism both in North and South Vietnam with our encouragement. Those who call for the de-escalation of the conflict in Vietnam only by *one* side, and denounce *only* the Americans for the death of innocent victims of military action, while refusing at the same time to condemn the Vietcong terror that has resulted in the death of many more innocents, are attempting to lynch the United States in the court of public opinion. If anything they are making a negotiated peace settlement more difficult.

THE CHARGE that liberal anti-Communist groups "have been a dupe of, or slave to, the darker impulses of American foreign policy," would be comical if it were not so absurd. To the extent that they have concerned themselves with foreign policy, their public record is one of independence, and sometimes criticism of American foreign policy. Because part of the financial support of some of these groups has come from the CIA, they have been made the target of the most vicious and objectionable form of "guilt by association." Granted that it would have been preferable for all their financing to come from private sources. But the pity of it is that the angels of philanthropy have been more willing to subsidize reactionary extremist groups on one side and ritualistic liberal groups on the other than liberal anti-Communist groups.

The only anti-Communist liberal group on the international scene whose work I know at first hand is the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Its activity has resulted in an open, consistent, and distinguished record in behalf of cultural and intellectual freedom everywhere. The Congress had no foreign policy. Its publications, whose contents were freely determined by their editors, frequently were critical of various facets of American culture and politics. In the face of actions like the appeal for clemency in the Rosenberg case, or the publication of articles in praise of Lumumba, no one can honestly impugn the intellectual independence of the Congress and its magazines. If anything, because of the unremitting charges in the Communist press that the Congress was an American organization, its publications and seminars made a special point of presenting a wide spectrum of views including "neutralist" positions.

The charge that the CIA subsidies put the Congress in the same position as Communist cultural organizations underwritten by the Soviet regime overlooks the crucial difference which the intellectual freedom to take any position on any subject, enjoyed by all participants in Congress functions, makes to the life of mind. The free market of ideas was *not* rigged but expanded into ever widening circles of dialogue in which no person represented anyone but himself. Some of the contributions made at Congress sessions and seminars compare favorably with the output of some of our best universities.

Whatever the limitations of American foreign policy may be, our open society still permits us to criticize it and hopefully to alter it. The United States still remains the chief shield of the free governments of the world against the totalitarian pressures of the Soviet Union and Communist China. Western Europe by itself could never stand up against Soviet might. Japan would be defenseless against China. In the long run Israel cannot, without the backing of a strong United States, survive the Communist-inspired and aided Arab onslaughts against it. In its own defense the United States must strive to preserve the integrity of the free world at its most strategic points in the hope that the Communist empires of the world will draw back from actions that risk war and gradually give their peoples a taste of freedom that may grow on what it feeds. Those who today pursue the policy of anti-anti-Communism in the field of politics and culture are the true gravediggers of liberalism. Among their major assumptions is either that the leaders of the Soviet Union and mainland China are no longer Communist or that Communism has evolved to a point where it genuinely accepts a detente with non-Communist countries, as well as the ideological coexistence without which the profession of "political coexistence" is a sham. These possibilities, however remote, are not excluded in the time-perspective of this century. But to base present policy on them is to lapse into the outlook of ritualistic liberalism—which may be most comprehensively defined as the view that it is possible to be liberal without being intelligent.

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Irving Howe: Let us look back and ask: what were the sources of *our* anti-Communism? I mean, of those political people and intellectuals who maintained an attachment to the values of democratic socialism. In its ear-

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liest and best version, this anti-Communism had nothing to do with proposals regarding foreign policy—that came later. It had nothing to do with the corruptions and vulgarities of the CIA, "conduit" foundations, plush conferences—that, for certain intellectuals, also came later. And as for the anti-Communism that could be framed in opposition to the radical outlook—that certainly came later.

The kind of anti-Communism, the only kind, to which I have been pledged these thirty years had its roots in the socialist experience of the 30's. With various modifications required by the intervening years, it remains a part of my political outlook: namely, the anti-Communism which acquires its urgency from a wish to achieve a profoundly democratic and egalitarian society.

A certain historical sense is required here. To those of us who experienced the debacle of socialism as the central fact in our intellectual lives, anti-Communism signified primarily *an effort to salvage the honor of the socialist idea.* We came to know in the most painful ways the brutalities and deceits of Stalinism. We lived through the era of purges, murders, and lies. And we learned one overwhelming lesson: that without democracy, socialism is a mere delusion; that if not a sufficient, democracy is a necessary condition for socialism. Nothing can make us yield that conviction—and by the same token, our opposition to Communist, as to all other, dictatorships.

We fought the political battle against Stalinism within the radical community, among intellectuals and in the labor unions. In the United States that battle has largely been won; internationally it is far from over. To see Communism as a major domestic concern is a kind of ideological myopia; to claim that on a world scale it has been rendered ineffectual is a form of wilful naivete. But for radicals and liberals trying to create viable peace, civil rights, and other progressive movements, there can be occasions when the struggle against "Left authoritarianism" (whether or not it stems directly from the CP) takes on an importance it does not have in the country at large. The phalanx of semi-, demi-, and quasi-fellow travelers no longer has any significant power in the United States, but it can still play a notable, and notably destructive, role in the Left-liberal world.

Do you suppose there were not people in the 30's ready to denounce us on grounds similar to those you mention in your first question? Do you suppose there were not people who said that by harping on the crimes of Stalin we were playing into the hands of Hearst and the reactionaries? And indeed, what was happening in Russia did provide useful ammunition for the Right, as well as for the ideological racketeers who made anti-Communism into a kind of spray gun with which to attack every liberal or radical opinion. We had the choice of telling the truth and knowing it might be exploited by the reactionaries, or of keeping silent and thereby not merely acquiescing in horrible events but allowing the reactionaries to exploit the truth all the more effectively. We chose, as best we could, to tell the truth.

Whatever our mistakes and absurdities (there was no shortage), I think we made a contribution to intellectual health. And even if in time to come we will be seen as no more than a transitional generation, forming a bridge between the socialism besmirched by the Stalinists and whatever humane radicalism may yet arise, we need have no regrets.

ANYONE MORE sophisticated than a street-corner speaker knows that the content of a radical or liberal politics cannot be defined merely through "anti-capitalism." Our age has seen a plethora of demagogues, from Hitler to Nasser, who proclaimed themselves anti-capitalist. If that was no reason to abandon our own opposition to capitalist society, it was certainly a reason to work out the most precise discriminations of viewpoint. We had to differentiate our kind of anti-capitalism from that of the enemies of our enemies who were *also* our enemies. Nowhere is it written that in politics you can look only in one direction for enemies.

Precisely the same holds in respect to anti-Communism. There is no such thing as pure anti-Communism, just as there is no such thing as pure anti-capitalism. *In their "official" or governmental versions, as propagated by Rusk and Mao, Ky and Nasser, both anti-Communism and anti-capitalism are ideological blights, verbal covers for oppression, demoralizing slogans that divert people from a humane politics.* Yet is this any reason to abandon our opposition to either capitalism or Communism?

Those "leftists" who refuse to take a principled stand against Communism try to create the impression that anti-Communism is a unitary politics linking everyone from Barry Goldwater to Norman Thomas. This is malicious nonsense—especially when it comes from people who keep insisting that in regard to Communism itself analytic discriminations are necessary. The meaning of one's anti-Communism depends on the political terms to which it is linked, the moral coordinates that give it shape. To insist upon some sort of indivisible anti-Communism, by means of which the far Right, the liberals, and the democratic Left can be mashed into one big amalgam, is a new form of McCarthyism.

Now I am ready to say—as I have said at least five thousand times in the past years—that anti-Communism can form a protective mask for detestable politics. This, in fact, has been one of the ways in which the rise of Communism has damaged the cause of freedom—it has given the far Right a number of seemingly effective arguments. I would even further say that the more serious versions of anti-Communism can harden into one

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or another kind of ideological rigidity, a failure to recognize new historical developments. Of course; that is a possible risk in all political thought. Yet it is a risk less likely to occur among those who in principle are devoted to the ethic of democratic controversy than among devotees of a total ideology.

I see no merit whatever—indeed, only evasiveness—in the view currently fashionable among New Leftists that (to quote Staughton Lynd and Tom Hayden) they "refuse to be anti-Communist." If someone thinks that the societies existing in the Communist world are essentially progressive or desirable, then "a refusal to be anti-Communist" is not exactly an heroic stance. If, however, one believes that these are oppressive and undesirable societies, then the Lynd-Hayden formula is merely cowardice. How, in any case, can anyone actively involved in politics avoid taking a stand, no matter how complex and modulated, in regard to so crucial a matter as Communism?

I find myself equally disturbed by sentiments one hears these days among intellectuals that "anti-Communism is passé." If they have in mind State Department rationales and popular myths, then these should always have been rejected—as some of us always did. But if they have in mind the basic principles to which I have referred here, then there is nothing whatever passé about anti-Communism (except, of course, to those intellectuals interested in fashion rather than truth).

It is disturbing to me that a libertarian like Paul Goodman should cooperate with a section of the peace movement containing strongly authoritarian elements and rarely, if ever, speak out in criticism of them. I do not mean that Goodman should drop his fierce opposition to the Vietnam war, which I share, or his activities against it, which I respect; yet it seems to me that a man always ready to examine the moral credentials of his political opponents ought occasionally to inspect those of his allies. And to do that he would not have to look far: one of his close collaborators, a co-editor of *Liberation* magazine, is David Dellinger, a pacifist who finds it appropriate to praise totalitarian regimes.

THESE DAYS it is frequently said that there is no longer a monolithic bloc, hence traditional anti-Communism has become irrelevant. When people speak in this way, they unwittingly reveal that they are thinking mostly as putative advisers of the State Department, since in respect to foreign policy such statements make a good deal of sense. But for those of us concerned with both a reconstructed radicalism and intellectual freedom, the fact that there are conflicts among the Communist powers is no more a reason for relaxing our principled opposition to Communism than is the fact that there have always been conflicts among capitalist powers a reason for relaxing our opposition to capitalism. To be sure, in any particular situation the differences in political repressiveness among the Communist powers, or their differences in national aggressiveness, can be crucial. No one in his right mind would propose that either in political stance or in proposals for foreign policy Yugoslavia is to be equated with China. But what, after all, is new or sensational about this? We have always made parallel distinctions in regard to capitalist countries (e.g., England and Spain), even while maintaining a principled opposition to the social system itself.

Still, can one continue to speak of Communism as a distinctive form of society or a socio-economic model that can be usefully applied to Russia, China, Poland, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia? A satisfactory answer would have to be very complex, but I believe that finally it would be: yes. For all of these countries, despite the radical differences among them, share several crucial elements:

First, the domination of a total party-state which prevents opposition parties from functioning and otherwise stifles democratic processes.

Second, the Communist regimes are fundamentally hostile both to private property in its traditional capitalist forms and to genuine socialist relationships in the productive process. (Communism, in my view, represents an historically new social system, both anti-capitalist and anti-socialist, for which neither liberal nor Marxist theories have adequately prepared us.)

Third, all of these societies find their ideological justification in a body of doctrine loosely designated as Leninism. Divergences are of course growing among the Communist states as to the proper interpretation of texts, yet there remains a common historical source and a common proclaimed purpose.

Now, at some point in the future, the differences among the Communist powers may become so fundamental that there will no longer be any analytic profit in applying the same terms of designation to all of them. A country like Yugoslavia, for example, might drift back into capitalism or move forward to socialist democracy—though right now neither seems at all likely. If, however, either development were to occur, Yugoslavia would no longer be a Communist society in the sense I have here used the term, and a new analytic response would be required.

While these considerations lead to a principled anti-Communism, they cannot tell us how to respond to the exercise of Communist state power in any particular situation. And it has been this power which, in the postwar years, has presented us with the most perplexing problems. As long as we had merely to cope with Stalinism in the intellectual world or the trade unions, the problem was (conceptually) rather simple. But after the Second World War we had to ask ourselves: given the enormous growth of Russian power and the

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real possibility of a Communist takeover in Europe, could we, as internationalists and democratic radicals, simply declare ourselves indifferent to the struggle in Europe, simply maintain an attitude of simon-pure abstentionism? Or did we have to place ourselves in the tricky position of making foreign policy proposals for the United States, despite our continued opposition to its dominant political and social arrangements? There was, I think, no choice but to opt for the second course and it was here that the difficulties of anti-Communism really began, at least those which are today most under discussion.

In certain situations we judged it necessary to "support" the Western powers even while retaining the full right to criticize their conduct. We wanted, for example, to see Berlin defended and not fall to Eastern Germany: an estimate I still believe to have been entirely correct. We wanted the Marshall Plan, whatever its defects, to enable Western Europe to achieve its economic revival. We wanted the U.S. to provide socio-economic aid to underdeveloped countries, especially those, like India, that were struggling to enter the democratic path. Such a politics meant trying to influence, in a very modest way, the foreign policy of what remained, after all, a capitalist power. And we knew perfectly well—as can be seen in the incessant criticism of the U.S. in journals like *Dissent* all through the 50's and 60's—that simultaneously there were enormous pressures in this country toward a reactionary course in world politics, that the foreign policy of Dulles was very dangerous, that the fanatic and mindless anti-Communism flourishing both in government and among the people was both repulsive in its own right and likely to lead to disasters abroad.

There were choices to be made, some of them very painful. When the Hungarian revolution broke out ten years ago, socialists sympathized with it intensely; yet we had finally to acknowledge that we did not wish U.S. military intervention because we feared it might lead to a world war. Anti-Communism (and I here answer part of your question 2) could not, to a rational and humane mind, be the sole motive in political behavior or the sole determinant of foreign policy; it could only be one among many (world peace, national interest, colonial liberation, etc.); and the problem in making concrete political choices was to decide how much weight should be given to a particular motive or interest at a particular moment.

It became clear, furthermore, that the U.S. could exploit anti-Communist sentiments for all sorts of reactionary adventures, as in Vietnam; or that the price of "stopping" the Communists could come to seem utterly excessive; or that U.S. military interventions in underdeveloped countries helped the local reactionaries in the short run and thereby the Communists in the long run. During the 60's, as Europe became more stable, the cold war shifted toward the underdeveloped countries, and there, for reasons too complex to be stated here, the situation lacked the clarity of outline which by comparison the U.S.-Soviet conflict had had at an earlier time. The U.S. posture as a self-appointed protector of underdeveloped countries against Communist penetration—often signifying an indiscriminate hostility to indigenous revolutionary movements and a stupid class-bound sympathy for military-feudal rulers—is a posture with enormous dangers for the future. Here, those of us who remain principled anti-Communists and believe that democratic reformers and radicals should be helped in the underdeveloped countries, have to face extremely perplexing issues.

Even in the early stages of the cold war all of these difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that in the intellectual and, to a lesser extent, the radical worlds there began to be heard a crude and hysterical kind of anti-Communism, increasingly divorced from radical values, increasingly tied to State Department policies, increasingly ready to justify almost anything done by the U.S. in the name of anti-Communism. Some of us argued bitterly against this outlook, but in the era of the "American celebration" we were not heeded. A good many intellectuals lost their bearings and, as has recently become clear, even surrendered their independence.

Do I then feel any responsibility for American policy in Vietnam? None whatever, in any direct sense. For even during the time when it seemed to us necessary to support certain U.S. actions abroad (Berlin), we still found it necessary to devote a large portion of our energy to criticizing the U.S. for precisely the kind of policies that led to Vietnam. Yet anything one does can have unforeseen and undesired consequences, and in that general sense I suppose that any political person who has ever attacked Communist tyranny in a sustained way might have contributed to the atmosphere making for the Vietnam war. But then it is also possible that over the decades socialists and liberals, through their critique of capitalism, have unwittingly contributed to the atmosphere that enabled demagogues like Nasser, Sukarno, and worse to do shameful things in the name of anti-capitalism. The only way to avoid with certainty such dangerous possibilities is to refrain from action entirely; the way to minimize such dangerous possibilities is to try, as best one can, to make intellectual distinctions and achieve political clarity.

In saying this I do not mean to imply that I and my political friends have not made mistakes over the last two decades; of course we have. But I much prefer to confess to the errors I have made than to those others have made.

FINALLY, A WORD about your last question. It is phrased, perhaps intentionally, in an overly

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sweeping fashion. That certain intellectual institutions have had CIA connections hardly proves that "liberal anti-Communism has been a dupe of . . . the darker impulses of American foreign policy." I refuse to believe that, say, the Congress for Cultural Freedom represented the whole of "liberal anti-Communism." I know damned well that neither the Congress nor similar groups spoke for "radical anti-Communism."

The revelations about CIA ties are a sad and ugly business. It was one thing to argue, no matter how vehemently, with intellectuals one regarded as honest men of contrary opinion; it is quite another thing to learn that some were appearing under false pretenses insofar as they were no longer autonomous men but had become knowing accomplices of a secret intelligence service. That is not the business of intellectuals; that is not the business of people concerned with a disinterested scrutiny of ideas or a passionate defense of freedom. Even from the viewpoint of people who sincerely believed in an uncritical or almost uncritical support of the West during the cold war, the CIA connection was indefensible.

The whole matter very much needs an airing. Those intellectuals who have been accused owe it to themselves and their colleagues to speak out with a candor and completeness that, to my knowledge, has not yet occurred. To say this is not at all to ask for ritual confessions or excommunications. But too much has been compromised and besmirched for silence to be a way out. Perhaps this symposium will provide the occasion for the necessary retrospection.

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Murray Kempton: 1. I should hope more than anything else that this discussion will proceed without the spite and rancor which afflicted so much of the Communism of the 30's and the anti-Communism of the 50's. In deference to that dream of fraternity, I must beg off attempting to assay the responsibility of the "anti-Communist Left" for Vietnam. Abstract designations (this one covers Jay Lovestone *and* Norman Thomas) are of very little use for description and almost none for judgment. Guilt is, after all, personal. If we have been taught nothing else, I hope to have learned that you have said very little about a man when you have put a label on him.

Fifteen years ago, to be a member of the anti-Communist Left meant generally to accept historical American liberalism as the alternative to the Soviets. To the degree we made this acceptance, it is hard to argue that most of us can disclaim any contribution to the climate which has ended with Vietnam.

Vietnam is a liberal's war. Mr. Johnson summed up the image appointed for it when he described General Westmoreland as possessed of a soldier's head and a social worker's heart. Mary McCarthy has noticed how much the rhetoric of our pacification campaign sounds like everything that has been taught in political-science departments of American universities for the last twenty years.

No member of the Left could have been employed by the government of this country unless he had been certifiably anti-Communist. Even those of us who had no aspirations for such service found it useful to describe ourselves as anti-Communist. I do not mean to exaggerate the McCarthy terror; still, to enter at all seriously into the American debate, some security clearance was needed, even if you had to proclaim it yourself. I am not saying that we were insincere in accepting this description of ourselves but rather that we accepted it without thinking it through. For twenty years now, the foreign policy of the United States has been conducted in the language which religions evoke for the struggle between our light and your darkness.

To call oneself a member of the anti-Communist Left was, I'm afraid, to speak in some of the tones of religious incantation and to feel oneself as part of a holy war. Now that Vietnam has brought us to that turn at which holy wars generally arrive at one time or another, I do not think many of us can disclaim some responsibility—even if only for pronouncing the litany—for the atmosphere which so overbore our prudence and our tolerance as to bring us to the bombing of farmers in villages.

In fairness to others, I should talk of my own part. So far as other Americans are concerned, I long ago stopped thinking of myself as an anti-Communist. For quite a while, though, I retained some prejudice against alien Communists at war with the United States.

Part of the reason for this prejudice was that I had been a soldier myself under remarkably amusing circumstances. I identified with our soldiers. What gradually became an enraged distaste for domestic anti-Communism began, in fact, with annoyance at the way this government treated former soldiers who happened to be Communists. I have always thought of myself as a nationalist if not a patriot; it would be embarrassing to me to think myself a supporter of the enemies of my country.

It will be noticed that, in taking this attitude, I was entrusting the definition of the enemies of my country to a government which I knew from direct experience could not even be trusted not to interfere with the liberties of its own citizens.

The only value of the Vietnam experience has been educational. If it had not lasted so long, we should not, I think, with quite the same certainty, have been able to understand how much of the history of the United States in the world for twenty years now has been, as was said of Turkish

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history, "entirely military and entirely mendacious." We have now been watching Vietnam for two years; the Bay of Pigs lasted three days and Guatemala three weeks. Vietnam works on the understanding as a slow-motion film does; here we can follow actions which at all other times have simply flashed by. There can now be no excuse for us not to know what our leaders are like.

I COME NOW to an interior quarrel whose exposition may disqualify me from any part in this symposium at all. I want to know why it is so hard for me to express the sympathy which, in logic, I should feel for the Vietcong. I am, after all, not a pacifist. The genuine pacifists have had, all in all, the most honorable record of any group of Americans over the last twenty years. But, unless it is genuine, that position seems to me a dishonorable disguise. It would be convenient to be able to say that the enemy is war itself and not the government of the United States. But I am not used to being neutral. It is already painful enough to notice how obviously more attractive Ho Chi Minh is than General Ky. Will the time not come when, in our hearts, we shall have to choose between them?

We are unready for that choice, for a reason which seems to me more relevant than the words we still use about being of the Left or of the Right. Our trouble is that, as Americans, we do not have the habit of being in the opposition. We do not have Burkes and Foxes. That is why it is possible to read a work condescending to Burke from the pen of a member of the political-science department of a university whose international-relations department may have a subsidy from the CIA and whose biology department is assisting the Defense Department in germ-warfare research. A man in the real world must be able to say, when he has to, that his government is the enemy.

2. No, in sorrow, because I wish real life were simple enough so that one could feel that one had said something when one called oneself an anti-Communist. To say so is immediately to have to take most of it back.

"Are you still willing to support a policy of containing the spread of Communism?" I assume the questioner is talking about real toads in real gardens. If so, what policy of containing Communism am I being asked to support? That of the government of the United States, I assume again.

Arthur Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days* contains one superlative *précis* of that policy. When Trujillo was assassinated, Schlesinger says, "Kennedy examined the situation realistically:

" 'There are three possibilities,' he said, 'in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third.' "

The most temperate and sophisticated man to be President of the United States in our lifetime thus accepted the "policy of containing Communism" as leading to the conclusion that Trujillo was preferable to Castro. Forget the dubious assumption that I "once supported containment because [I was] opposed on *moral* rather than narrowly political grounds to the spread of a totalitarian system." Ask yourself whether the government of the United States has ever been so opposed; that is the policy of containment we are talking about.

3. I caught myself the other day reading the names of the Board of Directors of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and trying to guess CIA affiliations. There is a little of J. B. Matthews in us all. I should like to govern this impulse; to call a friend "a dupe of, or a slave to, the darker impulses of American foreign policy" sounds to me like language we ought to get out of our systems.

We are fortunate to have Thomas Braden's memoirs of his career as the CIA's paymaster to the anti-Communist Left because otherwise it would be hard to appreciate the mindless vulgarity of this operation. You pity anyone who had dealings with this sort of man as you ought to pity the Hollywood Communists for the former taxi driver who was their district organizer. Braden's assertion that an editor of *Encounter* was "an agent of ours" is the language of an *aparatchik*; and our experience with the House Un-American Activities Committee ought by now to have made us thoroughly suspicious of these confessions which are also boastings.

The CIA experience, for most of my friends who engaged in it directly, was, I suspect, very like what the experience of being a Communist must have been for many other Americans. That is, there were in it no very large sins. There are, however, certain affronts to one's domestic sense. When an apparatus tells a man that reasons of state make it necessary for him to conceal his affiliation, it may or may not have harmed his character but it has certainly damaged his capacity to function as a friend. An Englishman who was being paid by *Encounter* had, for example, a clear right to know whether he was being paid by CIA funds, because, if there is one thing that ought to be a conscious act, it is the decision as to whether you will enter the paid service of a foreign government. An Englishman who wondered and asked an American friend had a right, assuming that the friend knew, to a frank and honest answer. I have always thought that E. M. Forster's statement that he would sooner betray his country than betray a friend was deficient in logic. Still, in the real world the issue is generally presented as a real betrayal of one's friend as against a fancied betrayal of one's country; and Forster's is quite a good rule in practice, just as any society whose rules make it impossible for one single man to trust another is a very bad society in practice.

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My own mind, I'm afraid, is quite divorced from the politics of Right or Left, which will not, I hope, be taken to mean that I want it to be divorced from political responsibility. The most substantial lesson to me from the CIA experience has come from the realization that Ignazio Silone was the editor of a magazine which would very probably never have been published without a CIA subsidy. The lesson seems to me neither that the CIA was so wicked that it even corrupted Silone nor that the CIA was so high-minded that it even helped Silone. The lesson is in the figure of Silone himself. For he is a man who could have this experience, suffer, if you choose, this suspicion and remain absolutely beyond our criticism. Because we know him, we know that he could not do the low or dishonorable thing. We think of Silone as we always have because we know what he has always been. The resource of a man, as of a movement, is not the intellectual but the moral capital. There are not many of us who have earned that automatic trust; and that is perhaps the worst thing that can be said of the anti-Communist Left.

Still, we are not as old as we sometimes think we are; and, if we have the sense detachedly and forgivingly to learn from what has happened to us, there remains a way to go and work to be done.

MURRAY KEMPTON, *the New York* Post *columnist, is the author of* America Comes of Middle Age *and* Part of Our Time.

Robert Lowell: COMMENTARY's three questions touch on a hundred submerged thoughts and half-thoughts and unanswered puzzles—two-thirds of a lifetime. I will try to be brief and no more precise than I can honestly feel and believe.

1. I was never, I think, anti-Communist, but I was and still am anti-Stalinist. In the scramble for possessions and spheres of influence immediately after the last war, I was strongly opposed to the Russian polemic and policy in Korea and Europe. I suppose I believed we should hold what we had and not advance. I suppose, if I had been called up for the Korean draft, I would have been a conscientious objector. A helpless, inconsistent position, but I have never gotten over the horrors of American bombing. For me, anti-Stalinism led logically—Oh, perhaps not so logically—to my being against our suppression of the Vietnamese. For others anti-Stalinism led to the opposite.

2. I see no usefulness in labeling oneself anti-Communist. Communist regimes as bad as Stalin's may reappear (though I think there's none on the scene now) but tyranny is not a monopoly of Communism. In some poor countries, Communism is perhaps the best regime that is likely to be obtained. A necessary disaster, I am tempted to say, for such countries—a disaster because after the carnage and idealism of the revolution, the country will be saddled with another crushing and leaden bureaucracy. Yet *necessary,* because something better won't come, though of course it could and should. I don't see any justice or practicality in tearing the world apart on this issue.

3. The CIA scandal is too recent, hot, and confused to be judged rationally. It's given me more hours of troubled thinking than I would like to confess. My only connection was printing poems in *Encounter* and making a summer's trip to South America for the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Rumors were flying about that there were CIA agents in the Congress, but I was given no instructions. At my first stop in Brazil, I answered some question about Castro by saying that he was "a hero and a tyrant," and vaguely felt that this sort of answer was pleasing neither to the Congress nor to leftist Brazilian intellectuals. The CIA literary magazines generally had high intellectual and cultural standards. A plausible argument could be made that Stephen Spender's *Encounter* was once the best literary magazine in English. Still, one is plagued by unhappy thoughts of gullibility, shallowness, and opportunism—are we the discredited generation?

ROBERT LOWELL *is the distinguished American poet.*

Dwight Macdonald: The most interesting and difficult of your questions is "Would you call yourself an anti-Communist today?" My answer is Yes, Maybe, and No.

Yes—if you mean not the ideas of Marx and Engels but their post-1917 exploitation, under the name "Communism," with varying degrees of faithfulness to the original, as a technique of action and propaganda for gaining power, and holding it. This kind of Communism seems to me a regression even from the modest standards of freedom, democracy, and equality before the law the bourgeois West has achieved after centuries of political struggle. A regression that sometimes, as with Mao's Red Guards and their anti-cultural Cultural Revolution, becomes a mirror-image reversal, Left becoming Right, of Marx's vision of Communism as "a society in which the full and free development of every individual becomes the ruling principle." In Mao's China, the ruling principle seems to be rather the full and free repression of every individual. Even the more bourgeoisified Communist countries lean more toward the Maoist than the Marxist line on the individual. In this sense, then, I am anti-Communist. I think the toiling masses need liberation from their liberators, and I believe that Western capitalism now offers them a better life, morally and materialistically, than Communism does.

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Maybe: When the Moscow Trials awakened me to what had actually been going on in Russia since 1929, Communism was a geographical and political monolith. The USSR was not only the sole Communist country—the only game in town—but it was also big ("One-Sixth of the Globe"), rich ("Moscow Gold" was not a Hearst fantasy), and totalitarian (the Stalin bureaucrats demanded the same instant service from the comrades abroad they had become used to at home). Therefore the Third International followed the Moscow line with a tropistic automatism the Kremlin's present occupants must recall with nostalgia as the caviar and vodka go round. After the war the monolith began to fragment with Tito's break in 1948. Stalin's death in 1955 was followed by the great "thaw" in Russia itself, a trend toward a more humane, liberal, bourgeois system which, after twelve years, seems clearly not a tactic, like Stalin's alternation of "hard" and "soft" periods, but a long-range strategy. The bases of totalitarian control remain, but the more extreme barbarities of the 1929-1955 period have been abolished and seem unlikely to return. The 1956 revolts in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, provoked by Khrushchev's "thaw," were put down by Khrushchev's troops, but the East European satellites have been revolving in orbits ever more erratic, and independent, in relation to the Soviet planet, as evidenced, most recently, by Rumania's refusal to back the Soviet line at the UN on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The taking of power by Communist regimes since the war in countries as diverse as Cuba, Algeria, Ghana, and North Vietnam, and by leaders as varied, in doctrine and personality, as Castro, Boumedienne, and Mao, has caused such extensive further fragmentations of the monolith as to suggest that the only reasonable definition of "a Communist" today, as of "a Jew," is somebody who calls himself that. As a universal menace, "Communism," *tout court*, has become a dead horse useful only for ritual floggings by our politicians.

No—if you mean the kind of crusades mounted *in nomine* anti-Communism, domestically by the late Senator McCarthy and abroad by our present President. They do little, if any, damage to the Communists and a great deal to us. The latter point hardly needs laboring here beyond noting that the evil McCarthy did has been interred with his bones while the evil Johnson is doing to "the American image" globally and, more important, to our own image of ourselves and our traditions, seem likely to leave permanent scars. "Tail-Gunner Joe" had no armies at his command and so his power for mischief was limited, despite the worst possible intentions. But now another demagogue with the same ignorance, or shall we say lack of curiosity, about Communism and the same weakness for lies, or shall we say "credibility gap," is by historical accident actually in the White House, and he does have armies, alas.

The chief reason I'm not "anti-Communist" in the McCarthy or Johnson sense is that I'm against real Communism. The principal results of the Senator's search-and-destroy commando raids were to give publicity to an expiring CPUSA, down to its last twenty thousand members including FBI agents, and, by the absurdity and unfairness of his accusations, to gain sympathy for Communism. Our President's genocidal crusade in Vietnam makes the enemy look good, relatively; if I were a South Vietnamese, I'd vote for the Vietcong over Ky and Westmoreland—if such a vote were miraculously permitted (by Ky and Westmoreland). As an old Commie fighter, I rate Johnson about as, I imagine, old Indian-fighters rated General Custer: rash, hot-headed, vain, and alarmingly ignorant of the nature of the enemy. Ho Chi Minh may go down in history as LBJ's Sitting Bull —or, if the war continues to be catastrophic for us, perhaps LBJ will get a footnote as Ho's Custer.

To ANSWER your other questions, I hope briefly:

1. No, I don't feel personally responsible for Vietnam since I've done what I could to oppose Johnson's escalation by speaking, writing, and signing those ads. I even signed an *ur*-ad against Kennedy's meddling there—which I don't think was on the same level, morally, as Johnson's escalation, nor do I think the latter was a necessary consequence of the Vietnam tactics of his two predecessors. Kennedy didn't send the air cover at the Bay of Pigs and he later admitted the invasion was a mistake; Johnson would have sent in the planes, he never admits mistakes, especially serious ones, and had he been in charge we would still be blasting away in the Sierra Maestra, with disappointing results despite the leveling of Havana and Santiago. Eisenhower never did much of anything in Vietnam or anywhere else, a Presidential quality we can appreciate now we have a man of action in the White House.

I suppose "the anti-Communism of the Left" did help create a favorable climate of opinion for Johnson's war, but I don't see how this could have been avoided unless we had shut up, which would have made us accomplices of the other side.

But there is another kind of responsibility, the kind one feels as a citizen whose government commits atrocities one knows about but cannot prevent Vietnam, Hitler's prewar concentration camps, Stalin's forced-labor camps) or doesn't even know about until afterward (the development of the atomic bomb and its use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Hitler's wartime "death camps"). The guilt one feels about such atrocities is not personal but national: my country did these things, I am part of it, I have helped shape it, and have been shaped by it. In Vietnam we see the darker side of our technological productivity and our mass industrial society—a sinister extension of "the American way of life."

2. I've answered this above.

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3. I was indeed "involved" in the secret financing of *Encounter* by the CIA during the year I was a special editor, unwittingly and "unwittily" as they say, and I think I was played for a sucker and I'm still sore about it. I see no justification for secret subsidies of any kind for cultural activities. For details on my career as an unwitty CIA agent, and my specific ideas on the whole CIA imbroglio, see my "Politics" column in the June *Esquire*. I don't know what you mean by "the darker impulses of American foreign policy," by the way, since this implies there are some lighter ones.

DWIGHT MACDONALD *is a* New Yorker *staff writer and the author of, among other works,* The Responsibility of Peoples *and* Against the American Grain.

William Phillips: To answer COMMENTARY's questions, one must reexamine the terms and ideas they take for granted, for some of our confusions have been built into the categories and language handed down to us. It is easy to give glib answers based on old or new clichés. But it is not so easy to escape from the going assumptions. Often what looks like fresh thinking is either a middle-aged maneuver to ward off criticism from the New Left or a youthful gesture of repudiation of anyone "over thirty."

The very term "anti-Communist" is loose and misleading, for it lumps the views of people like William Buckley, Sidney Hook, Irving Howe, Norman Thomas, Dwight Macdonald, and those on the far Left, like the Trotskyites, who might be opposed to Russian and Chinese policies. Most of America is really "anti-Communist," which is not the same thing as the "anti-Communism of the Left." Yet even this more narrow use of the term is also misleading, as it does not distinguish between radicals who disapprove of the official Communist movement and ex-radicals who have made of "anti-Communism" an ideology and a way of life. It is actually the ex-radicals who are the "anti-Communists," and to confuse the two is to blur the history of the Left in this country.

One has to remember that "anti-Communism" had its origins in "anti-Stalinism," which, as the name suggests, was a factional position on the Left: it really applied to those who still believed in socialism or Communism, but not of the Russian variety. Those anti-Stalinists, however, whose disillusionment with Russia became the basis of all their political thinking turned into "anti-Communists." For a time, a distinction was made between hard and soft "anti-Communism," but today the softies have dropped out, and most of the surviving "anti-Communists" are united by the firmness of their stand against Communism and Communists all over the world. This comes down to supporting—with hesitations and qualifications—any institution, any policies, any society or government, any means, short of outright Fascism, that opposes the spread of Communism. There is some ambiguity as to whether Communism is to be limited to movements connected with Russia or China, but usually indigenous and independent Communist movements are also included because the "Communist threat" is generally regarded as indivisible.

NOW TO your questions specifically.

1. The distinction I have been emphasizing is one between those whose opposition to the undemocratic character of Soviet Communism was a function of their own radical commitment and those who made of anti-Communism a doctrinaire and total view of the world. I am implying also that though I myself did occasionally swing too far in the direction of "obsessive anti-Communism," on the whole my criticism of Communist practices was part of a larger radical perspective. Times have changed so much that one tends to forget that the kind of criticism of the Communists that is exploited by conservatives today was once a necessary phase of radical development, and an unpopular one. Therefore I am loath to accept any kind of retroactive guilt for having attempted to keep alive a radical tradition which was being discredited by such things as the Moscow Trials and the suppression of intellectual liberty under Stalin.

Nor do I believe that the support of the war in Vietnam has its origins in the kind of criticism of the Communist parties made by people like myself in the 30's. There always existed a species of conservative anti-Communism more easily assimilable by politicians. To have taken its anti-Communism from the Left, the American government would have had to perform the most delicate surgery to extract the criticism of Russian Communism from a complicated and radical structure of ideas. The anti-Communism of the present administration—and this is one of the things wrong with it—is the old, conservative home-grown anti-Communism that is almost a reflex in this country. After all, the American government didn't take my advice in the 30's any more than it does today. If it did, we might have other problems, but not, I think, the ones we have now. For my opposition to intervention by either side is based on the belief that native forces that alone can solve the problems of Asia and Africa are not permitted to follow their natural course by either American or Chinese intervention.

No doubt such a position is full of ambiguities and contradictions, leading to all sorts of compromises, because it is based on ideal forces and possibilities that do not yet even exist. But its outlook has no more to do with American aims than it has with those of China. The vulnerability of the position comes from its Utopian character: it

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can be accused of not being very practical but not of providing a justification for intervention.

I am, of course, talking about a "third force," which is an old idea and perhaps no longer a useful one. It may be that the concept of the third force belongs to a theoretical pattern inherited from the 30's, which assumed a Marxist view of history, but expected a "third force" to rectify the mistakes of Russia and China and to lead the way for the rest of the world. And it may be that such an outlook, however tempting to intellectuals whose desire for independence from all vested interests, national or ideological, makes them a breeding ground for "third force" thinking—that such an outlook simply has no relation to contemporary politics. Since the notion of the "third force" arose out of criticism of the undemocratic character of the Communist parties, it would be applicable mainly to advanced countries, as in Europe, where democracy meant something and could conceivably survive radical and social changes. For countries like Vietnam, however, talking about democracy is often a way of not thinking about the questions raised in backward societies. But even in the West the concept of a "third force" might be outdated by the changes within the Communist world which suggest at least the possibility of further democratization and decentralization of what once looked like a permanent monolith. In that case, a third force is more likely to emerge from within the Communist countries than outside them.

THE EMERGENCE of a New Left suggests other possibilities, of a more spontaneous nature. This New Left—and to some extent the civil-rights movement—in a sense is acting like a third force, since it has its own political life. However, in its reluctance to define its relation to the Communist states and parties, the New Left is avoiding the theoretical implications of its stand, though it is still too early to tell where the movement is going.

As for myself, the truth is that I am caught in the contradictions of the period. By training, temperament, and political experience, I am an addict of democracy. Hence my political reflex is to look favorably on any radical program or movement that promises some measure of democracy, and to criticize those that do not. On the other hand, I am convinced that the question of democracy for backward countries in Asia and Africa is more complex than one would gather from the rhetoric of liberalism. And I must say, too, that the ritual use of the slogans of democracy and freedom by professional anti-Communists tends to drain them of any meaning—except as advertisements for the status quo.

2. No, I would not call myself an "anti-Communist," though I have no more use for Mao than I had for Stalin. To be an "anti-Communist" today is not easy. One has to be pathologically single-minded, allergic to change, and in love with existing institutions. It is not at all the same thing—though "anti-Communists" act as if it were—as having been "anti-Communist" or rather, "anti-Stalinist" in the 30's and 40's, when Stalin was at the height of his power, the thaw was not even conceivable, and the Soviet bloc seemed to pose a threat to everything genuine liberals and radicals stood for. Given the climate of opinion at that time, it was quite natural to think of America and Europe as protectors of at least a limited kind of freedom and democracy, particularly in relation to German Fascism.

As for containment, a policy intended originally for Europe, I must admit that I did not oppose it so long as it appeared to mean only the resistance to invasion. But recently it has become clear that containment does not seem to have any meaning for the so-called underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, or South America. The issue there is not invasion by Russian or Chinese armies, and to pretend that it is has become a strategy for ignoring the real problems of social and economic reorganization in these areas.

3. The CIA question is not so simple as it seems. As I recall, I was probably not so aware some years ago as I am today of the implications of CIA financing of cultural projects. And I can understand the temptations. But I always did think there was something unsavory and conspiratorial about publications, organizations, and individuals rumored to be connected with the CIA. The atmosphere they created was a peculiar blend of ulterior aims and immediate self-interest. There was always the smell of the gravy train, and the people supposedly involved—I do not mean the innocents—were usually of a certain type: breezy, rootless, free-wheeling, cynically anti-Communist orgmen. It is true that the magazines and organizations financed by the CIA were not restricted to official or conservative views, apparently because the enlightened wing of the CIA realized that anti-Communist activities abroad, to have any effect, had to look free and have a slightly Left coloration. This, in fact, is the argument used to justify CIA support: that the recipients were free and that their activities weren't entirely conservative. But it is a sophistical argument, for the publications and organizations were free only in the sense that the policies required by the CIA were in accord with the beliefs of the people running them. (My guess is that the CIA rarely gave orders.) I am not referring to the honest people who were taken in, but to key people who were chosen because their politics were adaptable to if not identical with those of the CIA, and because they were cynical enough to play the game in which each side pretends it is using the other side. The fact is that only certain projects were financed by the CIA, presumably because the others could not be trusted to play ball, although mistakes sometimes were made, particularly in distant places and languages, where the CIA could

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afford to write off a few ventures that were on the level.

On the whole, the CIA projects were definitely anti-Communist and pro-American, though subtly so and camouflaged by a sprinkling of dissenting articles and activities. Perhaps if CIA backing were out in the open, like the support of magazines by private institutions, it would have been more acceptable, for then the source of the bias as well as the money would not have been secret. And, maybe, one would have fewer objections to financing of this kind if it were extensive and covered all shades of liberal and radical opinion, including activities or magazines that could not conceivably become stooges. But this was probably impossible, since the CIA was not a ladies auxiliary, dying to support culture of any kind for its own sake. Obviously, the CIA believed it was using culture to fight the cold war, even though it seemed at times that the original purposes had been forgotten by people who were as interested in their own careers as they were in the cold war.

Aside from the deceptions and ironies, the debut of the CIA in the field of culture no doubt coincided with the general decline of the Left. Its recruits came, I suppose, mostly from that new breed of political intellectuals who were able to pursue their professions as editors, journalists, organizers in "anti-Communist" magazines and organizations. Detached from ordinary political life, they became pure "anti-Communists"; they had no independent ideas or aims; their political history was assigned to them.* "Anti-Communism" finally found its ideal form in the CIA: the reduction of politics to one question, that of "anti-Communism" itself.

In retrospect, the difficulties of the Left appear to have come from the tendency of politics to polarize toward the extremes, which then feed off each other. For a time, some hope of escaping the Communist/anti-Communist syndrome could be found in the decentralization and the dissidence of the Soviet world, in the nationalist and socialist movements in Asia and Africa, and in the growth of dissent in this country. But recently, the naked power moves of the Soviet bloc in the Near East, together with the stale ideology, succeeded in bringing back the old confrontations. So, too, the almost automatic ganging-up on Israel of the Asian and African countries, rationalized by a hodge-podge of racial, national, and anti-colonial propaganda, buried another hope—and with it the myth that being dark-skinned and poor and underdeveloped made a nation virtuous and progressive. As a result, I find myself—like many other liberals and radicals—in the awkward position of expecting the American government to come to the aid of Israel, while arguing that America should not police the world in the name of democracy and self-determination.

* None of these remarks is meant as personal criticism of individuals, some of whom I like and respect as people.

One way out of these theoretical dilemmas has been to ignore them, as the New Left has done. Practically, there is much to be said for the current boredom with theory and the belief in spontaneity of the New Left here and the new intellectuals in the Communist countries. But the new politics does leave one without the sense of continuity that belief in the future is supposed to provide. It may be very modern and cool for radicals to travel light today. But to anyone who has been through the arguments of the Left, a radical without a theory is like Hamlet without a father. Still, one could argue that Hamlet might have been better off.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS *is chairman of the board of editors of* Partisan Review *and professor of English at Rutgers. A collection of his essays and stories,* A Sense of the Present, *will be published shortly by Chilmark Press.*

Robert Pickus: COMMENTARY's questions accurately limn the currently fashionable liberal anti-anti-Communism. That current fashion seems to me as morally and politically disastrous as the liberal military anti-Communism it attacks. In so well rehearsed an argument, predictable in its distortions, direct answers are usually a mistake. First, therefore, a context for my replies.

I've never described myself as a "liberal." My essential political position has been too pointed, my commitment too radical. My political life began at the end of a war, and ending war has been the point ever since. If ending war is the problem, there is little of use in liberal politics or thought.* Democratic socialist, with primary emphasis on the first word, would be closer to an accurate description of my politics. But there too one encounters an almost total absence of useful ideas about what I regard as the central problem of our time. That problem is organized mass violence: war.

I have made my political and ideological commitments, defining both the goals and means I would support, the political philosophies and organizations I consider enemy. But I have long believed the crucial question was not which conception of justice is right, but which institutions and understandings can assure that the inevitable conflict of competing conceptions would not lead to war. It is not the choice between competing economic and political systems; it is conflict itself, that is now the central problem.

I have taken that problem as the focus of my political life because of a fact of 20th-century

* Though democratic institutions *are* a way in which conflict may proceed without becoming war, liberal thought is of little use in situations (e.g., the current world scene) where there is neither a sense of community nor shared values to sustain such institutions.

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technology—in more significant degree than ever before, man's survival depends on the maintenance of responsibility among men; because of political belief—reliance on national military power can only make me a collaborator in the destruction of the political values I see as central; and because of religious convictions that will not allow me to accept murder as legitimate, individual lives as pawns.

No 20th-century Jew comes to this position easily. I find my own pacifist conviction painful and unsatisfactory. I find the self-righteousness of much of the pacifist world incredible; its failure to develop the alternate strategy of conflict demonstrated so hopefully in the American civil-rights movement, tragic; its current role in too many instances, as tail to a variety of Marxist and other revolutionary kites, a betrayal. But I share a root pacifist perception: if you forget your responsibility to the human being opposite you in the name of some abstraction like Freedom, Justice, or History, it is just a toss of the coin whether you drop the napalm or are hit, whether you enter the concentration camp or guard it.

The problem is how to counter the violence others will use; the problem is how to force needed change without becoming an executioner. Given the failure to solve these problems, the pacifist's moral witness is usually flawed. His prime contribution is his focus on the right problem, not his moral witness. When a thoughtful pacifist leaves sentimentality behind, he thinks about ways of prosecuting conflict, ways that build instead of destroy community. He, then, is thinking to the right purpose, for the problem of world peace stated most simply and most fundamentally is the problem of achieving community. This implies a kind of unity with the enemy. Before this harsh fact most current thinking and action falters. It either burkes the realities of power and the validity of conflict, sentimentally seeking peace (no conflict) where there is no peace, or it organizes for war—and thus destroys the possibility of achieving that sense of community which makes law possible. Since law, to be the guarantor of an end to organized mass violence, requires a preponderance of power, legitimized by a community of consent, these understandings badly need sophisticated development and explication.

There is nascent in post-Niebuhrian pacifist thought a realistic program for achieving community while prosecuting conflict. But it remains nascent, abandoned for sentimentality or for a vulgarized quasi-Marxist political analysis which locates the problem of 20th-century international conflict wholly in the structure of the American economy and the evil motivations of an American power elite.

I SET THIS context, because without it my answers to COMMENTARY's questions would be easily misunderstood. I was and am an anti-Communist. That is, I would support forces working for democratization in any existing Communist society, and would be in jail or dead in many. Sound U.S. policy would in my view not only seek to limit the extension, it would also, by the model of its foreign and domestic policy, seek to encourage the reversal of totalitarian elements in the thought and practice of Communist societies.

But COMMENTARY's assumption that such a person "supported containment" is, in my case, mistaken. I have never favored a foreign policy which took containment of Communism as its primary goal. The *primary* goals, in my view, are three: the construction of international or supranational institutions that can interdict the use of mass violence by any group pursuing its own conception of justice or security; the development of a sense of world community strong enough to allow such institutions to resolve conflict without mass violence; and the use of such institutions to help needed change in developing nations come with minimal violence and without the imposition of totalitarian political systems.

Containment was predominantly a military policy. As such it was an obstacle to my primary political goals. Though aware of the threat posed by Communist power and some Communist purposes, I worked then as now for alternatives to a dominantly military foreign policy; for in my view such a policy makes us a threat to all men's future, as well as to the belief in the value and dignity of individual men which we, as democrats, proclaim.

Such work cannot be undertaken without directly challenging the Communist devil theory so common in American life. While I never dodged the importance of ideological conflict with the Communist world, I did distinguish it from the realities of Soviet power and challenged its simplistic versions. For, those convinced of a totally evil Communist world—monolithic and incapable of change, the supreme threat to American values and interests—are unlikely to support non-military initiatives to achieve the three primary goals stated above. Such initiatives offer, I believe, our best chance of limiting the spread of totalitarian systems and of gaining Communist support for the steps needed to end war. While I do not share the optimism which discounts the plain statements of Chinese Communist leaders, or yet count the Soviet Union a reliable ally in stabilizing world politics, I have *fought,* not helped create, an anti-Communist climate "favorable to the war in Vietnam." While resisting Communist organizational goals, I have also fought the conception of Communists as a proscribed group that has deeply damaged democratic politics.

Nor have I had direct or indirect contact with the CIA. Many of the projects recently described as CIA-financed (e.g., schools for training union and peasant organizers in South America) have seemed to me the expression of some of the sound-

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er, not "the darker" impulses of American foreign policy. Their danger lay—it seems to me—not in the foreign policy area, but in the secrecy involved and in the threat they posed to the desirable relation between voluntary organizations and government agencies in a democracy: influence should run from the former to the latter, not vice versa. CIA projects of the Guatemalan or Bay-of-Pigs sort seem to me a natural result of the acceptance of war as a legitimate instrument of national policy, and ought to be dealt with by challenging that acceptance, rather than by condemning one form of our side's commitment to the military resolution of conflict.

My guilt lies in another direction: I seriously underestimated the ease with which liberals, once persuaded to abandon a Communist devil, would adopt an American one. Or, more specifically, I failed to perceive how quickly an anti-anti-Communist climate could arise and pervert work against the Vietnam war in student, religious, "intellectual," and liberal circles.

In the late 40's, a still vigorous Communist party channeled and corrupted the concern for peace of many who supported the Progressive party. At present the Communist party itself is a much less significant factor, but its emotional and intellectual heritage persists and plays a significant role in shaping, manning, and financing the liberal reaction to American policy in Vietnam. By now, because of this fact and other weightier explanations, the rules of the political game are neatly reversed when you leave mainstream America to confront the currents I am criticizing in liberal, academic, literary America.

In this sometimes influential world, political courage is required to maintain an *anti*-Communist stance. Here, anti-Communism is always "blind." If you believe Hanoi bears some responsibility for continuation of the killing in Vietnam, and are a careerist, or simply value non-hostile personal relations, you say nothing about it in the Math Department of the University of California, Berkeley. If you are conducting a national campaign for a unilateral American ceasefire in Vietnam, you must nevertheless plan on losing significant money and support if you accurately depict the Vietcong's political leadership and their purposes.*

For much of the dissenting community is dominated by an automatic anti-anti-Communism, as distorted in its views of Communist reality as the Communist-devil theory it replaces; as dangerous, in its isolationist tendencies, to the essential conditions for a stable peace as the intervention it opposes; as dominated by vituperation, conspiracy theories, and a contempt for reason, as the Bircher it sees in every opponent of Communist organizational goals.

THAT MUCH of the original and genuine opposition to war could be diverted to other ends was evident early in the protest against the Vietnam war. Take, for example, Staughton Lynd's ringing announcement, "We are here on behalf of Jean-Paul Sartre," at one of the early student peace demonstrations. In the midst of pacifist rhetoric, Lynd linked the anti-war movement with a man whose conception of desirable policy includes Soviet missile attacks on U.S. bases in the Philippines.†

It turns out Lynd was politically prescient. Students, moved to action by Camus' moral standards, first adopted the political perspective on Vietnam and then the morality of revolutionary violence of Sartre, Camus' pro-Communist and pro-terrorist opponent. American responsibility for dropping napalm on children was protested in alliance with others who rationalized the murder of children in the pursuit of political goals. Students who had once reflected on Camus' terrible dividing line between those "who accept the consequences of being murderers and those who refuse do to so with all their force and being," soon set about blurring that line. Fanon and Sartre replaced Camus. The same persons who viewed in anguish and fury *Ramparts* pictures of napalm victims, responded coolly to the *National Review*'s pictures of civilians injured in Vietcong fragmentation bomb attacks on market places and public gatherings: "any revolution involves some injury of innocents."

I remember the shock with which some Berkeley students discovered the difference between opposition to American power and opposition to war. The Vietnam Day Committee there received a wire from the North Vietnamese Student League welcoming members of the Vietnam Day Committee as comrades in the North Vietnamese commitment to spill the blood of the imperialist exploiters until victory was finally won. A number of students active in the VDC drafted a response explaining that what they wanted was an end to the killing, that when North Vietnamese students began to pressure their government for an end to war, as American students were doing, then and only then could they call one another comrades. It turned out that the VDC could not send that wire; it would "split the movement."

That judgment was accurate. Any statement critical of Hanoi's view of the war, or suggesting that the NLF, Hanoi, and Peking share a part of the responsibility for the continuation of the killing, was out of place in the context of a political movement which, as the VDC leaders put it, sought "to increase the number of people who are

* Gail Kelly's "Origins and Aims of the Vietcong" (*New Politics*, Winter 1966) contains a most useful discussion of the differences betwen the NLF's widely publicized 1961 program for South Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Party's almost unknown program of October 1965. The latter is, I believe, a more accurate indicator of the program of an NLF government. It is a carbon copy of the Hanoi regime.

† See *Les Temps Modernes*, August 1966.

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opposed to the structure and value systems of American society rather than the number who are tactically opposed to the Vietnam war."

I MARK THIS perversion of what might have become a genuine anti-war movement not as a disappointed pacifist, but as a citizen convinced that a sound anti-war movement could have achieved its objective: attaining overwhelming majority support for significant changes in American Vietnam policy which would have maximized the chances for a negotiated settlement to end the killing.* Such a movement could still develop—the *Negotiations Now!* campaign is one sound attempt to build it—but not without recognizing that however fiercely and sometimes accurately the lies, omissions, and distortions of the administration are punctured, the American public is unlikely to accept the policy recommendations of those who pass on unchallenged every lie, omission, and distortion of the NLF-Hanoi side of the war. To move away from the falsifications, and the justifications of mass violence, encountered in America by becoming a part of the mirror image of that nightmare is no progress; but precisely that move has become the "progress" of many "anti-Vietnam war" protesters.

I cannot explore here the complex web of thought and experience that propelled segments of the student movement from a most affecting expression of interracial solidarity and anti-war protest to racist politics and the support (whether openly and ideologically committed, or present simply in the choice of issues, allies, and arguments) of wars of liberation. My focus here is on the anti-anti-Communist strand in this experience. It is an element which also plays an important role in the adult community.

This anti-anti-Communist current has been aided by the most unlikely people. For a painful contemporary political experience, I recommend listening to John Kenneth Galbraith, totally failing to distinguish among audiences, summarize for a group of ex-Progressive party activists the sins of anti-Communism; or hearing this able man demonstrate his misunderstanding of contemporary Left politics by congratulating student activists, already persuaded that any critical examination of Communist politics is red-baiting, on being "unscarred" by McCarthyism.

Arthur Schlesinger is the only person I've encountered in this particular leadership group who seems to have an accurate sense of what is moving in liberal and Left peace circles. Recognizing an enemy to the Left and explaining why he perceived it as such, he shocked a segment of a San Francisco liberal audience which expected him to stop after an attack on administration policy.† But Schlesinger's refusal to celebrate "pop Maoism" or a peace effort which, reactive only against Washington's policies, has contributed to a polarized, enraged, and confused political climate, is exceptional. More commonly anti-war speakers seem to see only Dean Rusk in their audiences. In the circles I am here discussing, the political and moral assumptions of, say, the *New York Review of Books* are rarely challenged. Thus the initially hopeful passage from apathy and moral indifference to moral and political responsibility, which could aid in ending the killing, is sidetracked into a one-eyed morality, serving to justify one form of exploitation and violence even as it challenges another. This is not a matter of moderate versus radical approaches to social change. Rather it involves very different conceptions of what constitutes a healthy racial commitment.

A rigid and self-righteous anti-Communism, which has prevented an accurate perception of the complex and changing reality of the Communist world, seems to be abating. The Consular Treaty, the attempts at contact with the Chinese, and Kosygin's moment on the lawn at Glassboro are indications, at different levels, of the possibility of a more flexible and hopeful American approach to the Communist world. The problem now is to apply it to Vietnam, to Cuba. But the concomitants of the current anti-anti-Communist ethos are themselves formidable obstacles to this endeavor. That this ethos contributes to strengthening a military nationalist Right has been adequately demonstrated in California.** My concern here is with the approach to the Vietnam war which is characteristic of these politics and with its effect on the chances for significant change in U.S. policy.

"Radicals" caught in this world view see America as the single villain in a melodrama of world politics. Violently asserting America's depravity and consequent inability to do anything but evil abroad, they nurture isolationist currents.

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* *Vietnam Peace Proposals* (World Without War Council, Berkeley) is a useful compilation of such policy proposals. Its statement of the criteria by which those seeking an end to the war may distinguish justifications for continuing the war from valid peace proposals is of special value. A suggestive section describes an American initiatives approach, of interest to those who reject escalation or surrender and seek a more effective way to open the blocked road to negotiations than a military policy that has failed to do so for 30 successive months.

† For the latter forbidden part of his speech (given the prevailing convention ruling out any discussion of any variety of pro-Communist politics) he was attacked, not simply in the pro-Communist Left press, but in the San Francisco *Chronicle*. Admittedly there are members of the *Chronicle*'s staff that view the world through *Ramparts* or ex-Progressive party glasses and systematically identify any criticism of those points of view with cowardice or right-wing extremism. The discouraging fact is the expectation, probably correct, of those engaged in such political vendettas, that they will go unchallenged in the liberal community. Thus, for example, Dr. Spock continues to dominate SANE while he lends his name for a time to efforts like the Tri-Continental Congress Against Imperialism.

** Carl Landauer and I charted some of the details in a pamphlet, "Peace, The New Politics and the Pity of It All" (World Without War Council).

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Carrying peace banners, they ardently, in their identification with the NLF, urge a new just-war doctrine.

Liberals, reacting to State Department justifications, adopt descriptions of Vietnamese reality as mistaken as those they reject. They see the Vietcong simply as the representative of the Vietnamese people's desire for independence and social change. But thousands of Buddhists and former Viet Minh fighters preferred Ky's jails to walking three miles to NLF territory. To General LeMay's claim that this is "not a civil war (or) a peasants' war . . . [it is] part of Communist strategy . . .," they reply: it *is* a civil and a peasant war. In fact, as any observer capable of candor will agree, it is all three.

They applaud the "politics of escalation" explanation of why there has been no negotiated settlement of the war. But the administration's failure to give priority to attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement—the priority they claim it has in their own plans—is just one part of political reality. The clear preference of Hanoi and the NLF for a military victory is at least as significant an explanation of why there have been no negotiations.

Many caught in this reactive ethos applaud and vote for peace candidates who describe the war as a "racist war against the colored people of Vietnam," despite the fact that Vietcong Vietnamese have murdered other civilian Vietnamese leaders to a degree that if applied proportionately to American local leaders would mean more than a quarter of a million dead American mayors, health workers, and teachers.

The result is, in sum, Hanoi's view of the war. It is a view some Americans, desperately seeking a way to protest the horror and immorality of American policy, have mistakenly supported, but it is a view that the overwhelming majority will reject.

It is a view that obscures these essential truths: the overwhelming majority of the people of South Vietnam are not fighting Communism or American imperialism; they are fighting to stay alive. What they desperately want is that the killing end. Their enemy is anyone who justifies American killing for one more day; anyone who presents Hanoi's justification for continuing the war as though it were a peace position.

WE ARE LEFT with a genuine tragedy. The likely victors in the current discussion among American intellectuals will be those calling for a return to a politics of national interest and political realism. This is a more rational politics than current U.S. policy, but it is a perspective that is part of the problem of war, not a solution. The generous goals and moral concern that originally animated the anti-war movement have been perverted into another kind of just-war theory, thus paving the way for their abandonment. All in a time of some hope. For, there is a chance now of getting majority support for an approach to conflict with the Communist world that builds, instead of destroys, that sense of community essential to growth toward world law. There is a recognition now that even though the argument within the Communist world revolves around the question of whether organized mass violence is one justifiable road to change or the only one, it is now a much more open Communist world, and one undergoing radical change. There is now a widespread recognition that open violence is not the only enemy of peace. There is also a violence of the status quo that America must confront and change. There is a new understanding that progress toward a world without war need not wait for prior Communist agreement; we can initiate it. There is recognition that the old conceptions of the cold war do not fit a world in which the most dangerous divisions are between the developed and the yet-to-be-developed nations. And there has been until recently a deep moral revulsion to all justifications of war. Together, these could constitute the beginnings of an authentic peace politics.

But these ideas need a vehicle. Organizations dominated by the ethos of current anti-anti-Communism cannot provide it. Nor can a politics that takes its *origin* in an anti-Communist perspective. Breaking free of those two bad choices requires reaffirming the root values of democratic theory and the "mad truths" Ignazio Silone listed in explaining his wish to affirm the superiority of "the human person over all the economic and social mechanisms that oppress him." Those "intuitons of man's dignity," that insistence on the "extension of the ethical impulse from the restricted individual and family sphere to the whole domain of human activity" have found expression in workers' movements *and* in American history.* This is our hope. No one committed to those truths could accept the historicism of Robert Heilbroner's earnest and coherent invitation to acquiesce passively in a Communist wave of the future;† nor would he accept an America capable of our present policy in Vietnam.

He would work to change that future and that America.

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* Harold Kaplan's "In Defense of Anti-Communism" *(Bennington Review,* Summer 1967) is a statement of the reasons for valuing that tradition over revolutionary Marxism. It deserves wider circulation.

† "Counterrevolutionary America," COMMENTARY, April 1967.

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Philip Rahv: I was never a liberal anti-Communist or, for that matter, any other kind of liberal. When a very small group of us broke away from the Communist movement in the late 1930's we did so because of our fundamental allegiance to democratic socialism; and substantially that is still my position today. Needless to say, democratic socialism, in our understanding of it, was fully consonant with freedom of thought and expression, in the arts no less than in science and philosophy. Though by no means "orthodox" in our approach to Marxism, we did not think of ourselves as abandoning its basic program and ideals; least of all did we think of ourselves as errant sons returning to the "bourgeois" fold. For it was not Communism, in its doctrinal formulations by Marx or even by Lenin, that we broke away from, but the Soviet embodiment of it known as Stalinism, then in total command not only of the Russian Communists but of the entire Communist apparatus abroad, which, under cover now of a revolutionary and now of a populist-democratic phraseology, was functioning as an instrument of Soviet policy pure and simple.

In that period the American liberals—and I mean the liberals of the *Nation-New Republic* variety—supported Roosevelt in domestic policy, and Stalin, whom they saw as a bulwark of anti-Fascism, in foreign policy. Hence inevitably we identified many of the most vocal and influential liberals as fellow-travelers, and we could not possibly have associated ourselves with them politically. And it must be emphasized again and again that in those years what is now called the anti-Communism of the Left was almost exclusively an anti-Stalinist movement, not at all incompatible with adherence to dissident forms of Communism, such as that formulated in exile by Trotsky and other heresiarchs of lesser fame. Nor did our anti-Stalinism in any way commit us to supporting the prevailing socio-economic system in America. We thought of capitalism not as a uniquely American and uniquely successful phenomenon validating "freedom" and "democracy"—such a notion, in vogue for almost two decades now, would have seemed to us ridiculous then—but as a historically determined system of world economic power. Our hostility to that power was so obvious that we mostly took it for granted while concentrating on the exposure of Stalinist terror, duplicity, and mendacity. To pursue such a course was far from easy, for at that time the climate of opinion among intellectuals was decidedly against us as more and more of them found in the threat of Nazi aggression the perfect rationalization for their backing of the Stalinists.

CLEARLY, the history of radical anti-Stalinism as I have very briefly and sketchily outlined it above has very little to do with the cold-war anti-Communism of our latter days, though not a few intellectuals who belonged to the movement of those early years have done their best to distort that history in the interest of creating an impression of continuity and consistency in their own political careers, thus absolving themselves of the guilt of any involvement with the by now abhorred Marxist doctrines. Such people, having equated their Marxist past with the U.S. version of original sin, have turned into sophists and sycophants of the American ruling elite. Of course, they still pretend that they are fighting Stalinism, as in the old days, even as it has become all too plain, except to those who profess to take seriously the cant of our native "democratic" rhetoric, that what official America really finds objectionable at bottom is not the Stalinist aspect of Communism but Communism as such, authoritarian or not. In writing of the relation of American power to the underdeveloped countries, Robert L. Heilbroner has recently and with exemplary lucidity put this whole matter in the proper perspective in these pages ("Counterrevolutionary America," April 1967). What is official America's fear?

> There is a threat in the specter of a Communist or near-Communist supremacy in the underdeveloped world. It is that the rise of Communism would signal the end of capitalism as the dominant world order, and would force the acknowledgement that America no longer constituted the model on which the future of world civilization would be mainly based. In this way . . . the existence of Communism frightens American capitalism as the rise of Protestantism frightened the Catholic Church or the French Revolution the English aristocracy.
>
> It is, I think, the fear of losing our place in the sun, of finding ourselves at bay, that motivates a great deal of the anti-Communism on which so much of our foreign policy seems to be founded.

Mr. Heilbroner is well aware that this is not a complete account of America's side in the cold war, since it leaves out the element of Great Power rivalry, which would be the same even if Russia were non-Communist. But he has put his finger on the main factor—exactly that factor which most authors of cold-war studies have so far studiously evaded. Hence his analysis, which explains why for official America the main danger is always located on the Left, is by far more coherent and historically plausible than the myths spread by the official propagandists, including the former anti-Stalinists turned anti-Communists *tout court*. For anti-Communism in the present-day meaning of the term, equivalent as it is to opposition to authentic socialism in whatever form, has no doubt helped to provide the ideological fuel needed by the policymakers in Washington (and the mass media at their service) for heating up the cold war whenever it suits their extremely narrow-minded, class-oriented conception of the national interest. And certainly, in that sense precisely, the responsibility for our dis-

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astrous involvement in Vietnam rests with the anti-Communists of the Left (in this context the word "Left" can be used only in a Pickwickian sense) as much as with anyone else.

However, I do not agree with Mr. Christopher Lasch's recent assertion that "things would be different if the American Left had not long ago committed itself to outdo the Right in its anti-Communist zeal."* I doubt whether, on an all-national scale, things would be very much different; Mr. Lasch seems to be overestimating the power of resistance which the intellectuals as a social formation can exert against the gravitational pull of a ruling elite when it appears to be firmly entrenched in positions of authority. The old American Left he has in mind has for some years now consisted of exiguously small groups of intellectuals, divided among themselves, and the percentage of staffers it has contributed to the Pentagon's think-factories and the various cold-war institutes masquerading as centers of "Russian studies" is correspondingly sparse. But I do agree with Mr. Lasch's argument that "once the Left itself accepted anti-Communism as the *sine qua non* of political respectability, it became a prisoner of its own immediate success. . . ." The old American Left has paid a steep price for its attainment of political respectability, and that price is self-betrayal.

Insofar as cold-war anti-Communism implies implicit or explicit support of our society's present social and economic set-up—and, in my opinion, it implies no less than that—I cannot be counted among its partisans. Nor am I a supporter of the present regime in Moscow, which, though it has done away with the worst features of Stalinism, is still far from fulfilling the original promise of the Russian Revolution. The present Soviet leadership, while fulfilling certain elementary requirements of socialism, is at the same time pursuing a course of cynical *Realpolitik* abroad in the mode traditionally associated with Great Power behavior throughout history. For instance, it is playing the Arab card in the Middle East, just as the British did in the 1930's and 1940's, though the latter played the game with more restraint and finesse than the Russian latecomers. But only naifs and "true believers" have failed to note that the State Department, though inhibited by certain domestic forces and unequivocal past commitments, is itching to play the same card, in the hope of outbidding the Russian "competition." The Arabs are the overwhelming majority in the Middle East, and that is the sufficient justification of policy for all the powers, great or not so great, including de Gaulle's France. Witness the very mild, "soft" response to the Arabs' severing of relations with the U.S. in the wake of the Big Lie that America and Britain intervened militarily in favor of Israel. Witness, also, the covert wooing of King Hussein, another "bulwark of anti-Communism," though undoubtedly not so steady a bulwark as King Constantine of Greece. In Washington, as in Moscow, cold-war considerations are paramount, and from that vantage point the national interests of Israel, which is not really a part of the cold war and which cannot but resist being dragged into it as a pawn of one or another superpower, are merely an annoying distraction.

What Soviet society is badly in need of is a fundamental *political* reform that would once and for all eliminate the one-party monopoly of power and the arbitrary rule of the bureaucracy. But this is a long-term prospect. It cannot be accomplished from the outside but only by the Russian people themselves as education and full-scale modernization in the economic sphere gradually promote among them more libertarian perspectives. Cold-war anti-Communism, Washington style, can only obstruct their gaining of such perspectives, and a nuclear war would surely bury them for good. And so it would bury us.

IN THE DAYS when Communism was a monolithic world-structure, ruled by an iron hand in the Kremlin, it was possible for a democratic socialist to support, even if only on tactical grounds, what the Editor of COMMENTARY calls a "policy of containing the spread of Communism"; and I am still opposed to the Communists being allowed to take over countries by force and against the will of the majority of their population. But this is no longer the question today, when monolithic totalitarian world Communism has ceased to exist. Least of all is it the question in Vietnam, where American power has all along prevented even a moderately honest election and is actually shoring up obsolete social institutions and reactionary, corrupt governing classes. The Orwellian language in which the administration is defending its war in Vietnam is absolutely insufferable. Perhaps democracy, even in the restricted American sense of the term, is impossible in a backward area like Vietnam. But if that is the case, surely Generals Thieu and Ky, as well as any future puppets in Saigon, are the last people in the world one can trust to undertake even a minimum program of political democratization and economic modernization.

The recent revelations concerning covert CIA backing of certain intellectual and cultural projects, which have for years pretended to be free of Washington control, came as no surprise to me. It is inherent in the logic of anti-Communism as currently defined, for in terms of that logic the means are irrelevant and only the cold-war ends are important. (Our crusade in Vietnam is ruled by the very same logic.) The people who accepted secret CIA subsidies without being clear in their own minds as to what was involved are in many ways to be compared to the "fellow-travelers" and "stooges" of the 1930's, who supported Stalin's reading of Marxism and his murderous

* *Teach-ins: U.S.A.*, edited by Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh (Praeger), p. 308.

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policies even as they spoke of the Russia he despotically ruled as a "workers' paradise" and as a "classless society." But in contrast to the "stooges" of yesterday, the "stooges" of today are paid cash on the line for their pious declarations.

PHILIP RAHV, *an editor of* Partisan Review, *teaches English at Brandeis.*

Harold Rosenberg: COMMENTARY'S questions raise the vital issue of confusing anti-Communism with "containment"—i.e., with stopping Communism *geographically*.

Containment means not only checking the spread of Communism as a social theory or political movement but stopping the expansion of Communist nations. Such expansion, it is assumed, cannot be arrested by arguments or rival political organizations but only by the economic and military force of anti-Communist nations. In a program of containing Communism, anti-Communism becomes an aspect of national power politics.

To combine the notion of fighting an ideology with that of blocking off physical terrains from certain countries results in a hybrid logic that can easily get out of control. Phantoms take on flesh. An argument and a massacre become equivalents. Minds are searched for contraband. A professor advocates a super-police regime in order to repel error. General Westmoreland stands as the outpost of the free mind. The CIA drops depth charges among American intellectuals and is defended as the spearhead of anti-Communist radicalism.

The nub of it is that containment channels the ideological conflict with Communism into the alternatives of national wars. Either we or they. "We" means those who accept the national ideology, "they" anyone who opposes it. All anti-Communists are united by force of the enemy.

This interchangeability of nation and ideology is a heritage of Bolshevism. It lay behind the logic that led to Lenin's famous World War I slogan: "The main enemy is at home." By the same logic Russia became after the October Revolution synonymous with socialism, and "Defense of the USSR" synonymous with world progress.

What madness this mixing of nation and ideology can lead to is exemplified in the revival by the Trotskyites of the old "Main enemy is at home" slogan when the Red Army invaded Finland. Workers of Finland, defend the USSR, the Fatherland of socialism! As a Marxist, I, a Finn, was supposed to fire at my neighbor who was firing at the Russians who, the moment they got rid of him, would put me against the wall as an anti-Communist. . . . This is what I mean by logic getting out of control.

Containment is the application of the same blending of intellectual and state aims. As a free man opposed to Communism, I am supposed to fire at people who are trying to free themselves from all kinds of tyrants who might be friends of Stennis or Nixon.

When it is a matter of your country confronting a Communist country, what does it mean to say that your anti-Communism is "Left"? Both the Communists and the Communist-containers will answer: it means nothing.

To the Communist, Left anti-Communism is simply anti-Communism that strikes from the left side, an ally of imperialism that refuses to admit its complicity. (To Mao, the Soviets are Left anti-Communists.)

To the container of Communism, on the other hand, Left anti-Communism is simply being "soft on Communism," i.e., an anti-Communism that is prepared to lose.

Given the struggle for containment, both the Communist and the anti-Communist patriot are right against the Left. They have fixed it that way between them. The logic that flows from identifying a social philosophy with the national interest has been forced upon the Left by the act of the Bolsheviks in transforming socialism into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy and by the reflex action of the United States since Truman in transforming American foreign policy into an instrument of anti-Communist ideology.

In the struggles for spheres of influence in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Near East, to be a Left anti-Communist can mean little more than to insist on limiting the fight against Communism to certain methods and allies, while renouncing others—for instance, to fight Communism with economic aid but not with napalm, and to help anti-Communist peasant movements but not anti-Communist dictators.

BUT THE methods you use in a fight, and the allies you line up with, are not always for you to determine—your antagonist also has a voice in what you are compelled to do. If the whole issue is one of weapons, of tactics, Washington is justified in saying to the Left, we know more about what is effective in given situations than you do. We have tried everything else, and now it's napalm. Unless you're ready to match Communist dirty tricks, including infiltration of cultural institutions in the United States by the CIA, you're really prepared to let the Communists take over.

Washington knows that so long as containment is postulated the government has the advantage in the argument of being able to talk in terms of relations of forces—and Washington keeps pressing this advantage. All it needs to do to silence the Left is to declare all civil wars which the CIA has been unable to control to be wars of aggression by Communist countries. Trapped in the logic of limiting the expansion of Communist areas, the Left can only respond with antagonism and frustration.

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The answer to COMMENTARY's first question is therefore: Yes, anti-Communism of all varieties—democratic, socialist, anarchist—leads potentially to Vietnam so long as the axis of American foreign policy is blocking the spread of Communist regimes. It matters not whether the objectives of my politics are the free individual or the cooperative society; if I am determined to keep Communist powers out of new places, I may have to support actions (including the most stupid) that I have every reason to fear and condemn. My will to "contain" Communism cannot carry the precondition that there be socialists in the White House or philosophers in the Pentagon, or that American banks and black marketeers not rush in behind the troops to get theirs out of the natives.

Containing Communism leads to lesser-evil politics with the *idée fixe* that compared to Communism *anything* is a lesser evil. An anarchist anti-Communist, for example, faced with the possibility of a Communist takeover, no matter from whom, must be prepared to embrace Pentagon belligerency.

Once it accepts the philosophy of containing Communism, the Left is on the spot: it has acknowledged dependency on the "enemy at home" to protect it against being eliminated by Communist violence. Nor does the fact that there are now several Marxist-Leninst power centers make the spot it is on any the less difficult. Each of the Communist centers is capable of spurring aggression both to win victories in non-Communist areas and to advance its position in the Communist world. Thus anti-Communism will continue to be confronted by situations in which ideology is embodied in national power and in the direct confrontation with which the concept "Left" is rendered meaningless.

So one is compelled to choose between defeating the policy of containment and giving up Left politics. In this situation containment must go, and a normal, non-ideological foreign policy must be restored in Washington. Such a policy is quite adequate to stop countries that may be a menace to the U.S. But containment not only tries to stop *all* countries of whose ideology it disapproves, it also sabotages American freedom and the conflict of ideas.

Getting rid of containment is necessary not because there is any virtue in Left politics as such, but because certain truths considered to be Left cannot be neglected without plunging this country and the world into disaster. Containment, on the other hand, which mixes up places and ideas, destroys all truths by the mad logic it has derived from Communism. For instance, it is a "Left" truth that the revolution of the peoples throughout the world cannot be confined within the framework of capitalism, and that the attempt so to confine it results in wars of repression. Containment cannot tolerate this truth and would rather see people killed, including Americans, than put up with it—any more than Communism can tolerate the truth that its kind of revolution is not necessary for progress and is even an obstacle to it.

I do not accept the assumption made in question 2 that containment is, or ever has been, a *moral* position. On the contrary, containment is an inverse extension of Communist power thinking. It presupposes the victory of a one-world system, theirs or "ours." Morality might have led America to interfere wth the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Red Army, but containment prevents such concrete responses. Its first step is to destroy traditional diplomacy and to conduct foreign policy on a totalitarian basis, including the manipulation of trade unions, scientific conferences, and art festivals as tools of international scheming.

Could I have a moral obligation to keep Communism out of South Africa or out of Spain? Do I have to protect dictators from Communist dictation? Yes, if the ground of all virtue is not freedom or justice but the negative system of defeating Communism. But freedom is not simply the other side of anti-Communism. Freedom is not a system and, as we are discovering in Vietnam, it cannot be introduced by system builders. We have trouble enough keeping it going in Alabama and Mississippi. The ex-slaveholders are sabotaging it daily, and no one has yet found it necessary to interfere with their current program of discharging the fruits of their evil throughout the length and breadth of America. The mere presence of a free country is a force for the containment of tyranny, but countries do not act against tyranny but against those who threaten the interests of their rulers. Without the presence of the U.S. the revolution of Juan Bosch could not have taken place, because long before that revolution the Dominican Republic and all of Latin America would have been subjugated by the Spanish, the Germans, the Russians, the Chinese. But in the presence of a U.S. dedicated to containment, Bosch's revolution could not take place either, because it did not fit into our totalitarian foreign policy.

NOT ONLY IS containment the opposite of moral, it is also the opposite of practical. It is being defeated at enormous cost to the U.S. as its Communist model has been defeated again and again since Tito successfully defied Stalin. The anti-Communist strategy pursued by this country is leading not to a firm anti-Communist world but to the disintegration of American relations with all free countries comparable to the breakdown or loosening of ties between the USSR and Communist countries. The idea of setting up a world system either Communist or anti-Communist is a sick idea in which the mind substitutes its own classifications and subclassifications for the variety of human inventiveness. For this sick idea pro-

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mulgated in the United States by vengeful ex-Communists, the U.S., unnerved in the face of a new world situation, has surrendered its traditional pragmatism and the values of fair play.

No state stands for freedom. It stands for itself and its spheres of influence. The maintenance of those spheres is the function of normal diplomacy.

Containment must be abandoned as quickly as possible in favor of a foreign policy released from the totalitarian hypnosis and subject to determination by free conflict among the diverse interests in American society.

First of all, containment must be abandoned by the Left itself. There must be an end to thinking in terms of world systems and world anti-systems. The notion of a global politics emanating from a center and embodying a uniform concept of social and economic development is an inheritance of Leninism in its worst aspect, the aspect that led to the formation of the Third International and its control and destruction of socialist parties. It is an attempt to manage mankind, a species of *hubris,* which, whether its intention be good or bad, will by the irony of history lead to self-deceit, crime, and crack-up.

The intrusion of the CIA into American intellectual life is a manifestation of the country's crack-up through the instrumentalities of containment. It represents the demoralized conviction that no one is to be trusted and that free men opposed to Communism cannot remain free unless they are coordinated into the anti-Communist system and manipulated by anti-Communist programmers. When the CIA deceives free minds in order to contain Communism it is actually engaged in containing freedom by segregating individuals from one another and habituating them to control. The suspicion of one another aroused among intellectuals, trade unionists, and students by the CIA exposes, by its resemblance to conditions in totalitarian countries, the nature of the threat that has grown up in his country in the epoch of containment.

HAROLD ROSENBERG, *author of* The Tradition of the New *and* The Anxious Object, *recently became art critic for the* New Yorker.

Richard H. Rovere: Among Americans for Democratic Action there has been doctrinal controversy over Hubert Humphrey's enthusiasm for American policy in Vietnam. The ADA doves, who far outnumber the hawks, consider Humphrey a backslider. Humphrey insists that it is those in the anti-war majority who have lapsed into heresy: he hasn't left the church, but just about everyone else has. Though wanting in candor and relevance, this argument seems to me historically sound. The ADA, to which I have never belonged, was established as a militantly anti-Communist organization. Over the years, its leaders have been more conspicuous as advocates than as critics of American foreign policy. Along with other liberal anti-Communists, they certainly did help to "create a climate . . . favorable to the war in Vietnam." Now they are appalled to discover where anti-Communism has led them, and they want out. But it is they more than Humphrey who have changed. Dean Rusk's speeches put one very much in mind of the kind of thing one heard at rallies of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom fifteen years ago—or, for that matter, the kind of thing one read at the time in the columns of this magazine. Hubert Humphrey, Walt Rostow, Paul Douglas, John Roche, and Max Ascoli have kept the faith.

I do not think it is a faith worth keeping or that there is anything commendable in Humphrey's obdurate and highly suspect orthodoxy. But it should, I believe, be acknowledged that the war in Vietnam has brought about, or perhaps merely revealed, great changes in attitudes and opinions in the liberal and intellectual communities. I have little doubt that if history had moved at a somewhat swifter pace in Southeast Asia and we had faced in the late 40's or early 50's the circumstances we now face in Vietnam, most of today's liberal doves would have been liberal hawks. Anti-Communism in those days had a powerful grip on most liberals. Few of them criticized President Truman's conduct of the war in Korea, and while there are important differences between Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1967, there are more similarities than most liberals like to admit. Moreover, no matter what Dwight Macdonald's present opinion may be, President Johnson has not thus far been less circumspect in his prosecution of this war than President Truman was in the other. There was hideous bloodletting in Korea, and few liberals protested it; in Berlin and elsewhere, we have run large risks of general war, and the government, as a rule, has had liberal support, even when the President was Eisenhower.

Two things, I think, have led former supporters of American foreign policy to become its opponents. One is the mere passage of time. After so many years of cold war and crises, Vietnam is somehow just *de trop.* It seems too large and too expensive and too long. If there were any kind of assurance that it could be satisfactorily cleaned up in a few months, a good deal of the opposition to it would vanish. But more important, I think, and especially among liberals, is a realization of the awful inadequacy of anti-Communism as a foundation for a global policy. Twenty or even ten years ago, nearly all Americans believed that there was something in the world that could be properly described as "international Communism" and that it threatened world peace, human freedom, and American security. Had we given the matter the thought it deserved, we might have

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concluded, no later than 1948, when Tito's Yugoslavia broke with Stalin's Russia, that there really was no such thing, that national interest was more powerful than ideology, and that while we might on occasion find it advisable to resist the outward thrust of certain Communist nations, it made absolutely no sense to have a foreign policy directed against an alliance that did not exist. (The Communists, of course, were as mistaken as we were. They thought they were part of a great international movement, and their awakening, one imagines, must have been far more discomforting than ours.) At any rate, the lesson has been learned by most American liberals and has turned them into doves. People who used to say there are things worse than war now say there are things worse than Communism and that the war in Vietnam is one of them.

While it seems to me clear and worth remarking that the liberal anti-Communists bear much of the responsibility for creating the present "climate of opinion favorable to the war in Vietnam," I am uncertain as to how much importance should be attached to what I take to be the fact. Would things have been different if they had used their brains more than they did and seen through the myth of anti-Communism a decade or two earlier? It might, I suppose, have made a good deal of difference, especially if they could have convinced John F. Kennedy at the outset of his administration that their view of Communism should govern his foreign policy. But the principal lesson in all this, I think, is to be skeptical of the prevailing liberal dogmas today. Senator Fulbright, it seems to me, often talks as much nonsense as Secretary Rusk, and I do not find it difficult to imagine a COMMENTARY symposium ten or fifteen years hence dealing with some contemporary disaster and asking whether we were led into it by the anti-war liberals of the mid-60's.

IN MY MISSPENT youth, I was briefly a Communist, but I have never been an anti-Communist—an admission that may interest the FBI. What I mean is that anti-Communism has never seemed to me to be anything like a point of view. I am against a good many things, Communism among them, but I do not care to describe myself in terms of my antipathies, and I didn't particularly like to be described, as I sometimes was in the early 50's, as an anti-anti-Communist, though the term did have a certain accuracy as applied to me. I belonged for a time to the American Committee for Cultural Freedom but quit when it became clear that the organization was anti-Communist and little else. On questions of foreign policy, though, I subscribed to the prevailing view, and I suppose that as a writer I probably did make a a small personal contribution to the mess we are in today. I am very sorry about this.

While I would be happy to see the day when anti-Communism no longer occupies the place it presently has in American foreign policy, I continue to think that Communism is one of the things our foreign policy might be directed against. Not by military interventions in Southeast Asia, not by large-scale military-aid programs, but by most of the other means available. Most Communist governments continue to be mischief-makers in the world at large. In what I have seen of the underdeveloped world, the Communists contribute little of value and do little more than get in the way of people who are trying to organize decent and reasonably open societies. I think it is worthwhile to assist many anti-Communist governments and even to give them a certain amount of military assistance in maintaining internal security and in resisting aggression. (I am not one of those who think we had no business at all in going to the aid of the government in South Vietnam. I think we had an obligation to do so and that our role in lending *assistance* was as defensible as our present role as a belligerent is indefensible.) But I see no merit at all in anti-Communism as the basic doctrine of American diplomacy or in any view of life or politics that can be encompassed in the term anti-Communist.

I must confess that I have not entirely sorted out my feelings about the CIA and its role in postwar American life. I have been a contributor to *Encounter*, and my suspicions about its origins and its finances arose well before my last association with it. I can think of many occasions in the past when it is more than likely that I was—or at least that the CIA thought I was and may have been right in so thinking—serving some CIA interest. Because I cannot recall an occasion when I did or said anything I did not want to do or say, I have felt no personal guilt. But I am now inclined to think that I have let myself off too lightly. Other people were being deceived and betrayed, and, while I was not sure of this at the time but nevertheless suspected that something fishy might be going on, I lent myself to the system of deception. I will not knowingly do so again, and I will be more diligent in checking up on my hunches. Meanwhile, I would like to see the President and the Congress put an end to the whole business.

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Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: I write as an unrepentant anti-Communist—unrepentant because there seems to me no other conceivable position for a liberal to take. There was a time when some liberals may have regarded Communism as a more rigorous and uncompromising extension of liberalism and even felt morally intimidated by the presumed superior purity and devotion of the

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Communists. I do not see how any liberal could possibly feel that way after the last thirty years of world history. It is surely not necessary in 1967 to insist that liberalism and Communism have nothing in common, either as to the means or the ends of government, either as to principle or practice.

In principle, as its adherents readily admit, Communism is an all-encompassing monolithic faith requiring obligatory and total belief in the infallibility of a deterministic theory of history, according to which all societies must proceed along the same predestined path through the same predestined stages to the same predestined conclusions. In practice, this profoundly anti-liberal, anti-democratic conviction of infallibility is embodied in a party or, more precisely, in the temporary leadership of a party which, in the name of its self-appointed infallibility, has not hesitated to practice the most cruel deceits and to commit the most terrible crimes.

The question therefore does not seem to me one of "anti-Communism." How can a liberal be anything else? The question rather is the weight to be given to anti-Communism among all the factors shaping decisions of public policy. For, though Communism is an important issue, it is not the only issue in the world. There is no doubt that some people, even perhaps some liberals, have become obsessive in their anti-Communism, consider it the only problem on the horizon, subordinate everything else to it, allow it to swallow up every other consideration and value. Obsessive anti-Communism blinds its victims to the realities of a changing world. It is the enemy of sensible policy.

Sensible policy obviously must reject obsessive anti-Communism. But it must also, in my view, incorporate rational anti-Communism—by which I mean anti-Communism graduated in mode and substance according to the character of the threat. Thus in the 1930's and 40's, when Communism was a relatively unified and disciplined international force, when all Communist parties took their orders from Moscow or lost their status in the Communist movement, when within the United States Communists had penetrated labor unions, the liberal community, even the government, when in the developing world Communism expected to sweep all before it, and when every extension of Communism meant the automatic extension of Russian national power: then Communism—Stalinism—posed a grave threat to the democratic world. The measures taken to confront that threat—in essence, the policy of containment—seemed to me then, and seem to me now, rational, wise, and brave.

BUT THE situation of contemporary Communism is obviously different; and the fallacy—and tragedy—of current United States policy, it would seem to me, is that we are trying to deal with polycentrist Communism today in terms of stereotypes and strategies left over from the fight a generation ago against Stalinism. We have thus permitted rational anti-Communism to yield to obsessive anti-Communism. For two essential points distinguish the character of the Communist problem today from what it was as late as the time of the Korean war.

1) *The end of Communism as a unified movement*: the quarrel between Russia and China is much more than simply a row between the two leading Communist powers. Its ultimate importance is that it means the elimination of any sole and single center of authority in the Communist world. It means therefore the end of the unity both of Communist discipline and of Communist ideology. It means that Communist parties and states are now set free to respond to national concerns and to pursue national policies. Not all Communist parties will do this, at least at once; but it is clear that in this polycentrist age the extension of Communism no longer necessarily carries with it the automatic extension of Russian—or of Chinese—national power. The fact that a state has a Communist regime is no longer evidence that it will serve as the obedient instrumentality of Russian or Chinese aggression.

2) *The failure of Communism as a revolutionary movement*: even the most obsessive anti-Communist, Mr. William Buckley perhaps excepted, can no longer claim with a straight face that Communism presents an internal revolutionary threat in the United States. In general, in spite of Marx's expectation that Communism, as the climax of the modernization process, would come first in the most developed countries, it is in exactly these countries where Communism is least dangerous—where, indeed, instead of bourgeois nations undergoing communization, Communist parties are becoming bourgeoisified. Thirty years ago, during the depression, Communism cast a powerful spell on young people in the democratic world adrift on a sea of economic insecurity. Today the glitter of modernity in the West casts an even more powerful spell on the young people within the bleak and tacky Communist empire.

And even in the underdeveloped world—in which the Communists, contrary to Marx, have come to repose their final hope—Communism has been a spectacular bust as a revolutionary creed. At the end of the Second World War the old colonial empires were breaking up. Deep-running revolutionary demands for social change and modernization were sweeping Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The third world looked like a set-up for the Communists. Even some liberals became mesmerized by the conviction that Communism must ineluctably ride to power on the nationalist upheavals of the underdeveloped nations. One still finds, even among liberals, lingering traces of this defeatism.

Perhaps these pessimists may in the end turn out to be right. But the historian is bound to note

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that in the generation since the end of the Second World War, in spite of the multiplication of states which has enlarged the membership of the United Nations from 50 at San Francisco in 1945 to 122 today, Communism has come to power in only *three* underdeveloped countries. The Communists won out in China and North Vietnam essentially because they were able to place themselves at the head of nationalist movements *during* the Second World War. The other major Communist success—Cuba—was a special case; Castro led a democratic revolution and then personally carried his country into the Communist empire. In the rest of the third world—despite social revolutions, as in Bolivia, Egypt, Algeria; despite pro-Communist nationalist leaders, as in Indonesia and Ghana; despite a heavy investment around the planet of Communist money and zeal, Chinese as well as Russian—Communism has thus far on the record proved itself a flop.

The upheavals in the underdeveloped world have very often produced regimes which do not much like the West or the United States; but these new nationalist states do not much like Communism either. Nationalism is a far more powerful force in the third world than Communism—and Communism has made gains only as it has disguised itself as nationalism. If containment of China becomes the problem, then the best agency of such containment will probably be not the armed intervention of white men from across the sea but the local nationalism of Asian peoples. The two heaviest blows recently suffered by Peking, besides those it has been inflicting on itself—the destruction of the Communist party in Indonesia and the declaration of independence by Communist North Korea—were struck by local nationalism, without benefit of American troops, money, or exhortation.* In the unpredictable future, the best barrier against an aggressive Communist state may in some circumstances even lie in the national Communism of neighboring states.

THESE TWO developments—the end of Communism as a unified movement, and its failure as a revolutionary creed—obviously have altered the character of the problem Communism creates for the democratic world from what it was in the days of Stalin. With these preliminary remarks, let me comment briefly on COMMENTARY's three questions:

1. The contribution of the anti-Communist Left to the American folly in Vietnam seems to me negligible. The developments which landed us where we are today were, in my judgment and as I have argued elsewhere (*The Bitter Heritage*), "a triumph of the politics of inadvertence." I doubt whether the existence of the anti-Communist Left affected one way or the other the melancholy series of small official decisions, each more or less reasonable in itself, which have now concluded in a vast catastrophe.

2. The containment policy was not essentially a policy of containing Communism. It was a policy of containing the Soviet Union, a state employing its control of the international Communist movement as one means of advancing its national power. The "same principle" does not apply to Vietnam because Vietnam is a different problem. No one in his senses could suppose that Ho Chi Minh poses a threat comparable to that posed by Stalin after the Second World War or by Hitler before it. Is it seriously argued that, if Ho conquered South Vietnam, he would then move on to Hawaii and Seattle? The analogies with Korea and Munich make sense only on the assumption that our enemy in Vietnam is not Hanoi but Peking and that the Vietcong and North Vietnam are merely the creatures of a premeditated Chinese campaign of aggression. There is no evidence, so far as I know, to support the proposition that East Asian Communism is a homogeneous and centralized movement, and many reasons to doubt it. If, for example, Communist North Korea can defy and denounce Communist China, why should anyone suppose that Communist North Vietnam, a country with a thousand years' memory of fighting the Chinese, would be more subservient to Peking?

3. One essential problem raised by the disclosure of CIA covert support of left-wing groups is this: organizations of the Right in most countries get financial support from the local business communities and oligarchies; organizations of the anti-democratic Left get it from the Russians or the Chinese; but organizations of the democratic Left have no obvious and reliable sources of support. That is the gap the CIA sought in its way to fill. Perhaps the attempt was a mistake, but the problem still exists.

My own feeling is that the CIA expenditures were wholly justified at the time when they began. During the last days of Stalinism, before the Marshall Plan had restored the economic energy and moral confidence of Western Europe, the non-Communist trade-union movements and the non-Communist intellectuals were under the most severe, unscrupulous, and unrelenting pressure. For the United States government to have stood self-righteously aside at this point would have seemed to me far more shameful than to do what, in fact, it did—which was through intermediaries to provide some of these groups subsidies to help them do better what they were doing anyway. The mistake lay in the continuation of this system of subsidy beyond the time of need. As one who

* Is it still necessary to comment on the curious argument that the Indonesia generals would not have resisted the Communist takeover had it not been for the American presence in Vietnam a thousand miles away? If so, may I quote from *The Bitter Heritage*: "This proposition omits the fact that, if the generals had not resisted the takeover, they would all have been horribly killed. They were fighting for their lives."

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served in the government well after the point when the support should have been transferred to open or private sources, I admit my own error in not trying to do something more specific about the problem. (What I did try to do is accurately described by Roger Hilsman in his book, *To Move a Nation,* page 79.)

Communism today is a boring, squalid creed, tired, fragmented and, save in very exceptional places and circumstances, wholly uninspiring. *La guerre est finie.* This does not diminish the obligation of the liberal to regard Communism with contempt or to reject its absolutisms. But it does greatly transform the character of the problem Communism poses for the democratic states. It does mean that we must abandon, laborious as that effort may be, those beloved old phrases about "the international Communist conspiracy." It does mean that we must not let such phrases betray us into foolish and perilous adventures, as in Vietnam. It does mean that rational policy will give anti-Communism the priority it deserves, which has fallen now rather low, and will move on to meet the great and serious problems of our time—the problems of the control of nuclear weapons, of the modernization of the underdeveloped world and of the humanization of industrial society—problems which Communism *per se* can never solve and which will yield only to the best vision and intelligence of humane democracy.

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Stephen Spender: Until the recent revelations about the CIA, anti-Communism seemed to me a name covering a great many attitudes and activities of those who were either consistent reactionaries or who had become disillusioned about Communism. The so-called anti-Communists ranged from Ignazio Silone to Barry Goldwater: and these have few views in common. Moreover, I thought this was often a label applied by those who specialized in being anti-anti-Communist: anti tends to breed further degrees of anti. I never thought of myself as predominantly anti-Communist, but I recognized that I was fair prey for the anti-antis.

However, the CIA has gone a long way toward bringing up to date a seemingly outworn Communist thesis: that all who disagree with Communism can be classified as one "class enemy." The appraisal which led the CIA to support many left-wing individuals and organizations showed its agreement with the argument often put forward by party stalwarts in the 30's—that liberals were more dangerous opponents of Communism than conservatives, and that social democrats were "social Fascists."

In spite of this, I feel under no obligation to accept an overall interpretation of my attitudes as read by either the CP or the CIA. In answer to your first question, I do not feel that the fact that my "name has been associated with the anti-Communist Left" makes me in any way "responsible for American policies in Vietnam." I feel responsible only for what I myself have felt about Vietnam. I wrote about this a year ago, in answer to a questionnaire sent to writers by an English publishing house: that the Americans should stop bombing the North, but that they should also refuse to be driven out until they have made the kind of peace which is not a complete betrayal of their supporters in South Vietnam. I supported Senator Fulbright and the "enclave" theory. I am aware of the inadequacy today of such an attitude, but I mention it to show that having been what is called anti-Communist does not make me feel responsible for American policies in Vietnam.

There was and is, though, justification for holding views which may expose one again to the risk of being called "anti-Communist." I would defend being vigilant about Communism, even when confronted by situations in which there is a great deal to be said for Communist solutions of problems. My sense of the importance of vigilance—and of indeed trying to make some of my colleagues similarly aware—began at the time of Stalin, when many intellectuals accepted Communism out of despair at what passes for democracy in the democracies. Later, after the war, when country after country in Eastern Europe became Communist, one could not help noticing that many of those intellectuals who had helped to bring about Communism in their countries, regretted having done so. I knew something of the tragedies of Benes and Masaryk (Benes had told me that he had no fear of the local Communists making a coup, as he had a direct telephone line to his friend Stalin), and I met many Polish writers. I also met Rakosi, the Hungarian Communist dictator, an ex-prisoner who knew how to be his country's jailer.

The fact that the sympathizers regretted Communism after the event is not so important as the fact that in their own countries they were not allowed to say so.

It is true that capitalism is, in theory, and sometimes in practice, a worse kind of materialism than the Communist variety. Also there are many countries today which seem to require some kind of dictatorship which would cut ruthlessly to the root of their problems, if they are to resolve them. These include several South American countries, some Asian and African ones, and, if it is viewed in the light of problems needing draconian measures, perhaps even India (though I think India should find a democratic way out). There are also countries like South Africa and Rhodesia, and countries in South America, where Communism would seem preferable to the frightful inequali-

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ties as between rich and poor, race and race, now going on.

Yet when intellectuals accept the necessity of Communism, they also accept the necessity of doing away with their own intellectual freedom. They are abdicating the independence of the individual standpoint outside the political centers, in favor of a choice which, as far as freedom is concerned, is a gambler's throw of the freedom card on the table, in the hope it will win the jackpot of social justice. Once the card is thrown, no further choices are made. This has been sufficiently demonstrated.

It would be almost gratifying to be able to say—as we were disposed to do in the 30's—that intellectual freedom is a middle-class luxury of self-expression which must in certain conditions of poverty, inequality, and discrimination all come to a revolutionary crisis, be sacrificed for an imposed juster order in which the individual no longer counts except as a social unit. However, the decision having been made, there is no guarantee that the results will be those anticipated; or that even if they are, that when they are achieved the dictatorship will not linger on beyond the day of justified existence; but in the meantime, the critical awareness of a nation will have been delivered into the hands of the power mongers. When individualist intellectual freedom has been surrendered, it suddenly appears that none except officials has a voice that is heeded. Hence, the intellectuals do have a responsibility to be vigilant. I find myself on the verge of saying that however great their sympathies for Communism, they have a duty to be fringe anti-Communists, because they have a duty to defend intellectual freedom. They should not support choices which are irremediable.

So in answer to your question "Would you call yourself an anti-Communist today?" I can only answer that I am still prepared to adopt attitudes which would risk my being called it. Recently, when I listened to the speeches of Kosygin and Federenko at the United Nations during and after the Middle East crisis, two things struck me about them which made them seem more cynical than any speeches made by Arab, Israeli, American, or British delegates. The first was that Soviet attacks on their opponents still have the tone, the accusing vocabulary of the speeches of the public prosecutor during the Stalinist trials, speeches meant to hypnotize and bully the person attacked into a conviction of his own guilt. Secondly, that there could be no criticism in the Soviet press of a Soviet line of policy which might be switched tomorrow—and then, after the switch there would still be no criticism.

As FOR YOUR question about "containment," I think that one should study maps. As long as all the great powers have "spheres of interest," bases, outposts in foreign countries, it seems difficult to say that the position of America in Vietnam is morally wrong in some way which makes it absolutely worse than that of the other powers. It is, rather, an accumulation of errors which have added up until today the whole sum of the politics, the history, the geography, and finally the morals comes out today as wrong, in the lives of the Vietnamese and in the consciences of many Americans who have thought and cared about the matter. It may seem cowardly to say that a colonial position becomes wrong if a sufficient number of people on the spot rebel against it, and if a sufficient number of people in the colonizing country agree with them. But this is in fact the standard we apply to Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.

If we look at maps, we find that there are parts of the world where, whatever may be our interests, it would be wrong to attempt to "contain" Communism; for the situation in them may be "revolutionary" in the popular sense; and we may not have solutions of their problems which are more viable than Communist ones. From what I have written above, it should be clear that I have no confidence in the inevitable rightness of Communist solutions—Indonesia and Ghana offer sufficient reasons for doubt—but I am not in favor of "containing" revolution in countries which, for example, have recently become free from colonization, and where containment is therefore bound to seem like a resuscitated form of imperialism.

However, I do think that there are positions to be defended. By these, I mean "the West," and places where people look to the West for protection and value the Western concept of freedom. Among these, I include India. And although I am certainly not in favor of any attempt to "liberate" by force Eastern Europe, we should not forget that in those countries a concept of individual freedom which people there share with the West, is all the time suppressed. What one hopes—perhaps the most one can hope—is that in the coming decade a growing Russian-American understanding will take these disputes out of the context of the cold war.

In answer to your third question, I cannot tell whether the CIA "backing of projects" was a realization of the "darker impulses of American policy," for I do not know how dark these impulses are. I may be the dupe of the defense put up by the CIA when I say that I have the impression that some of these impulses were rather light. The motives of some of the CIA operators may have been dark, but the activities sponsored were seemingly allowed a free and independent development. The trouble which one comes back to again and again is that one doesn't "know" what the motives of the organizers behind the organizers, the operators behind the operators, may have been, and one has and had the right, even the duty, to know. As an "intellectual" one has this right, this duty.

What happened, I think, is that the military and civilian "Intelligence" methods and policies

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in dealing with "the intellectuals" in some defeated and some allied countries ran over from the war into the cold war. A good many things done by Intelligence in its CIA form were, like a good many things done during the occupation, highly creditable to the organizers, though in the context of the cold war, and from the point of view of those who were providing funds, there was always "an end in view." Not least of the disasters threatening the Congress for Cultural Freedom is the fact that excellent projects may be shelved or abandoned. The experience of the Congress showed that during and after the Stalinist period there was a consensus of intellectual opinion disillusioned by Communism which could be brought together on a broadly anti-Communist platform as a forum of discussion. What was wrong was that behind the front of the intellectuals expressing their sincere opinions and exercising their genuine freedom of speech, there was the inner circle of Intelligence, those exploiting the diversity of opinion in the interests of a policy concealed from the participants.

There are practical reasons for objecting to these methods, apart from the overriding one of objecting to lies. When the methods were exposed (as they were surely bound to be), confidence was destroyed between people who had long worked together. It is not just that the free were duped but that they were made to appear dupes, and sometimes unjustly made to appear hypocrites. The CIA operation added to that discrediting of individual freedom which has already taken place in the Communist world, where those who are sent abroad to attend congresses, conferences, etc., only exercise the freedom to represent a society in which there is not freedom. To adapt McLuhan: the methods become the message, and these methods were all too similar to those of the totalitarianism we were opposing.

The CIA introduced an element of back-room politics into intellectual activities which had previously been free of such things. The defense is now being made that they did so because the Communists were doing the same thing. But this defense amounts to self-condemnation.

A few days ago the literary editor of a national newspaper in England said to me: "After all, it isn't surprising that you were lied to about the CIA support for *Encounter*. Everything is lies nowadays." If so, what is new today is that methods familiar enough in party politics should be introduced into the conduct of a magazine professing standards of intellectual integrity. It does seem surprising to me that one editor—the American—should have concealed from his English colleagues the fact known to him—now, on his own admission—for the past four years that the magazine had up till 1963 received funds deriving from the CIA, and that, having this knowledge, he should have misled his colleagues into making false statements denying this.

The row over the CIA will have been a good thing if, after this, there is an entirely new start. This would mean, obviously, that neither money nor personnel should come from disguised sources for what are supposedly open and disinterested activities. It should mean also that those who receive money should look much more closely at the sources. I have suggested elsewhere that there should be a form of contract between the foundations and those who receive funds from them, guaranteeing that the funds do actually come from the stated sources. For them not to do so is by implication already a damaging breach of contract since, quite apart from all the other objections, it is harmful to the recipient's reputation.

STEPHEN SPENDER, *the eminent English poet and critic, recently resigned as co-editor of* Encounter.

Diana Trilling: In the limited space available, I shall make extended response only to your first question. My answers to the other questions you ask can be briefly summed up as follows: I am still an anti-Communist, as I have long been. I am opposed to the Vietnam war—which should indicate that I do not think containment of Communism is advisable or possible under all circumstances, or by whatever means without regard to the circumstances. My opposition to the Vietnam war is practical more than moral: I do not think the war will accomplish what it set out to; rather the contrary. Although I deplore all secret subsidies of intellectual projects, I also deplore the suggestion that liberal anti-Communism was "a slave to the darker impulses of American foreign policy." In the CIA-supported activities with which I had some acquaintance, those of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, I never knew any intellectual who did anything that was not wholly consonant with his own thought and conscience; and often these activities contradicted, even subverted, our foreign policy of the time. Dupes, yes—anyone who is deceived is a dupe. Now to your first question.

It is in an article (which you do not name) by Jason Epstein, "The CIA and the Intellectuals," in the *New York Review of Books* of April 20, 1967 that we find the first, to my knowledge, formulation of the idea that the anti-Communism of the Left is responsible for the war in Vietnam, or at least created a climate of opinion favorable to it. While I should be glad to give Mr. Epstein full credit for this inspired proposition, actually his article is to be noted only for the energy with which it carries the evolving anti-anti-Communism of more than three decades to its present logical outcome. The process of this development through the years has necessarily reflected changing conditions in the world and the accommodations these have required. It has therefore not al-

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ways followed a single straight path from its original premises. Its chief premise has nevertheless persisted: the belief that opposition to Communism constitutes a political, social, and cultural backwardness. I am of course aware that not only in the general population of America but even in the political histories of certain anti-Communist intellectuals there may be found substantiation for this opinion. But the widely-held idea that political and cultural reaction is an inevitable corollary or consequence of the anti-Communist position is a folly that has been irresponsibly if not maliciously promoted by those of different views on the Communist issue and has done incalculable damage in the modern intellectual world, indeed in the democratic world.

THE HISTORY of this belief is worth tracing briefly. It took root in American intellectual life, and also in that circle of the general life of the nation which most closely borders the professional intellectual community, as far back as the early 30's, with the arrival on the scene of the first wave of disaffected Marxist intellectuals. Although it was only a handful of ex-radicals who reacted from their former Communist commitment by an extreme swing to the political Right, they made themselves felt and heard, enough to constitute a warning against the retrograde fate that could await the ex-Stalinist. And a new crop of Stalinist sympathizers being already in the making, it was expectable enough that all forms of opposition to Communism, the liberal together with the illiberal, should be merged in the minds of these fresh converts, as a manifestation of the Right. For if the allegiance to Communism was taken to be the position of the Left, where else except on the Right did one locate one's opponents?

The rise of Nazism in Germany and the Spanish Civil War were the chief events of the 30's to foster and solidify this view, for in both of these developments the left-wing intellectuals effectively assimilated the anti-Fascist cause to the Communist cause. Since Communism was fighting Franco, Communism could not be put to question; whoever did put it to question, particularly for its role in Spain itself, was an "objective Fascist." The singleness of vision which demanded that one keep one's eye on the one enemy, Fascism, also effectively blinded the intellectuals to the fact that the Soviet Union preferred to sacrifice Germany to Hitler rather than allow a possible victory to the social democrats—the left-wing American intellectual continued to entrust the anti-Fascist struggle to the Communists, as the party of the Left. And even when the Nazi-Soviet pact revaled how little faith could be put in Soviet Russia as leader and guardian of the anti-Fascist effort, there remained to left-wing intellectuals from their earlier Stalinist commitment the comforting opinion that although anti-Communists might have been correct in not giving their entire allegiance to Soviet Communism, they had been correct for the wrong reasons, out of concern for capitalism rather than democracy. By the time Hitler had attacked Russia and Russia had become our ally in the anti-Nazi war, Communism had regained the left-wing confidence it had temporarily lost, and a new "liberal" position had been formulated: in making the pact with Hitler, Russia had been temporizing, as how could she not have done, weakened as she had been by her internal problems and by the difficulties placed in her way by the Western powers. We who were ourselves so much less than ideal, who had refused to intervene against Franco, and who had been so tardy in recognizing the Nazi threat, had scarcely the right to pass judgment on the beleaguered Soviet Union. Communism needed only our generosity and understanding (so ran the argument) to be rendered our permanent friend—hence Yalta.

Thus the rift between the anti-Communist intellectuals, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the intellectuals who defined their liberalism by their unwillingness to oppose Communism took shape and established itself over two decades. And now McCarthy appeared on the political scene, to polarize the two factions, anti-Communist and anti-anti-Communist, still more sharply.

Both these designations, as well as the alternative name which was then given the anti-anti-Communists, "civil-libertarians," were inaccurate —dangerously so—as descriptions of what they referred to. The anti-Communist faction was made to include pro-McCarthy anti-Communists along with anti-McCarthy anti-Communists, without distinction. This was of course inevitable inasmuch as the division which now obtained in the intellectual community was neither new nor solely, nor even primarily, a response to McCarthyism—as I say, it had already existed for two decades and was grounded in the assumption that where there is opposition to Communism, there liberalism is not and cannot be. The term "civil-libertarian" was similarly inaccurate in that it proposed that the unwillingness to oppose Communism, even though it required that one ignore the abrogation of freedom under the Communist totalitarianism, made a proper measure of the libertarian dedication. In the fierce antagonism between the two factions, however, what suffered the worst defeat was liberalism itself, even intelligence itself. Both liberalism and reason were deserted by the anti-Communists who could suppose that McCarthy's method of combating Communism could be theirs. And both liberalism and reason were betrayed by the anti-anti-Communists who believed that because Communism was being fought by the wrong means, McCarthy's, it had to be protected.

And so we come to the late 50's and to the 60's, and to the transformations that have taken place in the anti-Communist/anti-anti-Communist struggle since McCarthy's time. The significant change is not one of principle but of battleground. It is

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not that anti-anti-Communist sentiment has shifted its target: dissent from and opposition to America vis-à-vis the Soviet Union remains at the root of the anti-anti-Communist preference. There was always the belief that American power is matched only by American error; the fact that Soviet power has grown to equal ours has not produced a parallel equation.

But if America remains the target, the field of combat has changed, from politics to culture. There is now no longer even the pretense that it is different political systems that we choose between as we decide between democracy and Communism. It is no longer the structure of the economy that we have in mind when we talk about capitalism versus Communism, and it is no longer political decisions and their actual political consequences that we examine when we put ourselves to matters of foreign policy. Now our political decisions refer not to politics but to sensibility, to cultural view and tone. Where formerly we might indeed bring general considerations of culture, especially as culture presents itself to the literary intelligence, to bear on politics—it made for that valuable hyphenated category, literary-political—today considerations of culture are our *sole* preoccupation; the assessment of actual political problems is scornfully left to those of small imagination. In the intellectual community the modes of thought and feeling appropriate to literature triumph dramatically over the modes of thought demanded by politics.

Nothing if not a man of his cultural moment, Mr. Epstein has produced, with his article in the *New York Review of Books*, the archetypical pronouncement of this stage in the development of American anti-anti-Communism. It would be difficult to discover a better instance of the cultural mode in politics than Mr. Epstein's as he discusses "the" issue which has divided left- and right-wing intellectuals in recent years. "The issue was deeper," writes Mr. Epstein, by which he means deeper than that of "who should control the engines of the economy or how the wealth should be distributed. . . . It had to do not with who controlled and benefited from the exploitation of the land and the people, but with the very fact of exploitation itself. The facts," Mr. Epstein goes on, "are clearer now than they were ten years ago. Then it surprised us to find that the country seemed to have fallen into a frenzy of self-destruction, tearing its cities apart, fouling its landscapes, poisoning the streams and skies, trivializing the education of its children. . . . What we were experiencing was the familiar philistine expansionism (of which the Vietnamese are only the latest victims)."

We do not have to be deluded that America is becoming daily more beautiful, or that our air is pure, or that our children are being properly educated, to see the way in which Mr. Epstein's approach to politics connects with the old anti-anti-Communist position. It is American culture only that Mr. Epstein puts to the test; that of the Communist countries requires no comparative study. For to bring Communism, even Communist culture, under critical inspection of the kind we undertake in relation to our own country is to suggest a form of dissent from Communism which, as I say, has always, in the left-wing view, constituted a backwardness.

Nor is it of course solely a cultural preference that Mr. Epstein is announcing. He explicitly tells us what is the political choice that follows on his cultural choice. The difference between Left and Right, Mr. Epstein explains, is determined by the quality and force and direction of our cultural awareness. Depending on how we respond to the poisoning of our streams and skies we will take either a left- or a right-wing position on—say—the Vietnam war. Whoever abhors polluted air and desecrated landscapes will have adequate ground on which to judge American foreign policy. He will recognize it in all its "philistine expansionism." What further guide to decision in foreign affairs does anyone need?

Here, then, is where we have been brought by thirty years of anti-anti-Communism. Not that Mr. Epstein himself traces the historical development as I do; he has as little regard, indeed, for historical fact as he has for political actuality: his survey of the same period in our intellectual history with which I deal makes no mention of anti-anti-Communism. As Mr. Epstein sees these last three decades, there was never any significant split in American intellectual life, there were only varying manifestations of anti-Communism on which the CIA moved in. Only when the light of culture began to illuminate the scene some ten years ago—the new visibility was significantly coincidental with the death of Stalin—did the division between Left and Right reveal itself as the rift between those who can tolerate and those who reject the culture of America and the politics which generates or follows from it.

In other words, not only does Mr. Epstein write off the historical record everything which had to do with whether it was from the Left, the Right, or the middle that one refused the Communist option. So apocalyptic is his view of our American situation that it renders meaningless and unnecessary *any* judgment upon Communism. Where once the unwillingness to oppose Communism was sufficient evidence that one was a person of the Left, today this validation demands another more positive assertion—an extreme avowal of one's hatred and contempt for America.

The question his article does not pose, however, is the question one now must put to Mr. Epstein: if the nature and degree of one's non-Communism are of no account whatsoever, and all that does count is one's opposition to America, what reason can there be not to throw in one's lot with that most powerful and best defined opposi-

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tion to America, Communism? Why should one not be a Communist? In the answer to that question lies, I suspect, the future evolution of the anti-anti-Communist sentiment—unless, perhaps, another logic of its development be enforced, the option for anarchism, with its refusal of all political structure.

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Lionel Trilling: 1. In some meaning of the word, but not, I believe, in the meaning intended by your question, I feel "responsible" for the war in Vietnam—I feel responsible as a citizen of my country: the war is something I have to *answer for*. I feel no responsibility whatever for the war in the sense of the word that signifies that it is "my fault." I cannot give even the beginning of credence to the idea that my views as a liberal anti-Communist helped bring about the war. These views have never either affirmed or implied the necessity or the desirability of the war. The "charge" that they contributed to the creation of a "climate of opinion favorable to the war" might mean that they had this effect apart from their actual substance. If so, it is patent nonsense. The position of liberal anti-Communism, as I understand it and adhere to it, has never been influential, quite the reverse; at least in the section of the country that I inhabit, the climate of opinion has been created by people whose winds of doctrine, or sensibility, blow in the other direction.

In times of stress and confusion it is not uncommon for clever, thinking people to find comfort in searching out clandestine responsibilities, such as those assigned to witches and Jews; in the 30's and 40's it was a thing to say that the poets and philosophers of the Romantic movement were responsible for Nazism.

2. Perhaps it is already clear that I would by all means call myself an anti-Communist today.

I would indeed be willing to support *a* policy of containing the spread of Communism. I would not be willing to support *any* policy of containing the spread of Communism. I do not assume that there is no other means of containment than that of military force.

My opposition to Communism is less based than formerly on what you call moral grounds, more on political grounds (although these do not seem to me to be narrow). This shift in emphasis is to be partly explained by a revision of my estimate of the feasibility of democratic government in all circumstances. I recall the acute uneasiness I used to feel whenever there came to mind the remark of John Stuart Mill that there were occasions when the political tradition of a people made democracy impracticable. It seemed to me that to say this was virtually to abrogate the whole ethic of liberalism, that it was immoral to accept that democracy was not available to all peoples at any stage in their history. It now seems to me that experience enforces the truth of Mill's observations. The assumptions and habits that make democratic government possible are not present in the tradition of every people. Mill took it for granted that, failing a democracy, the natural and most promising form of government was monarchy. At the present juncture, the form of government that is likely to propose itself, or be proposed, to a nation that seeks to transcend its past in order to exist in the modern world will most likely be a form of authoritarian socialism having close affinities with Communism, probably calling itself Communist, borrowing some of the *mystique* and methods of the first Communist nation.

This, I believe, has to be accepted. There will be those who accept it as a good in itself, expressing by this judgment their disaffection from a parliamentary democracy that is bound up with capitalism. My own acceptance is of a *pis aller* and it is made possible by my hope that the authoritarian aspects of such governments as I here envisage will come short of totalitarianism and will, with the passage of time, meliorate toward actual democracy. Up to the death of Stalin this hope was scarcely to be entertained, but developments since that event may be thought to lend it the color of possibility.

In taking this position I do not relinquish my sense of the aggressive potential of Communism and I am prepared to suppose that a growing congeries of Communist nations might form an actively anti-democratic bloc of significant power. As against this I would put the factor of nationalism, whose divisive influence has in some measure become—the irony is instructive—a beneficent element of world politics. These are matters that cannot be prejudged and must be dealt with pragmatically as occasions emerge.

3. It goes without saying that the CIA's covert backing of cultural and political projects, many of which were admirable in themselves, was a disaster in our national life. The unhappy business is not to be defended, but its actual meaning requires to be rationally estimated. One aspect of the disaster is the license that has been given to the voluptuous moralizing that issues in the insensate and vulgar judgments you paraphrase. Of the liberal anti-Communists I know who took part in the covertly backed enterprises none were "slaves" to anything. Since they were by intention not informed of the sponsorship of the enterprises, they are to be thought of as having been treated with less than becoming respect, and perhaps that makes them "dupes." If so, they were not dupes of "the darker impulses of American foreign policy." The essence of the misfortune is that much that was in itself admirable has been compromised in public view by association with what was

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in part bad, in part inappropriate, as a result of which its good faith has been brought into question. But only bad faith will pretend to settle the question by the judgments to which you refer.

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Dennis H. Wrong: I can't help feeling that there is something slightly comic in the implications of COMMENTARY's questions. Are the 40's and 50's now to be stood on their heads while we beat our breasts and fill the air with *mea culpas* to atone for the anti-Communism we adopted in reacting against previous illusions, shared by some of us, about Communism? Surely, such a spectacle would powerfully confirm the suspicion that left-wing intellectuals are a peculiarly unstable, self-flagellating breed. And one cannot help wondering what the new penitential act of the next decade will turn out to be: which of our current beliefs will we be cravenly apologizing for when history produces, as it certainly will, new surprises for us?

The anti-Communism of the Left contributed something to the national mood supporting American cold-war policies, which now include the war in Vietnam. But let us not exaggerate the influence as some anti-Communist liberals exaggerated the influence of domestic Communists on American society and foreign policy only to discover that there was always a McCarthy or a Welch to go them one better. Anyway, who on the Left ever indiscriminately favored any and all forms of opposition to Communism, abroad as well as at home? To reject Communist regimes and their spread never implied approval of everything done in the name of anti-Communism. Hitler, after all, was—most of the time, at least—an anti-Communist.

Quite early in the cold war, liberal and radical anti-Communists were forced to consider which national policies resisting Communism—both those adopted and those merely proposed—they were prepared to support and which policies they felt obliged to reject because they violated other traditional values of the Left. Few of them during the period of the American nuclear monopoly favored preventive war against the Soviet Union and few were prepared to risk a third world war at the time of the Hungarian Revolution. Liberal and radical anti-Communists have criticized American alliances with or aid to such anti-Communist states as Formosa, Spain, Portugal, South Africa, a brace of Latin American dictatorships, and South Vietnam under Diem. They opposed direct and indirect American military interventions in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. The anti-Communist Left disliked and feared and did not hesitate to attack the Dullesian vision of a Manichean world struggle between the "international Communist conspiracy" and the "free world." On the other hand, most anti-Communist liberals and socialists supported the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade, the creation of NATO (though often with reservations), intervention in Korea, and the forced removal of Russian missile bases from Cuba.

It is tiresome to have to review this familiar recent history, but I do so only in order to make the obvious point that Vietnam hardly represents the first time that anti-Communist Leftists have dissented from American foreign policy in the last twenty years. The war in Vietnam has become, to be sure, the most morally and politically indefensible project to which the United States has committed itself since 1945 and perhaps in American history. Yet I do not see that the anti-Communist Left need have a bad conscience in opposing it, either out of a feeling of betrayal of its past anti-Communism or out of a sense of guilty responsibility for its share in creating the anti-Communist ideology now invoked to justify the war. Moreover, it is worth noting that of the anti-Communist policies listed above which the anti-Communist Left has supported, all except the last one—the Cuban missiles crisis—originated over fifteen years ago. If we view the anti-Communist Left in the large as a more or less coherent and enduring political tendency, it has always been selective in its judgments of American foreign policy and has become increasingly critical since the early 1950's. Thus no obvious moral and ideological inconsistency is involved in now opposing the Vietnam war after having given support to earlier American cold-war policies.

The matter is more complex, however, when the anti-Communist Left is seen as the capacious political home of a variety of groups and individuals with differing relations to Communism, anti-Communism, and the official agencies that have carried out American foreign policy. The labor movement is presumably part of the anti-Communist Left and most labor leaders have clung to a cold-war posture of early 50's vintage that is even more inflexible than Dean Rusk's. For them, as for much of the American public, anti-Communism has become simply a component of American patriotism as such, resulting in ritual assent to almost any action the government undertakes. Unfortunately, there is little doubt that they reflect the sentiments of their membership.

In the intellectual community, some who came of political age in the factional struggles of the 30's and early 40's failed to adjust to the new situation created when anti-Communism—or anti-Stalinism, to give it its proper name—which had long been a courageous and principled minority position on the Left, suddenly became the basis of national policy. What had previously been a

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parochial fight for the allegiance of a still nonexistent mass movement developed into a struggle for Europe and even the world. By the early 1950's history seemed to have vindicated in the most dramatic fashion possible the isolated, beleaguered, crankily idealistic anti-Stalinist Left, long assailed or patronized by more powerful groups ranging from Rightists, unwilling to distinguish Stalinists from Trotskyites or Norman Thomas socialists, to the liberal survivors of the Popular Front era for whom sympathetic understanding of the Soviet Union remained the ultimate test of political virtue. When the struggle for the soul of the Left emerged as the central issue of contemporary history, the old anti-Stalinist minority woke up to discover that its knowledge of Communist history and the Marxist texts, once dismissed as quaintly esoteric, had become a national resource. Some intellectuals lost all sense of proportion in this situation. I remember being told in 1952 that a vote for Stevenson was "objectively" pro-Communist. Another Old Left partisan wrote in a mass circulation magazine that the most urgent task of the day was "to make Communists unrespectable" in the eyes of the American public. This in 1952! I have no wish to name names, but it should be added that the proponents of these arguments were not among those few intellectuals whose anti-Communism became so monomaniacal that they ended up repudiating the Left altogether and moving to the extreme Right.

It was in this intellectual climate that funds for all sorts of cultural and intellectual projects were suddenly made available by foundations, universities, the State Department and, as we have recently learned in confirmation of longstanding suspicions, the CIA. Now the demagogic and racketeering exploitation of popular anti-Communism in domestic politics was an old story to the Left; McCarthyism was merely the latest and most successful instance of it. But there could be no certainty that the United States government itself might not undertake highly questionable actions abroad in resisting real or imagined Communist expansion once anti-Communism had become virtually an official ideology and national mission. The United States had, after all, never before assumed such world responsibilities, its politicians and bureaucrats were not notoriously sophisticated and enlightened, and an anti-Communist foreign policy was bound to increase the influence of the armed forces and secret intelligence services, not organizations usually regarded as uniformly benevolent by the Left. One might have expected, therefore, somewhat greater wariness toward and self-distancing from official policy and its instruments on the part of those liberal anti-Communist intellectuals who so willingly assumed the role of spokesmen for American democracy to their counterparts abroad. The charges to which COMMENTARY alludes are the price now being paid for the lack of such awareness.

I do not for a moment believe that anyone of substance in the Left intellectual community tailored his views to please the paymaster, but many were undoubtedly vaguely aware of government, if not CIA, funding and should have anticipated how this might discredit them and their enterprises at some date in the future. Actually, as is usually the case with ideological tendencies, the anti-Communist Left's most active and visible assumption of the role of defender of the American national commitment to resist Communism came after domestic Communist sympathizers had been silenced and reduced in numbers by events, and when John Foster Dulles was busy mechanically extending policies originally devised for Europe into a world-wide formula for the military containment of Communism. By the late 50's, only a few years after the creation of the journals, committees, and annual conferences receiving CIA support, anti-Communist liberals, horrified at the apparent acceptance by many Americans of the possibility of nuclear war and put off by American policies toward Guatemala, Quemoy and Matsu, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, were insisting, somewhat plaintively, "That is not what I meant at all. That is not it, at all."

The anti-Communist Left, then, largely supported American foreign policy in the early years of the cold war when Europe was its major theater, but the Left also made a major contribution to the shift in American attitudes toward a calmer, less demoniacal view of the Communist powers during the years immediately preceding the escalation of the war in Vietnam. If the anti-Communist Left is to be assigned a share of the blame for Vietnam, it also deserves a much larger share of the credit for the nuclear test ban, the shelving of the proposed massive civil-defense program, widening recognition of the rise of polycentrism in the Communist world, and the general detente with the Soviet Union. The very decline of anti-Communist militancy in the early 60's makes the war in Vietnam seem so tragic a reversion to a view of the world that the nation had shown signs of outgrowing. The war has given the more inflexible and reactionary anti-Communists a new lease on life as they project onto China the satanic designs formerly attributed to the Soviet Union.

CERTAINLY I WOULD still call myself an anti-Communist today. Communism would have to change more than it has, rather than American policies and attitudes toward it—however insupportable—before I would abandon the label, empty and meaningless though it has always been, without further specification of the grounds for being anti-Communist and the particular anti-Communist policies supported at a given time. When people like Staughton Lynd and Tom Hayden write: ". . . we refuse to be anti-Communist. We insist that the term has lost all specific content it once had. Instead it serves as the key category of

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abstract thought which Americans use to justify a foreign policy that is often no more sophisticated than rape . . .," I understand their feelings but am inclined to doubt, particularly after the book they wrote about their trip to Hanoi, whether they have ever understood the "specific content" of liberal and radical anti-Communism. (I remember debating with Lynd in 1946 at Columbia —he was in his late teens, I in my early twenties— the proposition that the Soviet Union was a true socialist society and therefore the main hope in the world for human progress. The audience generally supported his affirmative view, with one exception—Nathan Glazer.)

In common with others of my political generation, I retain a certain pride in having been a "premature" anti-Communist, but I do not expect the younger generation that came of age in an entirely different period to honor and respect this. Why should they? Such Old Left slogans as the "end of innocence" and the "end of ideology" naively presupposed that successive generations learn from and build upon one another's experience. History has always been more discontinuous, moving in fits and starts. If there is truth in Santayana's statement—the text of so many sermons read by the Old Left to the New—that those who forget history are condemned to repeat it, it is also true that one can be imprisoned by historical memories. Can any middle-aged supporter of the war in Vietnam discourse for longer than five minutes without invoking the Munich analogy?

I never supported a policy of "containing the spread of Communism" in the sense of favoring military action by the United States wherever Communist movements seemed likely to come to power. I did support, and still do, a policy of containing Russian and Chinese expansion at the expense of independent nation-states, such as occurred where the United States could do little to prevent it in Eastern Europe and Tibet, and threatened to occur in Western Europe and South Korea where the United States and its allies were able to check it by both military and non-military means. The fact that Russia and China are totalitarian societies, is, of course, not unconnected with their expansionist tendencies, but it is their *power,* not their repressive social orders, that necessitates resistance to their actual or threatened military aggressions. I also favor American support for Israel against Arab aggression, although the Arab states, while authoritarian, are neither Communist nor totalitarian, and I would favor it even if the Soviet Union were neutral rather than a supplier of arms to the Arabs.

The general moral principle at issue here is condemnation of military aggression and support for measures of collective security against it rather than disapproval of Communism or totalitarianism as such. In general, UN intervention, as in the Congo and, at least nominally, in Korea, is to be preferred—that, after all, is what the UN is for. But, as we all recognize, the UN is usually powerless to act except in small-scale conflicts where great-power involvement is minimal, so the burden of intervention frequently must fall upon the United States. Intervention, not to check revolutions or to take sides in civil wars, but against external aggression where there is real danger that the ensuing conflict will involve major powers, is the only kind of intervention that is justified.

How do these rules apply to Vietnam? Only by branding the Vietcong as agents of Hanoi and Hanoi as the agent of China can it be plausibly maintained that Vietnam is an instance of great-power aggression to which the tired Munich analogy and dominoes metaphor have possible relevance. And this is, of course, the Johnson administration's justification for the war. I do not believe that the Vietcon gis the advance guard of Chinese Communism in South Vietnam, although I have no doubt they have received aid and support from North Vietnam (Hanoi's greatest involvement, however, postdates American escalation of the war.) In short, no major Communist state, let alone a still united Russian-Chinese bloc as at the time of Korea, is sufficiently involved in the Vietnam conflict to give credence to the Munich-dominoes argument. While I do not agree with the view of some critics of the war that it is wholly a civil war within South Vietnam, South Vietnam is clearly not a viable nation-state comparable to Greece, Turkey, Israel, and other states that the United States is pledged to defend against external aggression. Thus I do not think that the "same principle" of containment which applied to Berlin, Korea, and Western Europe as a whole applies to Vietnam.

The most urgent intellectual task for the anti-Communist Left at the present is to acquire a firmer understanding of the sources of support for American anti-Communist militance abroad. (The most urgent *political* task is, of course, to oppose continuation of the war in Vietnam.) I do not believe that American policy must inevitably be what it is because of the fundamental structure of American society or because the "military-industrial complex" has become an irresistible and immovable Establishment. But neither can I believe that the general support of our misdirected effort in Vietnam stems purely from intellectual error. Nor is the answer to be found in examination of the impact of our military commitments on domestic political conflict, nor even in the domestic political uses of anti-Communism. We need deeper explorations of exactly what significance America's proclaimed world role has to the citizen's sense of himself, his place in the world, and his fears of what would happen should this role and the rhetoric sustaining it be suddenly abandoned.

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PAUL LENDVAI

THE NEW AUSTRIA & THE OLD NAZIS

ON ONE OF the busy streets of downtown Vienna about two years ago, a young student walked up and down, collection box in hand, parading two placards: "Please spare something for Franz Novak! Donations urgently needed! Contribute to gift parcels for Franz Novak in prison!" The three sweaters he was wearing were meant to protect him not only from the bitter cold—but from bruises. For the young man was pretending to be collecting funds for Eichmann's transportation officer, whose trial had recently dominated the headlines of the Austrian papers, and precaution against the attacks of angry passersby thus seemed advisable.

The young student's fears, however, proved groundless. "In roughly twenty minutes," he later reported, "I collected around 160 shillings [over six dollars] and a Nazi leaflet. About 45 per cent of the people contributed not even knowing for whom they donated, whereas 45 per cent contributed *because* they knew. With about 10 per cent I came up against opposition, but this was not persistent—let alone violent. On the contrary, during those twenty minutes a lot of people smiled at me; the Viennese are friendly people. The expected scuffle did not take place. I did not need the three sweaters as protection against bruises. But against the chill I felt for a long time afterward, not even ten sweaters could have protected me."

An exaggerated generalization on the basis of chance encounters? A distorted picture of the mentality of seven million Austrians? Such reactions, following the publication of the student's account, suggested that he had touched on an issue most delicate for the Austrians—their attitude toward the "murderers in our midst." Even today, the case of Franz Novak provides an ideal starting point for a review of Austria's postwar record in dealing with "old" Nazis and the manifold manifestations of neo-Nazism.

NOVAK'S CAREER as a Nazi dates back to 1929, when he joined the Hitler youth. In 1934, he participated in the abortive Nazi putsch against the Austrian government which culminated in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. Subsequently, he became a member of the "Austrian Legion" which was trained in Germany as an elite unit for the eventual showdown with the authoritarian, but patriotic, Austrian regime. After the *Anschluss* in 1938, Novak returned to Vienna and there, as Eichmann's transportation officer, he played a key role in the execution of the "final solution." In full awareness of what he was doing, Novak shipped 1.7 million Jews to their death. After the war, he lived in Vienna under the assumed name of Dolak until 1957, by which date he no longer found it necessary to conceal his identity. His newly flourishing career as assistant manager of a printing plant and functionary of *Kameradschaft IV*—an organization of veterans of the *Waffen SS*—was not interrupted until 1960 when the German Chief Prosecutor in Frankfurt issued a warrant for his arrest.

Stimulated into action by this warrant, the Austrians themselves finally brought Novak to trial. In December 1964, an eight-man jury—splitting its vote 5 to 3—found him guilty of "public violence." He was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, four of which he had already served while waiting to be tried. Novak's counsel promptly appealed the verdict.

The case thereupon went to the Austrian Supreme Court's court of appeals, whose president, Dr. Hans Sabaditsch, was a former member of the Nazi party and had, in consequence of his activities during the Hitler years, been barred from the bench between 1946-1949. The task of presenting Novak's case to his fellow judges fell to Dr. Konrad Zachar, also a former member of the Nazi party. While Novak had been shipping Jews to the gas chambers, Dr. Zachar, a public prosecutor, had become notorious for demanding maximum penalties for minor political offenses. For example, in 1943, Zachar obtained the death sentence in the case of one Leopold Strasser, a railroad worker who had given 30 marks to the wives of two imprisoned fellow workers. In 1946, he was pensioned by the "ungrateful" authorities, but the rediscovery of his juridical gifts led to his reinstatement in 1949. His presence on the bench in the Novak case caused the *Furche,* Austria's most

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distinguished Catholic periodical, to question "the moral legitimacy of a judge proclaiming the law in the name of the very republic whose advocates he had sent to the gallows. . . ."

The Supreme Court annulled the lower's court's verdict on technical grounds and ordered a retrial before another jury. On October 6, 1966 Novak was again found guilty, but the three judges on the case nevertheless acquitted him on the ground that he had only been "obeying superior orders." (Several Austrian newspapers pointed out that Novak himself had never used this argument; instead, he had pleaded that he had not known of the fate awaiting the Jews he was deporting.) Thus it was as a free man that Novak emerged from the court building in which, during the Nazi era, twelve-hundred Austrian patriots had been hanged.

THE CASE HISTORY of Franz Novak reflects some important facets of the Austrian way of life—the ingrained tendency to skirt decisions, the persistent failure to pass the test of historic responsibility, the love of compromise, the horror of initiative, the passivity, and the fatalism. The unique blend of these characteristics in a country which radiates beauty, history, and pleasure provides the basis for the famous *Gemütlichkeit*, but also the breeding ground for complacency and opportunism. To negate the noteworthy achievements of the democratic, independent, and neutral postwar regime of Austria would be as misleading and unwise as to overlook its failure in coming to grips with the past. The overall balance-sheet of the postwar period, like so much in Austria's thousand-year history, is paradoxical.

Though there is no disputing the dreary record of acquittals and fantastically lenient sentences meted out to major war criminals, there is no basis for the opinion that the overwhelming majority of Austrians today are sympathetic to neo-Nazism or to violence in any form. The postwar record of peaceful industrial growth and the election results between 1945 and 1966 show clearly that extreme views, whether of the Left or of the Right, have become fringe views. There is every reason for concern about the "dangerous Austrian mentality" (the phrase used by Cardinal Koenig of Vienna in condemning the acquittal of Novak)—a state of mind that manifests itself in the evasion of the truth about the Nazi era, public eagerness to forget an ambiguous past, and the proverbial Austrian dislike of "unpleasantness"; there is, however, no reason to equate this state of affairs with a wide-scale resurgence of neo-Nazi influences representing an immediate or serious threat. This point must be made at the outset because it is precisely the over-simplified criticism from abroad which provides facesaving formulas for the Austrian politicans engaged in elaborate attempts at whitewashing the situation.

The distressing evidence of Austria's failure to weed out the remnants of the Nazi past must be seen against the country's complex historical and racial background. Since the 1918 collapse of the old multi-racial Austro-Hungarian Empire—which was ruled by the Austrians even though they constituted less than 25 per cent of its population of 51 million—the violent vicissitudes in the life of the German-speaking Austrians have been related to a perennial conflict between their allegiance to the Austrian state and their loyalty to the German *Volk*. The seeds of this agonizing dilemma were already evident in the old Empire after the defeat of Koniggratz in 1866 and Austria's subsequent expulsion from the German Federation. In the wake of this defeat, and more than two generations before Hitler's rise to power, George von Schonerer formulated an ideology combining radical pan-Germanism with virulent anti-Semitism. Many of his arguments were to reappear in *Mein Kampf*, and even in present-day Austria, one finds highly active devotees of Schonerer's teachings in strictly "Aryan" student fraternities, in school and university circles, and in the *Turnvereine* (gymnastic societies).

Nothing more clearly demonstrates the central paradox of Austrian politics than the fact that even today the adjective "national" implies membership in a "Greater Germany" and the passionate rejection of the notion of an independent Austrian nationhood. To be sure, the majority of Austrians during the past century have been Christian Socialists or Social Democrats rather than pan-German, but both of these voter-blocs have contributed to Austria's current problems. The founding father of Austrian Christian Socialism and mayor of Vienna was Karl Lueger (1844-1910), whose anti-Semitism was as pronounced as von Schonerer's though his party's allegiance to Catholicism and the Hapsburg monarchy constituted a sharp dividing line from the pan-Germans. Nevertheless, the Christian socialists could never forge a clear sense of national identity for Austria; nor could the Social Democrats, who tended to be psychologically dominated by Germany. For example, one of their leaders, the late Chancellor Renner, was almost as enthusiastic in his public support of the *Anschluss* in 1938 as was the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Innitzer.

By and large, the *Anschluss*—the bloodless annexation to Germany—met with popular approval; one has only to remember the cheering crowd of 200,000 who filled Vienna's historic Heldenplatz on the occasion of Hitler's triumphal entry into the city, the jubilant eruption of pent-up anti-Semitic feelings in the capital, and the rush of self-seekers to grab the "aryanized" property of the Jews. In trying to understand, though not to condone, this response one should remember the sheer weariness of a population which in two decades of political strife and economic hardship had lived through a civil war and

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two abortive putsches. In addition, one has to take into account the racial kinship felt toward the Germans, the long pre-history of Austrian anti-Semitism, the total diplomatic isolation of the government in 1938, and the critical level of unemployment at the time (400,000 to 600,000 out of a population of 6½ million). All these factors help to explain the ease and speed with which the annexation was effected. The republic in which "most of the patriots were not democrats while most of the democrats were not patriots . . . had not enough will to resist by itself because it had not enough will to live by itself."*

WHILE postwar Austria owes its very existence to the allied powers, it had to survive the grueling test of a ten-year occupation, and Soviet domination over half of the country, before it attained independence. During this period, Austria's political leaders—many of whom had spent the seven years of Nazi rule in the same concentration camp—showed that they had learned something from the tragic consequences of their prewar fratricidal strife. Their political shrewdness was already evident in the first declaration of the provisional government, in April 1945, to the effect that Austria had been the first free country to fall victim to Hitler's aggression. Moreover, in the State Treaty of 1955, establishing the Second Republic, they took care to proclaim the thesis that the Austrian state had ceased to exist as an independent entity from the moment of the *Anschluss*, that the country had therefore been *forced* to participate in the war, and that consequently it had been liberated, not conquered, by the allied forces. There is much to be said for this "victim theory." Its political usefulness is beyond question, and it even reflects a measure of historical accuracy. Though the Austrian resistance movement hardly matched that of most other occupied countries in Europe, there was growing opposition to the Nazi regime from 1938 on. It would be unjust to forget that 35,000 Austrian patriots—Catholic priests, socialist workers, army officers, intellectuals, Communist youth, Christian-Socialist public servants—were executed because of their active resistance or their anti-Nazi convictions.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to regard the majority of Austrians as "victims," or to condone the present use of the "victim theory" as an excuse for granting legal amnesty, and even moral absolution, to the innumerable Austrian accomplices in Nazi crimes. By extending the "victim theory" to the population as a whole, the Austrians render themselves incapable of coming to grips with the realities of their past. These realities run almost exactly counter to the frequent assertion by Austrians that a relatively small number of their countrymen had been Nazis and that their participation in atrocities had been extremely limited.

The fact is that there were 567,000 registered Austrian members of the Nazi party. About 80,000 of them had been so called "illegal Nazis" even before the *Anschluss*. Over 60,000 Austrians belonged to the SA; 22,000 were members of the SS. According to the best available evidence, 65,500 Austrian Jews were murdered between 1938 and 1945, their property confiscated, their synagogues and cemeteries desecrated or destroyed.

Moreover, Austrian Nazis also bear a heavy responsibility for the mass murder of Polish, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Dutch, and Russian Jews, as well as gypsies and forced laborers. While accounting for only 8½ per cent of the total population of the Third Reich, Austrian war criminals, according to Simon Wiesenthal, can be held accountable for the massacre of about three million Jews.

This estimate was part of Mr. Wiesenthal's lengthy memorandum about "crime and punishment of Austrian war criminals" which he submitted to the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Joseph Klaus, in October 1966. Wiesenthal mentions two factors which may help to account for Austria's heavy involvement in the "final solution." First, there was the fact that Eichmann—who had grown up in Austria—began the operations of his "center for Jewish emigration" in Vienna, and drew heavily on Austrian Nazis for help. Secondly, in those areas of Poland which had once been a part of the Hapsburg empire, the Germans found some tactical advantage in employing Austrian occupation forces.

Wiesenthal's memorandum proceeds to cite chapter and verse of Austrian participation in Nazi atrocities. On the Russian front as well as in other occupied areas, there were special "police" battalions, composed entirely of Austrians, whose task it was to round up and murder Jews. The killing of two million Jews at Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka—a project called *Aktion Reinhard*—was planned and executed predominantly by Austrian Nazis. Moreover, the Austrians were specifically responsible for the murder of 110,000 Dutch Jews, and Austrians served as ghetto commanders in, among other cities, Warsaw, Vilna, and Riga.

The Wiesenthal memorandum was prompted by his impression that even the competent authorities were largely ignorant of the extent of the Austrian involvement in Nazi war crimes. Almost a year has passed since the submission of the Wiesenthal memorandum, yet no official action has as yet been taken.

The guilt-ridden silence of the authorities becomes comprehensible when one contemplates their sorry record in the matter of investigating and prosecuting the "murderers in our midst." Here too, however, one must beware of oversim-

* Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Rape of Austria*, Macmillan, London, 1963.

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plifications. Between 1945 and 1949, the first postwar governments did engage in serious efforts to punish the war criminals. Under the War Criminals Law enacted in 1945, special people's courts sentenced 13,000 Nazis, about 10 per cent of those who had been subject to investigation. The courts pronounced forty-two death sentences, of which thirty were executed. It must be remembered that at the beginning of the postwar period, there was still a paucity of evidence as to the full extent of the crimes of the accused, so that they were tried not for mass murder, but for offenses such as treason, perpetrating executions of civilians, and denouncing their fellow citizens. As a result, however, most of the Austrian participants in *Aktion Reinhard* and in the *Einsatzgruppen*, the mobile killing units in the East, remained, according to Wiesenthal, "virtually untouched."

By 1949 the Austrian government, with the approval of the allied occupation powers, had come to the conclusion that the process of denazification had been successfully completed. Between 1945 and 1949 half a million Nazi "smallfry" had been forbidden to vote; they were now restored to full citizenship.

This "reintegration" of "small-fry" Nazis fades into insignificance when one considers what happened in 1955. At that time, the newly independent Austria received into its custody about a hundred Nazi criminals who had been imprisoned in Russia, and who were released under the express condition that they be brought to trial in their home country. Most of these men were immediately pardoned by Austria's Federal President. To be sure, some of those who had committed especially horrible atrocities received sentences ranging from twenty years to life, but even these were quietly released a year or two later.

AUSTRIA'S record since 1955 has earned the country its reputation as a "haven for war criminals." Between 1961 and 1966, eighteen war-crimes trials were held; eight of these ended in acquittal. The War Criminals Law having been formally terminated in 1957 because of a prevalent though obviously untenable opinion in government circles that no further cases would come to light, the accused were tried before regular juries, consisting of eight laymen drawn by lot, and reaching their verdict by majority vote. In case of a tie the benefit of the doubt goes to the defendant.

In a number of cases, the jurors have shown that they regard war crimes as no crimes at all, or at best as minor offenses. The acquittal of Franz Murer, in June 1963, was the first of the recent verdicts to provoke strong protests both in Austria and abroad. During the Hitler era, Murer was known as "the hangman of Vilna." After the war, the British extradited him to the Russians, who sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment. Upon his return to Austria from the Soviet Union, in accordance with the provisions of the 1955 State Treaty, Murer started "a new life" and even managed to get elected president of the Farmers' Chamber in the Styrian town of Liezen. Brought to trial at last, he was declared innocent, despite the testimony of fifty witnesses concerning the atrocities he had perpetrated in Vilna. The verdict was applauded by the onlookers. After the trial, Murer was met by his close friend, Richard Hochrainer, presented with flowers, and driven home in a Mercedes. In 1961, Hochrainer had been sentenced to seven years for the murder of nine Jewish forced laborers *after* the war, but the court of appeal subsequently cleared him of the charge.

The reluctance of juries to punish Nazi leaders for their deeds was also evident in the case of Eichmann's friend, Erich Rajakowitsch, who, as head of the Department of Jewish Affairs in occupied Holland, had signed the deportation orders for Dutch Jews. In 1965, he was sentenced to thirty months for "malicious damage and intentional endangering of human lives." Since he had already served two years while awaiting trial, Rajakowitsch was soon a free man; indeed, at the end of the year he was an interested spectator at the much-publicized trial of Robert Jan Verbelen.

During the war, Verbelen had been an SS general in Belgium. In 1947, the Belgians sentenced him to death, in absentia, for his numerous acts of terrorism and for the murder of 101 Belgian patriots and resistance fighters. After the war, Verbelen managed to escape to Austria. There, under the cover name of "Herbert" he worked first for the CIC (American counter-intelligence) and, after the occupation ended, for the Austrian political police. As a reward for his labors, Verbelen was granted Austrian citizenship in 1959 under his real name. Three years later, the International Organization of Resistance Fighters discovered that a frequent contributor to obscure neo-Nazi publications, a certain Jean Marais, was none other than Verbelen. Since he was by now an Austrian citizen, Verbelen had to be tried in Austria. The jury acquitted him on the ground that he had killed "under duress of orders." As the *Neues Osterreich*, a now defunct Vienna daily, put it: "No court in the world would have recognized the validity of the argument of superior orders in the case of a high-ranking SS officer. A Viennese jury can claim the sad credit for passing a verdict under which even an Eichmann would have been let off." Neither storms of official and public protests in Belgium, nor the demonstrations in Austria itself, were enough at first to rouse the Austrian authorities from their lethargy and indifference. This past May, however, after eighteen months, the Austrian Supreme Court quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial. Verbelen himself went on to write his autobiography—*Mister Inkognito*—which was duly brought out by an Austrian publisher.

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Two months after the Verbelen trial, a Salzburg jury demonstrated its indifference to the fact that murderers were still at large in Austria. Two Polish-born brothers, Johann and Wilhelm Mauer, both naturalized Austrian citizens, were on trial for their participation in the massacres that took place in the Polish city of Stanislaw, a bloodbath during which 12,000 Jews were killed. After the war, both occupied high positions in the Evangelical charity organizations of Salzburg, and both were regarded as highly respected citizens. During the trial, horror was piled on horror as some forty witnesses, including those whose families had been killed by the two brothers, testified to the atrocities that had been performed by the accused. Many of the onlookers broke out in scornful laughter while these witnesses were on the stand, and the reference of the defense to the accused as "victims of a conspiracy of world Jewry" was greeted with roaring applause and shouts of "Bravo!" The jury, headed by a former SA man and registered ex-Nazi, did not disappoint the expectations of the spectators; in a verdict that referred to "superior orders," it acquitted the two brothers. The *Kleine Zeitung*, a Catholic daily in Graz, commented: "The verdict is a scandal. Forty witnesses have heavily incriminated the accused. The jurors, however, did not believe the witnesses because these witnesses were Jews. And that is what we mean when we speak of a scandal." The Communist paper, *Volksstimme*, drew the understandable conclusion that "murder is not a crime when committed against Jews and anti-Fascists."

The judge overthrew the verdict, and thus a second Mauer trial took place at the end of 1966, only a few weeks after the unexpected acquittal of Franz Novak. The passionate protests stirred up by the Novak case seemed to have an influence on the trial and to confirm the impression that Austrian juries are not immune to the pressures of domestic and international opinion. In any event, the two brothers were sentenced to twelve and eight years respectively, after the jury rejected the thesis of "superior orders" and found them guilty of participation in eight mass executions. The sentences may well be considered excessively mild, especially if one takes into account that Austrian juries are given to dealing as harshly as possible with "normal" capital crimes; but considering the context, they are a hopeful sign.

There are, however, few other hopeful signs, as becomes clear when one turns to the undisputed facts cited in the Wiesenthal memorandum about the present state of the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The Austrian courts have in their possession the names of sixty Austrians who worked in the death camps of Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor, but only one of these men is now in prison. Among the war criminals still at large, there are also 150 Austrians who were implicated in murder while serving in mobile killing units, forty guards from Auschwitz, including an aide to the commander, and more than a hundred guards and officials from other death camps. About a hundred of these men are not only free; they serve in the police and gendarmerie of the Second Republic. Even those public officials who, fearing self-incrimination, refused to appear as witnesses at trials in Germany (despite the promise of safe-conduct) have not been suspended from their positions.

FAR FROM ferreting out Nazi criminals, the legal department concerned with war crimes is so understaffed that it is unable even to deal properly with information routinely supplied by Germany. Austria's equivalent to Germany's Central Agency of Investigation at Ludwigsburg is Department 18 of the Ministry of the Interior. But the staff of the German agency has recently been tripled while the staff of Department 18 has been reduced from ten men to six.

Yet even if the courts and the government were prosecuting the war-criminals with a maximum of zeal and efficiency, they would not completely succeed in cleansing the Austrian atmosphere of its complacent insensitivity toward the past. At the heart of the problem lies the attitude of the Austrian people. *Die Presse*, one of Vienna's leading newspapers, recently ran a letter which concluded, "I can assure you that the Austrian public has had more than enough of these trials." The letter, a typical one, accurately reflected a substantial segment of public opinion, including the views of innumerable young people who were not even alive during the Nazi era.

To understand the prevalence of this attitude, one must see it in its historical context. After the end of World War II, the Austrians endured ten years of Communist pressure; they lived, so to speak, in the shadow of the Red Army. The new danger of a take-over by yet another totalitarian dictatorship gradually began to overshadow the task of coming to grips with the Nazi past. During the ten year-struggle for the independence of a united country, the Austrian leaders therefore began to sanction the absolution of hundreds of thousands of Nazi self-seekers and opportunists, who learned to think of themselves as "victims," while extreme right-wing politicians began to hail them as seasoned "fighters against Bolshevism."

As for the average Austrian, he wanted only to be left alone and to enjoy the fruits of an amazing economic recovery, stimulated by 1.5 billion dollars of Marshall Plan aid. Nothing in the postwar politics of the country has been conducive to an effort at individual soul-searching or dissociation from the racial and religious prejudices which are so deep-seated among the Austrians.

What the Austrian people needed was a comprehensive program of moral and political reeducation; what they were given was a halfhearted and incomplete program of denazification. It is, of

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course, true that if the government had been overly sensitive about employing people with a compromising past, it might not have been able to fill all the necessary administrative positions. Moreover, the primary reason for the pollution of Austria's political atmosphere is not the amnesty granted to the Nazi small-fry, but the unprincipled appeal for their votes since the franchise was restored to them in 1949. Throughout the entire postwar period, the two major parties—the People's Party and the Socialists—have been so evenly balanced that Nazi and pan-German voters and sympathizers (between 300,000 and 400,000) have been in a position to tip the scales. Thus, in 1949, the late Socialist Minister of the Interior, Oscar Helmer, authorized the founding of the League of Independents to thwart the People's Party's bid for an absolute majority in Parliament. A motley collection of ex-Nazis who appealed to pan-German, anti-Catholic, and anti-Semitic sentiments, the League of Independents received almost half a million votes in the first election it contested. Though the voting strength of its successor, the Austrian Freedom Party, had been halved by the time of the last general elections in March 1966, a new right-wing splinter group, headed by Franz Olah, managed to attract almost 150,000 votes, partly by exploiting anti-Jewish prejudices. Olah's appearance on the political scene, coupled with the internal dissensions among the Socialists, sufficed to cause what is by Austrian standards an "earthquake in politics." By winning four additional seats in Parliament, the People's Party secured an absolute majority, thus terminating the twenty-year-old coalition system.

One need not mourn the death of this rigid coalition system, under which all jobs—from ministers and directors of nationalized companies to theater ushers and cashiers—were neatly distributed between the "Blacks" and the "Reds." It may have provided the necessary political stability for Austria, but at the same time it was responsible for an all-pervasive mood of lethargy and apathy which has had a profound impact on the thinking of the younger generation. Instead of nurturing the impulses to master an ambiguous past, both major parties have appointed or tolerated men in public office whose careers had flourished under the Hitler regime.

Thus the defense counsels of accused war criminals can always score an important point by referring to the eleven ex-Nazis who still hold key positions in the Austrian judiciary system. In making these and other appointments, the leaders of the coalition system paid much less attention to a man's past record than to his present party affiliation. It is, of course, true that some of the ex-Naxi appointees were genuinely repentant. But even if one assumes that all of them have by now been transformed from unscrupulous opportunists into decent citizens of the democratic Second Republic, one must understand that their "rehabilitation" gave aid and comfort to the incorrigibles who subscribed to Nazi doctrines.

These doctrines are sometimes still taught at the universities, as can be seen from the case of the notorious Professor Taras Borodajkewycz, which sparked off Austria's greatest postwar political scandal. Borodajkewycz's pro-Nazi, anti-Austrian, and anti-Semitic utterances were a matter of public knowledge as early as 1956. Nine years elapsed, however, before the Socialists in the Parliament began to demand the dismissal of this shadowy figure who instructed hundreds of students in a racial ideology. Matters came to a head when Catholic and Socialist students joined resistance fighters and Communists in a protest demonstration against Borodajkewycz. The demonstrators were attacked by right-wing students, one of whom inflicted a fatal injury on an old pensioner. The pensioner's funeral provided the occasion for one of the most remarkable and moving anti-Nazi demonstrations seen in Austria since the war, and was attended by most members of the government. Nevertheless, it took another year of massive protests and court verdicts against Borodajkewycz before he was placed "in permanent retirement."

BORODAJKEWYCZ was hard to budge from his position because he enjoyed the protection of the People's Party, which as early as 1949 had used him as a liaison-man for establishing contact with former Nazis. Nor is this the only blot on the record of the People's Party, which has been notorious for exploiting anti-Semitic prejudices on the eve of presidential and parliamentary elections. At an election meeting in 1966, for example, one of the party's leaders in Lower Austria called the Socialist Foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky, a "dirty Jew." Only after the election was over—and won—did the party leadership dissociate itself from this outburst of one of its deputies—who was then chosen as a member of the leading caucus of his party's parliamentary group.

Since the Borodajkewycz affair, the Socialists have waged an uncompromising battle against anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi manifestations, both in Parliament and in their own press. Their credibility would be greater, however, if in 1963 they had not attempted to outflank their coalition partner by threatening to form an alliance with the Freedom Party; they went so far as to subsidize this party to the tune of $40,000, notwithstanding the fact that its chairman had been an officer of the *Waffen SS* and its eight (now six) deputies were well known for their pan-German sympathies. Moreover, the Socialists to this day have failed to purge the ex-Nazis from their own midst.

In short, then, all parties have compromised themselves and thus lost the moral authority to launch an onslaught against the complacency which prevents the Austrians from erasing the

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residues of the Nazi era. Numerically, to be sure, the Nazis are only an insignificant minority in contemporary Austria; most of the twenty-odd crypto-Nazi organizations and groups active today are not even worthy of a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, they could represent a latent threat to Austria in the case of a sudden economic slump or an unexpected—and at present unlikely—political upheaval.

Even now there are areas of Austrian life in which right-wing extremists, abetted by the apathy and indifference of the majority, exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. For example, the events during the Borodajkewycz scandal demonstrated the influence of the extreme right-wing student organization, *Ring Freiheitlicher Studenten* (RFS), which in the student elections early this year increased its share of the vote from 26 per cent to almost 30 per cent. Most of the terrorist outrages in Italy's South Tyrol, where 250,000 German-speaking people live, were committed by members of the RFS. Their attitude toward the Austrian state and their notion of Austrian patriotism can be gleaned from the posters they carried during a recent demonstration in the city of Leoben: "Austrian nation?—No!"

Their thinking betrays the influence of Borodajkewycz as well as teachers like Professor Halfried Pfeifer of Vienna or Assistant Professor Nikolaus von Preradovic of Graz, both of whom make it clear that their loyalty belongs to Germany rather than Austria. They have another source of inspiration in Professor Walter Heinrich, who still requires students to read an old textbook of his studded with references to "the liquidation of dangerous and unproductive races." Of course, most of the professors encountered by RFS members and other Austrian students are not pan-German, let alone pro-Nazi, but their thinking is likely to be staunchly conservative and dangerously provincial.

A second source of potential danger is the *Osterreichischer Turnenbund,* the parent organization of over 250 gymnastic societies with 45,000 members. While most of these members are concerned only with getting physical exercise, they are inevitably influenced by a strongly pan-German and ultra-nationalist leadership which regards the Austrian resistance fighters as "the scum of mankind" and which declares that "It is high time to liquidate the spiritual damages of the occupation . . . when the will of the foreign victors was supreme law." Such statements abound in the official publication of the *Turnenbund,* the *Bundesturnzeitung* (which, however, has a circulation of less than 5,000).

Yet another source of potential danger is the *Kameradschaftsbund,* the Austrian veterans' organization, many of whose functionaries avow that it is their aim to glorify World War II—in which 380,000 Austrians were killed. Here again, many of the rank-and-file members eschew extremist politics; they attend meetings for social reasons. Many of their leaders, however, use every conceivable opportunity to idolize the exploits of the *Wehrmacht* during the war and to slander the allied powers.

The extremist organizations of Austria are in close contact with one another, and with their counterparts in Western Germany. However, they are to be feared not because of any possible conspiracy against the Second Republic, but rather because they contribute to the infection of a public opinion which has traditionally been prone to racial and religious prejudices. The record of the newspapers in combatting this infection leaves something to be desired. Few of them can be accused of racial or pan-German bias, but most of them have failed to rouse their readers out of their indifference toward the more distressing realities of Austria's life. There are, to be sure, some notable exceptions: the *Furche* and the *Volksbote,* Catholic weeklies of high quality and low circulation; the *Kurier,* Austria's largest newspaper; and, since the Borodajkewycz scandal, the *Arbeiter Zeitung,* a Socialist party daily. But the benign influence of these publications is countered by the extremist views of, among others, the *Neue Front,* the organ of the Freedom party, and the *Wiener Montag,* one of Austria's biggest weeklies (circulation 180,000).

The quality of the *Wiener Montag*'s journalism can be judged from an editorial it published in 1966, when a commission of American Jewish organizations visited Austria to investigate the extent of racial prejudice in the country: "If, twenty-one years after the fall of the Third Reich, someone has the cheek to assert that there is anti-Semitism in Austria, then he should also have the courage to ask about its causes. For over two decades, the Austrian people have been officially influenced [by propaganda] in a pacifist, non-nationalistic and pro-Jewish vein. If, after all this, there should in fact be anti-Semitic manifestations in Austria, then these must be a reaction to the immediate present."

BUT THEN, the denial of the facts about anti-Semitism in Austria is not limited to extremist publications. Last year, in an interview given to a network of three hundred American radio stations, Austria's foreign minister, Lujo Toncic-Sorinj declared: "The Americans have a wrong picture if they believe that there is ani-Semitism in Austria. In Austria there is no rising anti-Semitism and hardly any anti-Semitism at all. This has completely disappeared since 1945."

The evidence is to the contrary. Austrian anti-Semitism has survived the virtual disappearance of Austrian Jewry. (Today there are fewer than 11,000 Jews in Austria, constituting less than two-tenths of one per cent of the total population.) On this point an incident which occurred a few

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years ago in the city of Innsbruck in the Tyrol is illuminating. In 1938, three-hundred-fifty Jews lived in the Tyrol; after the war, only fifty. Nevertheless, when the police arrested a young student who had desecrated the city's Jewish cemetery, they found in his possession a "poem" which declared: "The only foe whom it is worthwhile to hate, and even possibly to gas, is the eternal Jew, who today as before cheats the stupid but honest people. . . ."

When the situation calls for it, the anti-Semites feel free to "promote" non-Jews to the status of Jews. For example, during last year's elections anti-Socialist leaflets appeared in lower Austria, accusing "the Jews in the Socialist party of reaching for power." Four Socialist leaders were mentioned; three of them were not Jewish. The Socialists themselves are not immune from this sort of thing. In an opinion survey taken among Socialist functionaries after the expulsion of Franz Olah from the party, 16 per cent of the respondents claimed that Olah had fallen victim to the "intrigues of a Jewish and Marxist clique" within the party. In point of fact, not a single one of his principal adversaries was Jewish.

Austrian politicians are likely to characterize such manifestations of anti-Semitism as "isolated incidents"; they tend always to minimize or conceal the extent of racial and religious prejudice in the country. One of the results of this refusal to face the facts had been, of course, uncertainty about the nature of the facts. The first empirical study of Austrian anti-Semitism was not undertaken until October of last year, when the *Neues Forum*, a monthly publication, surveyed the opinions of twelve-hundred Austrians selected from different age groups, professions, and political allegiances. (The Austrian Ministry of Education subsidized this path-breaking project—to the extent of two-hundred dollars.)

The respondents were asked to check one of five answers to a question about the wartime murder of the Jews. An introductory statement referred to an imaginary debate on the subject in which the participants had discussed "whether the Americans and Russians are justified in reproaching the Germans for their acts against the Jews, when Negroes are suppressed in the U.S. and when there are concentration camps in the Soviet Union." The five possible answers to the question included an unequivocal condemnation of anti-Semitism to the effect that "the massacre of the Jews was the greatest shame of our century." Moderate anti-Semities who did not wish to associate themselves with Nazi crimes were given the chance to respond that "the Russians and the Americans are no better than the Germans," and militant anti-Semites could reply that "the Jews themselves caused their own misfortunes."

The results of this survey, published under the apt title, "The Austrian and His Shame," belied the official statements about the absence of anti-Semitism in Austria. While 39 per cent of the respondents did opt for the first and "democratic" answer, 10 per cent blamed the Jews themselves for the Holocaust, and no less than 26 per cent absolved the Germans by claiming that the Russians and Americans were just as guilty.

It is clear, then, that Austrian anti-Semitism represents a more serious phenomenon than a mere collection of "isolated incidents." At the same time, it is a less dangerous phenomenon than some foreign observers are wont to believe. For one thing, the Catholic Church of Austria, under the leadership of Cardinal Koenig of Vienna, has been above reproach in condemning anti-Semitism: as a result, active Catholics in Austria are more immune to prejudice than the rest of the population. The staunchly liberal and tolerant attitude of the Church hierarchy in a predominantly Catholic country bodes well for the future of Austrian democracy. Then, too, it must be remembered that since the war the advocates of bigotry and extremism have continuously been defeated at the polls.

What remains to be done is to defeat bigotry and extremism in the minds of many Austrians; the task of "psychic" denazification has yet to be completed. There is no danger of the neo-Nazis gaining significant (or serious) political influence in Austria; the danger, rather, is that complacency and indifference will prevent the Austrians from coming to terms with their past and will thus also prevent them from creating a truly new Austria.

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MOVING THE MIKVEH

Sanford J. Ungar

WILKES-BARRE IS a city of some 60,000 inhabitants in an economically depressed area of northeastern Pennsylvania. Earlier in this century, the region's rich deposits of anthracite (hard) coal supported a prosperous mining industry, but by 1961 employment in the mines had been reduced from a high of 67,000 (1926) to a mere 5,500 men. As the market for coal continued to shrink, it seemed that the best thing an unemployed miner could do was to leave town—if he didn't mind pulling up his roots, if he wasn't too old, if there was any other kind of work he could do or learn, and if he had friends or relatives who would help him settle elsewhere. Over the years, thousands of miners did leave, and a kind of despair settled over Wilkes-Barre.

Recently, however, the city has experienced a measure of economic revival: it has managed to attract new industry, including parts of the New York garment industry; and it has ventured upon an ambitious program of urban renewal. Included in the redevelopment project was State Street, a dark alley between the downtown business area and the wholesale produce district. The object here was to raze the city's red-light district. However, not all the shabby buildings on State Street were houses of ill repute; indeed, one of the doomed sites housed Wilkes-Barre's *mikveh,* the ritual bath maintained by the city's Orthodox Jewish community. The relocation of this *mikveh* was to prove more controversial than anyone had anticipated.

ACCORDING TO the *American Jewish Yearbook*, there are 177 public *mikvehs* in the United States. It may seem surprising that one of them should be in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, but the city has an old and thriving Jewish community. German Jews had settled there over a hundred years ago, and a large number of Jewish merchants of East European origin followed the influx of masses of coal miners during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They shared in the growing prosperity of the region, but—not being directly dependent on coal—they were not so hard hit as the miners in the subsequent decline. Thus, few Jews were forced to leave Wilkes-Barre when prosperity waned, and the coming of the garment industry increased their numbers.

At present, there are approximately 5,500 Jews—about 4 per cent of the population—in the Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area. For the most part, their lives follow the model described by John P. Dean for "Jewish participation in the life of middle-sized American communities"—they are conspicuously engaged in commercial enterprises and the professions; they are prosperous; and they frequently hold public office. Virtually every Jewish organization of any national significance has a Wilkes-Barre chapter. Women's service groups are particularly prominent, and at times the announcements of their activities seem to monopolize the social pages of the local newspapers. As Dean has explained about Jewish life in such towns, "strong pressures are brought to bear to belong to Jewish organizations, and strict sanctions operate to maximize financial contributions to Jewish causes." Sorry is the fate of the Wilkes-Barre Jew whose business has flourished but whose contribution to the United Jewish Appeal has fallen below the expectations of the campaign leadership.

This hyper-organization of the Jewish community has not prevented the Jews from being prominent in the community at large. They are among the directors of almost all the local banks; they belong to the city's most prestigious clubs; some of them live in the most exclusive residential areas. Indeed, in *The Status Seekers,* Vance Packard could point to Wilkes-Barre as one of the seven cities in the United States with the best Jewish-Gentile relations.

What is most striking about this Jewish community, however, is neither its social cohesiveness nor its prominence in local affairs, but its high degree of religious affiliation. About 90 per cent of Wilkes-Barre's Jews are members of a synagogue, and about 35 per cent belong to one of the city's Orthodox congregations. An estimated one-third of all families obey the dietary laws and keep three large kosher butcher shops in business. Moreover, the Jewish Community Center—whose counterpart in other cities is usually run according to the tenets of Reform Judaism—is closed on Saturdays, and it too follows the dietary laws. Finally, almost two hundred children attend Wilkes-Barre's United Hebrew Institute, a Hebrew and English day school, the modern equivalent of a traditional *yeshivah*. Admittedly, a number of children attending this school come from Conservative and Reform families who are dissatisfied with the weak public-school systems in the area, but the fact remains that Hebrew education is held in high regard in Wilkes-Barre.

All things considered, then, it is not so surprising that Wilkes-Barre should have a *mikveh*, an institution that is central to traditional Judaism. Its use is explained at length in the Talmud on the basis of the passage in Leviticus 15, which states: "And if a woman have an issue and her issue in her flesh be blood she shall be in her purity seven days; and whosoever touches her shall be unclean until the even." The Bible proceeds to specify the way in which a woman, as well as those to whom her defilement has spread, can cleanse themselves, and these specifications were elaborated—and made stricter—by subsequent rabbinical interpretation. It was Rabbi Akiba who

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finally declared that purification could only be achieved through a ritual bath.

Originally, the purification rites were meant to apply to both men and women—and even inanimate objects—that had become defiled, but over the years the *mikveh* came primarily to be used by Orthodox women once a month, and in connection with conversion ceremonies by both Orthodox and Conservative Jews.

It has been argued that today attendance at a *mikveh* is "the best single measure for determining who is a committed Orthodox Jew."* If this is the case, however, then traditional Judaism is on the wane in Wilkes-Barre, notwithstanding the impressive degree of synagogue affiliation and observance of the dietary laws. The exact number of those who use the *mikveh* in Wilkes-Barre is not known, but it is a very small percentage of the total Jewish population. The leading Orthodox rabbi estimates it at "between thirty and forty people," the Conservative rabbi at "only twenty or so." By any rational estimate, it is less than one per cent of Wilkes-Barre's Jews, so that those who do use it become the object of puzzlement. Thus one Jewish woman who was interviewed about her attitude toward the ritual bath suddenly whispered, "You know, Mrs. ——— down the street goes to the *mikveh*. You'd never have suspected that, would you?"

It is clear, then, that the use of the *mikveh* lies beyond the threshold of traditional observance of the vast majority of Wilkes-Barre's Jews. No one could expect that majority to show much concern for the fate of the doomed *mikveh* on State Street, but among a number of Jews—and Gentiles—subsequent events were to evoke feelings that went considerably beyond the expected indifference.

DETERMINED TO preserve the *mikveh*, the Orthodox leaders set about finding a new site for it. A few years earlier, the above-mentioned United Hebrew Institute had been erected in a residential neighborhood of Kingston, one of the small suburbs of Wilkes-Barre. It now turned out that the small frame house next to the Institute was up for sale, a fact which struck the leaders as a happy coincidence indeed. The house could serve as a home for the elderly couple who maintained the *mikveh*; the backyard provided ample space for a *mikveh*; and there was the additional advantage that it would be near the small Orthodox chapel housed within the Institute.

However, no sooner had the frame house been purchased and the plans for the new *mikveh* announced, than a groundswell of protest arose, both among Jews and Gentiles, and both from the neighborhood where the site was located and the general community. During the fight that ensued, myriad arguments were advanced against relocating the *mikveh* in Kingston, most of them variants of three distinct lines of reasoning.

The substance of the first argument was that, whatever its religious roots and justifications, an institution like a *mikveh*, where women came to undress and bathe in a semi-public facility, simply did not belong in a "nice," middle-class, respectable, heavily Republican neighborhood like Kingston. Some people were afraid of the possible effect of a *mikveh* on property values, and actually made tentative plans to put their homes up for sale. Indeed, in some circles there was talk of selling to Negroes "just to show those Orthodox." But most of those who used the "wrong-neighborhood" argument did so not because of economic motives, or at least would not admit to them. Instead, they were likely to complain that Kingston was the wrong place because the people who used the *mikveh* did not live there. (Sometimes this complaint was even masked as concern for those Orthodox Jews who would now have to travel too far to use the institution.) Thus a Jewish resident of the neighborhood stated, "The people who use it are not part of my community, not part of my culture. It's always been in some rundown part of town, and that's where it should be because some of those people would live near it then."

Others professed to be worried about the children who attended either the United Hebrew Institute or the public school next to it, and would therefore have to pass the *mikveh* building on their way to and from school. Might they not be exposed to unseemly spectacles? As one man said, "You never know what they might see in there."

If the "wrong-neighborhood" argument was employed by both Gentiles and Jews—and the apprehension of some of the latter about the feelings of their Christian neighbors played no small part—a second argument was limited to Jews who seized on the occasion of relocating the *mikveh* to express their general opposition to it. "It's a dying fragment of our culture," they said, "and no longer in keeping with its original intent of cleanliness." Here too, there was much worry about what the "*goyim*" would think. One woman, a resident of Kingston, insisted that the construction of a new *mikveh* would prove an embarrassment to the Jewish community: "It would be a reflection on our sanitary conditions. We all have plumbing, why should anyone have to use a public bath?" Most of the opponents, however, preferred to keep their opposition on a more theoretical level, referring to the need of modernizing Judaism and "keeping up with civilization."

Some of those who wished to abolish the *mikveh* altogether held that the financial burden it imposed on the Jewish community of Wilkes-Barre could not be justified. The *mikveh* had been receiving $1800 annually from the Wyoming Valley Jewish Committee, a representative assembly of all local Jewish organizations and charities. One of the leaders of the opposition now complained that it was "unfair to tax the entire Jewish community for the benefit of seventeen people"—her own authoritative estimate of the number of patrons of the *mikveh*. She was stating publicly what many other Jews, including the most prominent members of the Reform congregation, expressed privately—that the upkeep of the *mikveh* posed a problem of just allocation of community welfare funds.

* Charles S. Liebman, "Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life," in *American Jewish Yearbook 1965*.

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The third argument, and by far the most explosive and emotional one, was directed not against the proposed location of the *mikveh* nor against its perpetuation, but against the couple who had maintained it on State Street, who were now to move to Kingston, and who were considered to be most undesirable neighbors. Survivors of a Nazi concentration camp, they were obviously either unwilling or unable to make the "proper adjustments" to American life. For one thing, they dressed as if they were still living in the East-European ghetto of their birth. The man constantly wore a long black frock coat and wide-brim hat, an outfit that might not seem unusual in Hasidic settlements like Williamsburg but was bound to attract attention in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. What was worse, the couple had a reputation for uncleanliness.

"He doesn't have to wear that Amish costume," stated a woman prominent among the anti-*mikveh* forces, and went on to say, "I saw him walking down the street the other day, and I could tell he needed a ride. But even though I was going in his direction and I might give anyone else a ride, I would be humiliated to have him in my car. I don't know him and I don't want him to know me."

How is one to explain the virulence of the opposition to the elderly couple who ran the *mikveh*? In the United States there is, unfortunately, ample precedent for the hatred that the more assimilated Jews bear toward the less assimilated ones. In the 1880's, for example, there were shrill protests from the German Jews, already comfortably settled, against the arrival of "paupers" from Eastern Europe for whom they did not wish to be responsible. Much like the Jews of Woodenton in Philip Roth's "Eli the Fanatic," some of the Jews of Wilkes-Barre were unable to remain calm when confronting people who reminded them of an older cultural style among Jews. They could not, or did not wish to, understand that the man's black frock coat might represent "all he's got"—as it is explained to Eli Peck in Roth's story—or that by his extreme way of dressing he was pursuing, albeit extremely, a time-honored goal of Judaism: keeping one's distance from the Gentile world. (Before one engages in blanket condemnations, however, one must acknowledge the fact that the couple's plight during the war evoked a good deal of guilt among those opposed to relocating the *mikevh*.)

In seeking to understand the hostility to the *mikveh* and the couple who maintained it, it is important to recognize that the most vocal opponents were long-time residents of Third Avenue, the new site. Indeed, two of the major leaders of the fight had each lived there for about forty years; one of them was a charter member of Ohav Zedek, the very congregation that maintained the *mikveh* on State Street. They were "solid citizens" and thus their words carried great weight both in their neighborhood and in the Jewish community. In fact, it turned out that most of the arguments advanced by the Gentile opponents had been planted in their minds by these and other Jewish opponents of relocation.

To the Jewish residents of Kingston, then, the arrival of the *mikveh* posed a number of threats. The value of their property might decline; their relations with their Christian neighbors might deteriorate; the *mikveh* might bring with it the stigma of the red-light district. But surely their most basic fear was that the outside world would somehow identify them with both the patrons and attendants of the *mikveh*. They were frankly embarrassed by the trouble these "other" and very different Jews were making, so that, despite their anger, they made every effort to keep the dispute from being mentioned in the press, lest their embarrassment increase. Just after the United Hebrew Institute had been built, there had been earlier indications of this kind of anxiety: a number of Kingston Jews had objected to the Orthodox children's wearing skull-caps in public.

The campaign against the new *mikveh* was waged on two fronts. Some Jews attempted to get the Wyoming Valley Jewish Committee to withhold funds from the *mikveh*; and both Jews and Christians mounted an attack by way of the local government, persuading the Kingston Borough Council that the *mikveh* was a commercial bathhouse and thus in violation of zoning ordinances.

On both fronts, the campaign failed. The relocation of the *mikveh* was impressively defended by virtually all the clergymen in Wilkes-Barre, who treated the issue as a test-case for religious freedom in the community and argued for the right of a religious group to purchase property for any religious purpose. And a number of Jews, including a few residents of Kingston's Third Avenue, supported the relocation. Most of them solemnly denied that they might ever think of using the *mikveh*; they fought for the rights of others.

Thus, after heated debate, the Wyoming Valley Jewish Committee did approve the allocation, increased to $2500 a year, and the Orthodox community established a "membership fee" for patrons of the *mikveh*, making it a "private institution" the location of which was approved by the Kingston Zoning Board. And thus the *mikveh*—and its two attendants—finally arrived on Third Avenue with official sanction, but without the cooperation or sympathy of the neighbors, many of whom maintain an undiminished hostility.

Admittedly, some of the fears of these people have been confirmed. The attendants of the *mikveh* are rather unkempt. According to reports, they hang their wash on the bushes in front of their small frame house; they use open buckets instead of regulation cans for garbage; and they commit similar offenses against the taste of the local residents, who watch them closely. As to what goes on inside the *mikveh*, these neighbors know nothing. None of them has been inside, and both Jews and Gentiles among them would be horrified by the suggestion that they enter it.

The *mikveh* has come to Kingston, but it seems destined to remain an island in a hostile sea.

Sanford J. Ungar, *a young writer, is currently studying at the London School of Economics. Mr. Ungar was formerly an editor of the Harvard* Crimson.

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

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AFFAIRS OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. By GORE VIDAL. *Little, Brown. 377 pp. $6.95*

Reviewed by WILFRID SHEED

ANY PANORAMIC NOVEL, like any technicolor epic, is likely to seem trashy these days. The necessary elisions of scene and character have been given a bad name by fifty years or more of junk: historical novels, news magazines, digests, the lot. If the panoramic novel deals with U.S. politics it carries a double burden. For, as every small child knows, our public life has long since been processed, inflated, and simplified to the point of incredibility: so that a book about such gross unrealities as the outbreak of war or the rise of Senator McCarthy is already halfway to a Bible movie.

And then, there is that impossible setting. Washington, D.C. must be the dullest capital city in the world to write about outside of Canberra, Australia. Its social life comes through as a brackish blend of Northern hospitality and Southern vitality, which, combined with the bleached man-of-distinction sets and the notoriously poor quality of the acting, is more than enough to explain the absence of good political novels in this country. Gore Vidal has been accused of creating cardboard characters in this book, but if they were not cardboard, they would be truly unbelievable.

Thus, Vidal has set himself a brutal task: to play Trollope in the land of Alan Drury. He takes us into the stage politician's boudoir—and finds him performing just like a stage politician; he digs below the surface of a typical senator and comes upon nothing but more senator. Unless the whole thing is a terrible mistake, it would seem that the author is in the same bind as the Hollywood novelist: the *more* he tells the truth, the *more* artificial and journalistic he sounds.

For the first couple of hundred pages, the going is just as sticky as you would imagine. Prior to his last book, *Julian*, Vidal had been away from the novel for quite a while, and his style shows it. He seems to have forgotten what you do with the spaces in between the dialogue, and has crammed them with he-looked-at-him-sourly's and she-grinned-at-him-crookedly's plus a catty, worldly-wise commentary which is clearly coming from some place outside the story and punctures any illusion that any of this is really happening.

To make matters slightly worse, he jumps in and out of his characters' heads pretty much *ad lib*: and what he finds there turns out to be remarkably similar. This may be the truth about official Washington, but it only serves to make a flat situation flatter. The good guys and the bad all draw from the same fund of stoic wisdom, Vidal's private stock. It heightens the pulp fiction effect to hear the same point of view expressed four different ways, or rather one way under four different sponsors. It is like three roommates staying in bed while the fourth one wears the suit.

These are serious defects: and yet, if you have the patience to stay with Vidal (several reviewers, I suspect, didn't) you will observe that he turns them in the end to something like advantage. For it seems that pop fiction with all its superficiality and melodrama is not a bad medium for discussing our government. It is part of Vidal's message about Washington that personality does indeed not matter, that situation is everything; government people are ultimately not people at all, but points in space, clustering and separating like atomic particles. Their existence might be defined as pure relationship.

Thus our puzzle at finding so many people motivated by the same brand of cynicism is at least partly cleared up—cynicism is not a motive at all, but a reaction. It is what a rational man feels at the end of the day. The motive is much simpler: you play the game simply because you are on the field. You find the ball in your hands and you run like hell. If you are reflective, you sometimes wonder afterward why you did: but it doesn't matter what you decide about that. The philosophizing is done on your own time.

WHETHER OR NOT this proposition stands up historically, Vidal has written a very plausible story about it. The heart of it, leaving out side orders of adultery, buggery, and incest, goes like this. An elderly senator named Burden Day is prettily conned out of his Presidential ambitions by President Roosevelt, and then methodically chopped down by a young man in his own office, one Clay Overbury: a heartless streamlined new-thing politician zooming down the middle of the road past the old buggies on the right. Abetting Overbury is an evilminded presslord named Blaise Sanford who helps to concoct a wonderful war record for him and to stomp on any loose enemies. (Vidal's feelings about the Kennedy family are all too well known by now, and one looks for parallels here, but the author has been deft: Overbury is not nor has he ever been, altogether, a Kennedy.)

This version squares almost too well with an outsider's paranoid nightmares about our leaders. Wars, depressions, Communist scares are almost as unreal to these men as they are to us. Their only reality is as opportunities for self-advancement. World War II was image-making time. The McCarthy foolishness was a time to settle scores—with a hand over one's own groin of course. And so on. Even dear old Senator Day, the courtly old patsy from another era, has only one serious conviction, and this is more on the lines of a hobby: he believes that the Japanese-Americans got a raw deal during the war. Characteristically, this nearly destroys him politically.

No doubt the history of our times can be explained in these terms, as

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in so many other terms. Vidal gives us a neat parallel to this when he observes that the professional politicians could not tolerate the idea that Eleanor Roosevelt acted out of altruism and only accepted her after they had convinced themselves that she was acting cynically. There may be a touch of this in Mr. Vidal. (After all, it was *possible* to explain Eleanor in those terms.)

But as might be expected, this philosophy of politics by Drew Pearson out of Ayn Rand is harder to establish psychologically. For instance, Clay Overbury is presented as a completely empty man, moved only by a simple power mechanism. But his emptiness is demonstrated simply by leaving things out. In the end, we don't know enough about him to know whether he is really empty or not. It is inconceivable that any man of ability has ever gone around thinking, "I want power"; what he thinks is, "I want this and I want that," and from this we deduce that what he wants is power. Vidal has omitted the concrete symbols of emptiness. To put it another way, a man may be empty in effect, without being so to himself.

Overbury wants nothing at all. He hasn't even a phony dream of the Presidency to keep him going, only a dull upward reflex. All right, one grants the possibility—you about this politician, I about that one—but we must allow *something* in his head besides these Max Lerner abstractions. Overbury is not even permitted to like girls—he only likes his power over girls. If Vidal were writing about a real character, I would call this a vindictive refusal of imagination. Even Kennedys are not that cool. At that, Clay Overbury might be barely acceptable if he were the only frostbitten robot in the book. But his patron Blaise Sanford turns out to be another one. It seems he is backing Clay because of a *fascination with power*. Even the official nice guy, Blaise's son Peter, is frozen solid, although attractively so: he starts a left-wing magazine with neither faith nor enthusiasm. So it goes, down to the sexual arrangements of the minorest characters.

The trouble is built into the author's method. You can't tell where his melancholy aphorisms are coming from half the time, and it really makes no difference. Everyone has arrived at the same plateau of intelligence and inner detachment as the author. Even the men of action speak with a literary man's sense of futility. Not only is their game meaningless, but they are condemned to know it, like so many saints and philosophers. This somehow does not sound right for Washington.

The book would improve enormously if the characters' interiors were removed altogether. Their actions are convincing and so is their dialogue. If the author wants to play Marcus Aurelius to them, he should play it by himself. The characters should be allowed to think that they are accomplishing something, even if Vidal knows better. The game is not interesting if nobody believes in it. And the game as played in this book requires a more specific dedication than his characters seem capable of.

It could be that Vidal's various talents have worked against each other here. He is a playwright, and *Washington, D.C.* would probably make a truthful play. He is also an essayist, and *Washington, D.C.* might even, who knows, make a truthful essay. But a play and an essay put together do not make a novel: the urbane overview of the essayist rings false when foisted onto people-in-action, and the playwright's flower arrangements are bunched too closely for a longish novel. Yet the story is good, the wit is medium-to-good, and there is a nice air of gossipy bustle. And this does sound right for Washington.

HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION. By REMBERT W. PATRICK. *Oxford. 324 pp. $7.50.*

Reviewed by DAVID DONALD

WE KNOW MORE about how quarrels among historians begin than about how they end. The debate over Reconstruction after the American Civil War, for instance, has origins which are easy to discover. Up until a generation ago most historians accepted the standard view of the

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

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period as outlined by William A. Dunning and his students. Everybody knew that this was "The Tragic Era" or "The Age of Hate," during which self-interested Northern Radicals joined with ignorant Negroes, corrupt carpetbaggers, and slimy scalawags to loot the prostrate South. But beginning in the 1930's, new social values produced challenges to this venerable stereotype. Young white Southern rebels, unconvinced that the Dixie of Theodore G. Bilbo and Herman Talmadge was utopia, took a kindlier view of the social and economic legislation of the Reconstruction governments; Negro historians, who had never accepted the Dunning clichés, pointed to the remarkable advances made by the former slaves during their first decade of freedom; and civil-rights advocates found new value in the work and words of Thaddeus Stevens and Wendell Phillips. For the past quarter of a century the Reconstruction period has therefore become, as Bernard A. Weisberger says, "the dark and bloody ground" over which professional historians have fought.

Now it appears that the war is nearly over. The defenders of Claude G. Bowers and E. Merton Coulter have become fewer and fewer. At the same time the volume of revisionist writing on the Reconstruction era has significantly diminished. The publication during the past few years of several general histories of the period hinted that a cease-fire was imminent. Hodding Carter's *The Angry Scar* (1959), a work by a journalist who still used many of the old clichés, was a premature peace effort; so too was John Hope Franklin's *Reconstruction after the Civil War* (1961), which exaggerated the accomplishments of Reconstruction. Kenneth M. Stampp's *The Era of Reconstruction* (1965) was an admirable essay, which may have been, however, too concise and too personal to be widely understood.

Now Rembert W. Patrick's *The Reconstruction of the Nation* appears as a kind of peace treaty to end the war among historians. Detailed and comprehensive, Patrick's book is a careful synthesis of older scholarship and recent revisionist research. Because it does not profess to make major new contributions to our knowledge of the era, and because it does not put forward a strikingly original interpretation of the period, it offers an exceptional opportunity to assess just how much has been gained or lost in the historiographical battle.

Since Professor Patrick's book is virtually certain of acceptance as the standard account of the Reconstruction era for this generation, it is instructive to compare it with William A. Dunning's *Reconstruction: Political and Economic,* which found equal favor when it was published sixty years ago. There are many minor differences, but the most significant change is in the treatment of the Negro. To Dunning and his disciples the Negro was a member of an inferior race, whose admission to the body politic was a mistake and whose acceptance as a social or intellectual equal was unthinkable. Professor Patrick, like other revisionists, believes that all men are created equal and that all citizens have the right to participate in their government. Dunning's hypothesis led him to minimize the accomplishments of the Reconstruction governments in the South and to stress their venality and incompetence; Patrick's reverses the emphasis.

DESPITE SUCH important differences, the most striking thing about the new view of Reconstruction is that it is so much like the old. The chronological limits of the period seem unshakably fixed. Though one might argue that some of the major decisions concerning Reconstruction were taken early in the Civil War, Patrick, like Dunning, begins his story in 1865. Though Patrick includes a final chapter "extending the racial phase of the Reconstruction era to 1900," his story really ends, as did Dunning's, in 1877. For Patrick, like Dunning, "the South provides an almost irresistible theme for the Reconstruction era." He includes other matters, to be sure, such as Northern and Western economic developments, foreign affairs, and an excellent discussion of "The People," but he does so rather grudgingly, with the admission that each such digression "precludes the unity" which he had hoped to attain.

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The intelligentsia and the Party

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In substance, too, the new synthesis of Reconstruction history resembles the old. Revisionist research, it is clear from Patrick's excellent summary, has been largely confined to congressional developments in 1865-67 and to political changes within certain Southern states; the Grant administrations, which covered over half the period, have been little investigated. Moreover, much of the revisionist work of the last decade has served chiefly to cancel out the writings of earlier revisionists. Thus Irwin F. Unger, Robert P. Sharkey, and Stanley Coben have demolished the economic interpretation of the period offered by Charles A. Beard and Louis M. Hacker, and in consequence Patrick is left in a position not far from that of Dunning on questions of currency, banking, and tariffs. Eric L. McKitrick, William R. Brock, and LaWanda and John Cox have destroyed the favorable picture of Andrew Johnson painted by Howard K. Beale and George Fort Milton, so that Patrick's account of the Johnson administration is remarkably like that written by James Ford Rhodes over fifty years ago.

Wherever possible Patrick has sought to assimilate and reconcile both traditional and revisionist thinking. Was the Supreme Court overawed by Congress during Reconstruction? "Friends of Johnson and Southern sympathizers accused the justices of cowardice in bowing to Congress," Patrick writes in the traditional vein—only to add the revisionist touch: "Undoubtedly justices were influenced by public opinion and the election returns, but the Court's power increased during the Reconstruction era." He votes for the traditional belief that "the home-rule troop removal compromise remains the essential ingredient" in the 1877 bargains that ended Reconstruction, but then he makes room for C. Vann Woodward's economic interpretation of the compromise by noting that many forces were at work and "assignment of preeminent importance to any of them awaits the day when some investigator can determine with accuracy the effect of each idea on the vote of individual Southern congressmen." Evaluating the total consequences of the Reconstruction experience for the Negro, Patrick writes that "the 19th-century gifts of . . . citizenship, and suffrage . . . were later revoked in practice" and that even the Negro's freedom was "severely restricted," yet he also argues that the government had taken "major steps toward a better democracy in the United States."

No criticism is here implied of Professor Patrick's work, for caution verging upon equivocation is what one expects in a standard work of synthesis, which is acceptable precisely because it reconciles so many divergent viewpoints. Still, one cannot help regretting that so little seems to have been accomplished by the long historiographical warfare, which now seems to be ending, not with a bang but a whimper. After all the provocative pronouncements, after all the bibliographical articles, after all the stirring confrontations at historical conventions, our view of this segment of the American past turns out to be remarkably like that of our predecessors but with the moral values reversed. If the story teaches a lesson, perhaps it is that during the past generation students of Reconstruction have spent too much of their time assailing each other and too little in doing research. The intellectual cannibalism so widely practiced by historians seems better designed to promote individual professors than historical knowledge.

THE INCOMPLEAT NOVELIST

EUSTACE CHISHOLM AND THE WORKS. By JAMES PURDY. *Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 241 pp. $5.95.*

Reviewed by WARREN COFFEY

JAMES PURDY was born in Ohio in 1923. His parents separated when he was quite young, and as a result he attended schools in a goodly number of Ohio towns while being shuttled back and forth among relatives. These Ohio towns would later become the terrain of many of his short stories and of a novel, *The Nephew*. Not surprisingly, in all of his books Purdy has written about boys without fathers: Malcolm, in *Malcolm*, Cliff in *The Nephew*, Fenton Riddleway in the best of all his books,

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63: Dream Palace, Cabot Wright in *Cabot Wright Begins,* and in the book at hand, Amos Ratcliffe and Daniel Haws.

Purdy attended tht University of Chicago and the University of Puebla in Mexico and later did graduate work at Chicago and at the University of Madrid. He then taught for four years at Lawrence College in Wisconsin before leaving in 1953 to write full-time. In 1956, angered by his inability to find an American publisher for his work, Purdy had some of his stories, most notably the novella *63: Dream Palace,* privately printed. British reviewers and critics were so enthusiastic—Purdy has generally done better with critics and with fellow writers than with the common reader—that a British edition was quickly issued, and an American one, from an embarrassed New Directions, which had earlier rejected the manuscript, followed in 1957.

Among British critics, the late Dame Edith Sitwell was a particular champion of Purdy's writing, asserting roundly and with characteristic generosity that he would become "one of the greatest writers produced in America during the last hundred years." This is going very high, I think, for reasons I will discuss later. But in any event, since the reception accorded the publication of his first stories, the way has been quite a bit smoother for Purdy. He has had two Guggenheim grants and one from the Ford Foundation, and he has lectured at Yale and had his unpublished manuscripts collected there. He has published *Malcolm* (1959), of all his books the most even and the funniest, but also slick and faddish and best described, I believe, by a slick and faddish epithet, *campy.* Purdy has also written *The Nephew* (1960), a novel, and *Children is All* (1962), a collection of short stories and playlets—two books of which it is only possible to say that they go on for a total of 393 pages of what may or may not have been intended as a terrible revenge on the publishing industry. The stories, with the exception of "Daddy Wolf," are of a surpassing dullness, and of *The Nephew* all I can remember is a lot of old women sitting on porches and saying to each other "no juice if you please. I've drunk so much orangeade today I have a sour stomach." What these books show is the astonishing Ohio flatness that Purdy falls into when he writes in a straight realistic mode about ordinary small town people, as though the correct way to treat the dullness of life in Zanesville were to write a dull book. Purdy knows better than that, of course, but the point seems to be that he does his best work when he gets away from small towns and ordinary people and writes instead about people whose specialness, usually of a sexual variety, leads them into Gothic or surrealist terrain that matches and objectifies their agonized states of soul.

IT IS JUST such a Gothic atmosphere that pervades *63: Dream Palace,* and hovers in the Spanish moss and Mississippi forest of the last part of *Eustace Chisholm and the Works.* Purdy in this vein is closer to Southern writers like Truman Capote and Tennessee Williams than to any of his fellow mid-Westerners. Like the former, he uses the Gothic as a function of what he sees and the way he sees it; it is connected with his view that the "rationalism and liberalism" of our age has yielded a "simple-minded definition of human nature." Purdy's strongest work, I think it fair to say, is written in this Gothic or Surrealist mode. The plot of *Cabot Wright Begins,* for instance, a novel about a Yale-man rapist with upwards of 300 victims, has the funniest comedy and the sharpest satire Purdy has yet managed. In this book Purdy pops away smartly not only at certain epiphenomena of the publishing industry (the *New Yorker, Gooey and Girly, Your Rarebit is Running*) but at an entire society, and with great exuberance and brilliance of invective. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere Purdy has serious trouble with his plot, and despite the book's obvious merits one formed the suspicion after *Cabot Wright Begins* that he was not about to become the major novelist Dame Edith Sitwell had predicted.

Eustace Chisholm and the Works confirms that suspicion. It has a

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good novella under a lot of fat, but it's not a novel. Purdy simply cannot write novels, and when he tries to stretch out a novella, as he does here, the result can be very heavy going indeed. The book is about an aspiring writer in Depression days in Chicago. He has an ex-wife named Carla and lives with a salesman named Clayton Harms. Chisholm functions in the book mainly as a *raisonneur* who watches and comments on the love that grows up between Amos ("Rat") Ratcliffe and Daniel Haws. Amos is young, clever, and handsome, and studies Greek at the University of Chicago. Haws is older, an almost illiterate ex-coal-miner from downstate who falls in love with Ratcliffe but can't speak of that love or even acknowledge it to himself except by sleep-walking into the boy's room every night in the boarding house where they both live. Ratcliffe goes sour because of his unhappy love of Haws and starts selling himself around. Haws runs away and enlists in the army because he can't acknowledge to himself that he loves Ratcliffe. At appropriate intervals Eustace Chisholm comments that "the whole U.S.A. is nothing but Daniels and Amoses whispering and muttering . . . in the fallen darkness," a somewhat strained and matey thesis to begin with, it seems to me, and one not much recommended by Purdy's heavy management of it. Eustace goes around nailing things down in the Freudian way: Ratcliffe, we learn, had been abandoned by his father and slept with his mother, and Haws's father had died leaving the boy to function as son-husband in the household.

As the novel progresses, the characters become more like dossiers than people. Purdy carries this mistake even further with Maureen O'Dell, the main woman character, who is an alcoholic nymphomaniac. Maureen O'Dell's mother had (1) "withheld any knowledge of the human body from her," (2) "had refused to toilet-train her," and (3) "at her first discharge of menstrual blood had been more dismayed than her daughter, and had steadfastly sworn she did not know what the bleeding meant or what to do

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about it." Eventually we get everything but her Stanford-Binet and her undergraduate transcript. This is Purdy at his most inept, writing like a particularly keen group leader.

THE BOOK doesn't get any better until the last section, "Under Earth's Deepest Stream," when it breaks with this method entirely and starts working in the Gothic mode to say something about how terrible and beautiful life can be beyond positivist or rationalist categories of any kind. Trite as it may sound when described in this way, the sequence has considerable power, and for a simple reason: Purdy is working here with matter that nobody has conceptualized for him. Instead of treating his characters as analysands, Purdy tells us about the end of Daniel Haws in an army camp in Mississippi where a functionary named Captain Stadger almost literally carves him into pieces in a manic love-hate relationship that hasn't made its way into the textbooks yet but that becomes by Purdy's narrative powers ominously real. This section has the strongest writing in the book; it offers intense and brilliant flashes of the lives of desperate and crazed people—the kind of writing that characterizes Purdy at his best. But brilliant as they are, the flashes come too late to save the book.

Behind Purdy's trouble with the size and structure of the novel lies, if I am right, petulance. He has never forgiven his boyhood, or the Ohio towns, or the Depression, or any of the dark and terrible wounds he doubtless received when young. Accordingly, his books come to resemble a wheelchair careening in ever-narrowing circles, always returning to the theme of the lost childhood. In *Cabot Wright Begins* it appeared briefly as though Purdy might break this circle, widen his range, and transform the petulance into satire. But it hasn't worked out that way and in *Eustace Chisholm and the Works*, Purdy is back at lost children again. There is something essentially soft about this stubborn petulance, and in the attitude toward the rest of the world which it entails. It has prevented Purdy from introducing into his

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books a larger range of characters, or a larger chunk of the real world, and hence his lost children are never seen in their proper relation to reality. Unless Purdy succeeds in resolving his own sense of petulant deprivation, I would bet against his ever writing a genuine novel.

ADVISING THE COURT

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 1966. Edited by PHILIP B. KURLAND, *University of Chicago. 400 pp. $8.95*

Reviewed by
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW was launched in 1960 by Professor Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School in an attempt to satisfy three objectives: to fill the need for "sustained, disinterested, and competent criticism of the professional qualities of the Court's opinions"; to serve as a bridge between law and political science in studying the Supreme Court as an institution; and to provide a forum to which educated laymen could turn for guidance on the work of the Court. It was not at all clear why a new publication was needed to serve the first of these objectives, since there were already in existence dozens of law reviews, each busily soliciting articles from bench, bar, and academic community and having a difficult time of it. Nevertheless, Kurland succeeded in establishing his *Review* as somehow special—in part because it was in hard covers and published annually, in part because it was entirely a faculty product (unlike the law reviews, which are edited by students), but most importantly because he has been able to attract contributors of exceptional ability.

The *Review* has unquestionably gone a long way toward satisfying the first objective. Most of the pieces in this volume represent professional criticism of a very high order. It has been less successful, however, with the second and third. As a result, for non-lawyers, there is some risk that the articles will seem to illustrate what has become a favorite sport for com-

"Senator Robert F. Kennedy confronted the leaders of the nation's building trades unions in a Senate committee room today and told them that their efforts to open union ranks to Negroes had failed..."



This uncompromising opening to a *New York Times* article of April 18, 1967, quoted the Senator as predicting a new round of race riots in the cities this summer. "One of the reasons," he said, "is that Negroes and members of minorities are having difficulty finding employment. They feel bitter, frustrated, estranged from our society — from business, Government, and labor organization."

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mentators on the Supreme Court —finding the opinions loosely reasoned, their premises insufficiently articulated, the precedents inadequately reconciled. C. Peter Magrath criticizes the Court for its fumblings in the search for a definition of obscenity, Alexander Bickel for its weakly reasoned opinions in three cases dealing with voting rights, and Jerold Israel for its failure to discuss the nature of the state's interest in loyalty oaths. The criticisms are often deserved but they tend to be in-group in tone. In the article on obscenity, for example, Magrath does a splendid job of marshaling the cases and developing the ambiguities inherent in the new law on obscenity—in words like "community" and "prurient interest" and "hard-core pornography." In doing so, he demonstrates that the Court's reach may be greater than its capacity to deal with problems and ends of conceded importance.

It is, of course, in just such instances that professional criticism is most significant. Its passion for analytical rigor and for close justification is essential if the Court is to keep its moorings in what must ultimately be the source of its power—articulated reason sensitively attuned to the long-range ideals of the society. But yet even Magrath's piece, which is very good, is somewhat lacking in historical and social perspective. He gives too little weight to the fact that the Court has been dealing with obscenity for little more than a decade, that obscenity is only one among a large number of serious problems which have been waiting for solution for too long a time, and that it takes far more than a decade to build case law appropriate to so many areas. As a result, what may be transitional problems of definition tend to be presented as if they spelled an historic failure of the Court.

The real heart of the professional criticism of the Court is less with the quality of the Court's opinion than with the sweep and intensity of its ambitions. This Court, and lawyers generally, have been loosed by the legal realist movement from the feeling that legal change must occur in a slow and sensitive relationship to mores

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and values which are only half-known. Seeing law as a force capable of shaping men and institutions to an almost unlimited extent, they have taken on tasks of unparalleled magnitude—in civil rights, in education, in reapportionment, and in criminal procedure. And they have done so through doctrines which are national in reach, setting standards for all fifty states, and legislative in scope and purpose, fixing very broad norms and leaving to subsequent litigation the clarification and development of those norms.

FOR A COURT as adventurous as this one, what is most needed from the critics is a body of writing which does not begin and end with case-weaving but which joins issue with the Court on its own terms, divining the major themes which are often only implicit in each case and exploring in detail the larger issues. Israel's piece on loyalty oaths, for example, closes with the observation that the Court's decisions point toward the elimination of loyalty oaths while at the same time validating administrative loyalty programs which are directed toward persons in strategic occupations. He suggests, in little more than a sentence, that what the Court permits may be more of an evil than what it prohibits. This may well be the most important observation in the article. But it is tossed off, almost as an aside, at the end of so long a discussion of the cases as to leave no time to explore it.

Paulsen's piece on the juvenile court is somewhat better on this count, but it too shares the defect. After discussing in a generally approving manner the Court's extension of counsel to the juvenile court, he notes that it may not really be "a great leap forward," that real advances can come only if there is an "adequately staffed, well trained probation service." He does not, however, trace for us the effect "legalization" may have upon the great bulk of children handled by the juvenile court—whether, for example, officials who previously regarded themselves as "helping" the child will not feel themselves obligated to move to an adversary posture. Nor does he

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let us know that we should be quite skeptical of what probation officers can do with offenders in the present state of knowledge.

The pieces in this volume, and legal writing generally, are far better at pointing out the limitations and inadequacies of what has been said by the Court than at providing a large enough framework to channel and direct the Court's efforts. They tend to mask behind their "professional" criticism deep concerns about the capacity of the Court to deal so quickly with so many of society's profoundest questions. As they talk about the need for a precise definition of obscenity, for example, one senses that the real question is whether law has a role to play at all in setting the "moral tone" of the society and, if it does not, whether removal of legal controls should turn on whether there are other institutions capable of doing that job. Yet concerns of this sort are not made explicit, perhaps because they are too complex to suit a mode of analysis tied more to cases than to social processes.

What the Court—and the bar and behavioral scientists and the public—need is a body of commentary which is not case-provoked and case-bound, which opens the law's work to the society—so that its behavioral assumptions can be examined and its impact assessed. For law as an instrument of social control is being pressed to its limits. Those limits cannot even begin to be fixed unless lawyers are able to stand apart from their institutions and processes and make plain to others which jobs courts can do and which they cannot, or should not, do. And the larger the Court's reach, the greater the need for it to be understood and appraised by a larger constituency than the lawyers themselves.

The pieces in this volume do not fill the need directly, but they provide an indispensable base for moving to Kurland's second and third objectives. In the articles already mentioned and in the articles by Mansfield on self-incrimination and by Kitch on patents, we have careful analyses of major problems, each pointing to the larger questions but not pursuing them as far as they deserve. All

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things considered, therefore, this volume is a law review of unusually high quality, but focused on the Supreme Court and leavened at the beginning by a brief tribute to Felix Frankfurter, beautifully written by Archibald MacLeish, and at the end by William Leuchtenberg's absorbing vignette on Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. If the need were not for more, this would of course be quite enough.

THE JEWISH VOGUE

THE CHOSEN. By CHAIM POTOK. *Simon and Shuster. 284 pp. $4.95.*
THE 28TH DAY OF ELUL. By RICHARD M. ELMAN. *Scribners. 279 pp. $4.95.*
THOU WORM JACOB. By MARK MIRSKY. *Macmillan. 213 pp. $4.95.*

Reviewed by BARUCH HOCHMAN

THERE ARE A number of factors responsible for the school of American-Jewish fiction that has emerged in recent decades. A bookish generation, sprung from the people of the Book, came of age, and it had the old compulsion to make books, and the language and the skill with which to make them. With the writers came the readers; we have seen the emergence of a self-conscious Jewish reading public, avid to see itself mirrored in print. More than anything, there is a premium on ethnicity in our culture: everyone wants to hear about everyone else, and the more vivid the color, the greater the payoff.

But there has also been a real need to come to grips with the "Jewish experience," and the questions of tradition and identity which it entails. The forms and impulses of our tradition—albeit shattered and enfeebled—continue to haunt us, but provide no clear means of assessing or of integrating them. In the absence of other sources we tend to look to our novelists both for a diagnosis of the past and for prophecies of the future.

But to do so is to face recurrent disillusionment. Every generation has not only its backlog of experience, but also a limited set of vital issues. Those writers, now in their forties and fifties, who have made

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their mark with works of specifically Jewish interest, have done so essentially from a position of disaffiliation. Saul Bellow "writes Jewish" not because he is engaged with questions of public interest, but because he happens to be a Jew and happens to be committed to a kind of writing in which what one happens to be is of cardinal interest. So with Herbert Gold. And although Bernard Malamud "writes Jewish" in a more self-conscious, more literarily committed way, this is largely a matter both of artifice and of private myth-making.

Now, one might expect another generation to emerge, rooted in the ideology of the cultural pluralism that has characterized American life in recent decades, and hence more closely attuned to the interests and issues of the communities with which they are identified. Such a generation would be less anarchically individualistic than its predecessor and more thoroughly engaged with the issues that vex the community at large. It could, presumably, offer a new sort of insight into the conditions of ethnicity in general and of Judaism in particular today.

Such a generation of writers has indeed emerged. But although its members do engage with large public issues and particular social backgrounds, their work tends to suffer from a lack of imaginative and intellectual vigor; it is seldom adequate to the issues which it raises and attempts to confront.

THREE RECENT novels, by writers in their twenties and thirties, epitomize the difficulty. All three take on potentially large questions—nothing less than the ultimate viability of Jewish survival—and all approach these questions out of an apparent rapport with the experience involved. *The Chosen,* by Chaim Potok, is set among the Orthodox Jews of Williamsburg during the 40's and is concerned with the problem of transmitting the traditions of that seemingly doomed community. Richard M. Elman's *The 28th Day of Elul* confronts the Holocaust; in telling the story of a family's response to the threat of deportation to Auschwitz, the novel implicitly raises all those questions of heroism and cowardice that were aired in the controversy about Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* And Mark Mirsky's *Thou Worm Jacob,* in evoking the condition of a set of superannuated public Jews in Boston's old ghetto, renders the oddity and desperation of old-timers who have nothing to cling to but the forms of their discourse and the creaking pieties of an eviscerated tradition. What is curious—and ultimately disappointing—about these novels is that all three touch on public issues, but all three turn on essentially private preoccupations; rarely does any of them attain the vision and objectivity needed to deal with its manifest concerns.

The Chosen portrays the lives of two boys, one the son of a Hasidic rabbi, the other of a "scientific" Talmudic scholar, who clash on a baseball field. Charged with hatred at the outset, the boys nevertheless proceed to become fast friends. Reuven Malter, son of the secularist scholar, slowly comes to understand the pressure his friend Daniel is under—the pressure of his father's authoritarian distance and remoteness, and the tug of secular studies, with which this young heir to a Hasidic dynasty is infatuated. The novel rises to a climax on the eve of the Israeli War of Liberation, as tension mounts between Hasidic anti-Zionists, inspired by Daniel's father, and rationalist Zionists. Daniel finds himself faced with the choice between graduate school and the vocation his father has destined him for. Ironically, Daniel chooses graduate school and psychology, whereas Reuven, the secularist, opts for the rabbinate. In the crisis of generations and cultures, the son of a rationalist, who has come to love the tradition because he has been reared in love, chooses to sustain it; the son of the mystic, reared in silence and seeming hatred, turns toward secular science.

Fathers and sons dominate the action of *The Chosen.* Like many contemporary writers, Mr. Potok has turned with a vengeance from the old bogeys of Momism to the problems and anxieties surrounding a spiritually absconded paternity; from the vexed question of relations between the sexes to the cruxes of relations between men. He has, in fact, written a psychological thriller, playing out the friendship between two boys against the machinations of a seemingly villainous father: Reb Saunders, who has reared his son Daniel in brutal silence, and who presides over his life and destiny like a tyrannical god. Reb Saunders only seems tyrannical, however. We learn in the end that the silence which Daniel has suffered has been imposed for the sake of his salvation, to save him from the pride with which his intellectual gifts might have threatened him. Far from being distant and hostile, Reb Saunders is seen in his way to be close and loving.

It is in fact Potok's handling of this culminating vision of sudden wholeness and compatibility which makes *The Chosen* what it is: a novel written in the psychological optative, a wish-fulfillment fairy tale which concludes with the familiar, sugary projection of desiderated relationships and a not altogether convincing justification of the ways of fathers with their sons. There is no reason that things should not have been as Mr. Potok describes them, but one feels that on the whole they would not have been and in fact were not that way. In a sense, Mr. Potok's two intentions cancel each other out: on the one hand, a psychological exploration that could have made a telling case in point has been sacrificed to a mass of local color; on the other, a potentially authentic genre novel has been undermined by the private psychological games of the author. On the face of it, we have rationalism and mysticism and the conflict of the generations in a changing culture; in fact, we have a rather slick projection of fantasy, colorfully decked out for all our pleasures.

AN ANALOGOUS difficulty besets Richard M. Elman's *The 28th Day of Elul,* a far more ambitious novel and one that poses very real, very public questions, only to obscure them in a cloud of erotic irrelevance. Mr. Elman convincingly captures the guilt and torment of a particular Holocaust survivor—his crabbed sense of physical and psychic frailty, his scatological hat-

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

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*David Daiches, COMMENTARY, September 1965

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

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red of bodily functions, his irascible response to people and weather—and he makes his protagonist's boyhood milieu live vividly. But the point of this novel lies elsewhere.

Shandor Yagodah, now a 42-year-old resident of an Israeli *moshav,* has been asked to bear witness to the fact that he is a practicing Jew in order to inherit money from an American uncle. Outraged by the demand, and haunted by the shame and guilt of his experience during the war, he writes a long memoir to explain the absurdity of the request. He recalls the days immediately preceding the deportation of the Jews from his peaceful Transylvanian village; his account unmasks his bourgeois father as a self-deluded fool who could not face the ineluctable facts, yet successfully conveys the pathos, and even the inevitability, of that particular form of escapism. As the memoir unfolds, it transpires that Lilo, Shandor's cousin, fiancee, and lover, was sacrificed by Shandor's father to Miklos, a resentful gypsy boy, half-satyr, half storm-trooper, in order to save the Yagodah family on the eve of deportation. Shandor tells this story in order to suggest the ambiguities and complexities of the European situation, to illustrate the contention that even in a crisis, men do not ordinarily transcend their habitual ways of being and thinking, that when all else is stripped away a man will equivocate, temporize, and finally betray to save his bare flesh and the dreams and delusions that inhabit it.

Like Potok's Williamsburg, Elman's Clig is solidly rendered; but his characters, like Potok's, are unconvincing. Again, what we are told has happened might well have happened, but its significant inwardness eludes us. The trouble is partly in Elman's melodramatic gypsies. Almost Gothic in quality, they lurk on the edge of the Yagodahs' world, a virtually allegorical representation of the sinister aspects of the Jews' relations to their neighbors and—in Shandor's homoerotic bond to Miklos—of the ambivalence of that relationship. There is something about these gypsies that is uncomfortably reminiscent of the village idiocy in novels like William Styron's *Set this House on Fire.*

But worse than Elman's handling of the gypsies is the crude and gratuitous keying up in this novel of erotic violence that seems rooted neither in the characters nor in the situation. It is difficult to get from the bewildered Shandor of the Clig episodes to the tormented man who writes about them years later, and it is hard to swallow the simplistic invocation of his beautiful, simple Lilo of the early years. This is, to be sure, not a matter of abstract logic; by extrapolation, one *can* make sense of the experience which made the boy we have come to know the man who is telling us about him. But there is no sense here of the continuity of that experience, or of its inevitability; hence Elman can provide no fresh perspective from which to view the experience he attempts to illuminate. He leaves us with the uneasy feeling that he has merely indulged a predilection for the scatological and the perversely erotic. The heroic effort implied by the need to confront the Holocaust is undercut by the obtrusion of an irrelevant set of private obsessions decked out in available literary clichés. One wishes he had settled his turgid, hackneyed, erotic hash elsewhere, before turning to such urgent business.

THOU WORM JACOB, which is hardly more than a sophisticated piece of ethnic smut, suffers from none of the dividedness and unevenness of the other two novels. It is wholly of a piece, and very apt in its management of its materials; if Potok and Elman lack vehicles to objectify their vision, Mark Mirsky has his vehicle ready made. He is absolutely secure in his public and in his stereotypes, and his manipulation of them is fresh and vivid.

Thou Worm Jacob is one of those rollicking tales, highly stylized and peppered with whimsy, that assumes familiarity with the Jewish immigrant world and proceeds to take every liberty with its possibilities. Its subject: a ramble by several survivors of the old Jewish neighborhood in Boston who are beached among the scenes and habits of their past. Its characters

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are lean, hungry old men who crave past glory and grieve over present misery. They are public functionaries who have lost their public, professional men of the spirit who have no spirituality to profess. Their first action is to con two fat old ladies into letting them gorge on fat *fliegels* of barbecued turkey and tangy tidbits of commercial herring. They join forces with Druckman the Dreckman *(sic!)*, who nods along behind his jangled knacker's nag. Together, they take an "apocalyptic" ride over clogged Blue Hill Avenue traffic, landing in time to be collared by a comic old *shammes* (sexton) to round out his *minyan* (quorum). The missing tenth in their company is Druckman's old nag: the *shammes* notes that the horse has been circumcised. The tale ends with the horse's head sticking through a window of the basement synagogue.

This final touch is both hilarious and obscene. Reminiscent of the conclusion of Maurice Sendak's *Very Far Away*, it suggests, by pointed contrast, the real affinities of the tale. *Thou Worm Jacob* has been discussed both as a parody of a certain kind of dialect joke and as a parable for the times. It really is neither—neither a takeoff on the vulgarity of cheap bar-mitzvah entertainment nor a disquisition on a vulgarized and eviscerated tradition. It is, rather, that bar-mitzvah entertainment itself, with a touch of idyllic grotesqueness and a big dose of gratuitous cruelty.

Something childish and brutal informs this novel. It reminds one of those sketches of fat ladies and bumptious men made in one's boyhood, or the cruelty of one's adolescent correspondence from the borscht belt. Indeed, the gratuitousness of its hilarities is almost a virtue—almost, but not quite. In the end, it says nothing one cares to hear. The bumps and turns of its hilarity are finally exhausting, like the persistence of an indefatigable gagman. And for all the occasional brilliance of the writing, it rarely rises above the level of those hideous Kosher Chinese cookbooks that are written in Molly-Goldberg Yiddish.

IF THERE are any morals to be drawn from a reading of such novels as these, one is that neither piety nor security in one's public is a source of strength in contemporary fiction. Another is that we have possibly come to ask more from literature than it is likely, in the ordinary run of things, to deliver. We flatter ourselves—and the entire enterprise of current fiction—when we think of the novel as a ground of radical self-confrontation. At its best, of course, it may be that—and more; at its worst, it is a field on which we project our fears and wishes, but which offers little hope of bringing these emotions to heel. In the middle ground, occupied by these three books, we—and our novel-making alter-egos—muddle along, gripped by pieties or tickled by petulance, happy to tell over what we already know, fallaciously thinking it enlightenment.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

WILFRID SHEED, *a new contributor, is the regular movie critic of* Esquire *and the author of* Office Politics.

DAVID DONALD *is director of the Institute of Southern History at the Johns Hopkins University.*

WARREN COFFEY, *a frequent contributor, teaches English at the University of San Francisco.*

ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN *is professor of law at Yale.*

BARUCH HOCHMAN *contributed "Agnon's Quest" to the December 1966* COMMENTARY.

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Did you know that the Bar Mitzvah ceremony is unknown in the Bible and Talmud? (see page 57) That Judaism frowns on celibacy? (see page 81) That the mystical Kabbalah has doctrines in common with Hinduism? (see page 33



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Here is the contrast between Jewish and Christian viewpoints on sex and marriage, body and soul (flesh isn't "evil" in Judaism; see page 365). All the multitudinous sects and rites of Judaism through four millennia are included... Ashkenazi and Sephardi... Orthodox, Conservative and Reform... the priestly Sadducees and their rabbinical rivals, the Pharisees (whose philosophy pervades the New Testament that denounces them)... The Qumran Community, where the Dead Sea Scrolls were written by Jews who awaited not just one Messiah but two. Here are the hidden Jews who lived for centuries in Persia disguised as Moslems and in Portugal and Majorca disguised as Catholics... the dancing Hasidim, who still wear the formal costume of medieval Polish noblemen. Do you know what makes kosher wine kosher? See page 115. Does Judaism permit therapeutic abortion? See page 4.

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

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

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